




PROSPERITY OR CRISIS? EXAMINING THE EFFICACY OF BRITISH 







Tammy L. Baerg 
 












THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 




















The Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003 significantly altered the conditions 
for holding major forest tenure agreements in British Columbia. The goal of this forest policy 
was to allow the forest industry to become globally competitive. This thesis asks whether or 
not this goal was successful and what trade-offs were incurred as a result. Using the Prince 
George Timber Supply Area as a case study, mixed methods of inquiry were employed. This 
study examines changes throughout the forest industry over a fifteen-year period. In this case, 
the forest industry became globally competitive. But, significant consolidation within the 
forest industry occurred. Moreover, while the timber harvest increased and processing 
became centralized, the forest industry’s overall contribution to the provincial economy 
declined significantly. This thesis demonstrates that the government remains committed to 
supporting the current forest industry. However, the aforementioned revitalization legislation 
may have lasting negative repercussions for the provincial forest economy. 
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  Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
I have been interested in British Columbia forest policy since 1994, when the 
province was on the cusp of introducing legislation that promised to revolutionize forest 
practices in British Columbia. This legislation was the Forest Practices Code Act 1995. It 
was an exciting time. Other experts, like biologists, hydrologists, ecologists, and geotechnical 
engineers, were making significant contributions to the development of best management 
practices for the complex forest ecosystems that make up British Columbia. Less than ten 
years later, this revolutionary, but costly forest practices code was scrapped for a results-
based regime brought to life by the Forest and Range Practices Act 2004. Prior to the Forest 
and Range Practices Act, the government repealed numerous policies in the Forest Act 1996 
through the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 200, to support and revitalize a struggling 
forest industry. With these most recent legislative shifts in forest policy, beginning in 2003, it 
has been my observation that there is a pervasive silence surrounding the direction that forest 
policy has taken and continues to take, which I find fascinating. 
Although the current economic forecast for the British Columbia forest sector is for 
stability (Bennett, 2016), there is a timber supply crisis unfolding in areas that were hardest 
hit by the mountain pine beetle. This crisis, in turn, is prompting a new round of legislative 
changes (FLNRO, 2012a). As well, spruce bark beetle populations are on the rise in the 
Prince George Timber Supply Area and other parts of the province (Westfall & Ebata, 2014). 
It has been estimated that 108,472 hectares of spruce have already been attacked by the 
spruce bark beetle in the northern half of the Prince George District and lower third of the 
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Fort. St. James District. Given the location of the outbreak, it is likely that it falls within the 
timber harvesting land base1 (THLB) (Westfall & Ebata, 2014).  This latest bark beetle 
outbreak comes in the wake of the mountain pine beetle epidemic. Spruce and species other 
than lodgepole pine are expected to be the major contributors to the mid-term timber supply 
(Snetsinger, 2011). Yet, the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations, in 
its most recent service plan, declared its support for the forest industry and revealed its 
strategy to provide jobs and economic growth, where the stated goal of government is to: 
“[…] maximize the short and mid-term timber supply to support forest sector employment 
and industry sustainability […]” (FLNRO, 2016a, p. 5). 
1.2. Purpose of the Research 
In 2003, the Liberal government made legislative changes in order to accommodate 
the provincial government’s economic strategy for revitalizing the forest sector, and building 
prosperity for British Columbia (MOF, 2003a). Although these policies were intended to 
provide the forest industry with greater flexibility, which in turn was to benefit the citizens of 
British Columbia (MOF, 2003a), these benefits have yet to be realized. The changes to forest 
policies made in 2003 could not guard against the externally driven perturbations that 
influence the boom and bust cycles of the lumber markets (Hoberg, 2010; Zhang, 2007). 
Furthermore, these policies protected and benefited large corporations, which account for the 
bulk of the forest industry, more than they did forest-dependent communities.  
The aforementioned legislative changes were made to the Forest Act 1996 via the 
Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003. Among other things, Bill 29 repealed Section 
14 (f) of the Forest Act 1996, which required holders of forest licences to maintain a timber 
                                                 
1 “The timber harvesting land base (THLB) is the area of productive forest land available for timber 
harvesting” (Snetsinger, 2011, p. 10). 
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processing facility in the region where timber was harvested (Bill 29, 2003). Presently, there 
is concern about a rapidly declining timber supply in areas that have been hard hit by the 
mountain pine beetle and what that will mean to both the forest sector and the economies that 
depend upon it (ABCFP, 2011). The removal of the appurtenancy clause has generated fear 
in forest-dependent communities that forest corporations, via their job-producing processing 
facilities, will no longer be tied to the regions from which they extract timber (Hoberg, 2010).  
The removal of appurtenancy was only one in a suite of legislative changes designed 
to revitalize a struggling forest industry (Hoberg, 2010). Other changes permitted forest 
corporations to consolidate and subdivide forest licences, and gave them the ability to 
transfer agreements (Bill 29, 2003). These changes further strengthened the property rights of 
forest corporations on British Columbia’s public lands and makes compensation for breach of 
these rights less likely on the part of the provincial government (Luckert, Haley & Hoberg, 
2011). However, they did not trigger the mass dumping of assets, in the form of sawmills, as 
some observers worried. Rather, the new rules facilitated further restructuring within the 
sawmilling sector, allowing it to remain viable.   
Though change is a constant factor in the resource sector, the pace and scale with 
which it is occurring in north-central British Columbia is increasing. The alarming reality is 
that resource extraction and export is happening at an unprecedented pace (Burda & Gale, 
1998) in the midst of externally driven, market related perturbations that are also increasing 
in both frequency and severity (Halseth, Markey, Reimer & Manson, 2010). In the Northern 
Interior forest region of British Columbia, the timber resource is becoming depleted (FLNRO, 
2012a). It also appears that there has been a lack of diversification within forest dependent 
communities (Horne, 2009). Innis (1933) argued that Canada was locked into a staples 
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economy and that its pathway was determined by its absolute dependence upon its natural 
resources, which is still true for British Columbia (Bowles, Lytle & Paterson, 2002; Hayter, 
2000; Markey, Halseth & Manson, 2008). Freudenburg (1992) explains that commodity 
driven economies are extremely vulnerable in a globalized economy. Nonetheless, the 
government of British Columbia continues to look to other resources to exploit and replace 
timber as the province’s primary commodity and revenue generator (EMNG, 2013).  
1.3. Research Questions 
The Northern Interior forest region of British Columbia is facing a timber supply 
crisis. Though this crisis was inevitable, its arrival was accelerated by the devastation caused 
by the mountain pine beetle epidemic (Snetsinger, 2011). Proper mitigation of this timber 
supply crisis is vital given that the area hardest hit exists in some of the most forest 
dependent regions in British Columbia’s interior. This crisis provides an opportunity and 
context to demonstrate how forest corporations have adapted their business, in terms of 
where they process the timber they cut, as a result of the relaxed regulations brought in by the 
Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003 and to critically evaluate long standing 
harvesting, revenue generation, and timber allocation decisions that continue to dominate 
British Columbia forest policy.     
This thesis will argue that while the government’s relaxation of restrictive 
legislation and promotion of a good business environment has assisted forest corporations 
and facilitated the temporary survival of the forest industry, the adoption of neoliberal 
economic theory into the context of the British Columbia forest industry has not strengthened 
British Columbia and brought prosperity. Rather, the application of this theory has weakened 
the forest economy as a whole by perpetuating the status quo of the timber supply being 
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controlled by forest corporations. Further, though the assistance to strengthen the forest 
industry has resulted in a more stable forest economy, this forest economy contributes a 
much smaller share than it once did in the provincial economy. At the same time, the people 
of British Columbia have not received fair compensation for the publically owned timber that 
drives this forest economy. Finally, this thesis will argue that the long term viability of a 
forest industry in British Columbia will likely require a more radical shift in forest policy, 
which could include a different arrangement of forest tenures.   
My research examines the policy changes of the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment 
Act 2003, invoked by the Liberal government, that were aimed at revitalizing the forest 
industry. Although little has changed over time with regards to British Columbia’s core forest 
policies (Haley & Nelson, 2007; Pearse, 2001; Rayner, Howlett, Wilson, Cashore & Hoberg, 
2001), I suspect that the context and driving forces which shape forest policies have changed. 
It is the complexity of forest policy that warranted a holistic approach to this research. Such 
an approach not only examines the internal and external forces that drive government policy, 
but uncovers the interconnection between policy choices made and the impacts of those 
policies on both the intended and unintended targets. For these policy changes in question, 
the intended target is the forest industry and the unintended targets are the environment and 
human communities. My data collection was guided by my research questions, which are as 
follows:  
1) What was the context that motivated government to make the 2003 forest policy 
changes? 
 Were these forest policies already in place in other jurisdictions, or were they 
unique to British Columbia? 
 What was occurring globally at the time that may have influenced this specific 
direction? 
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 Were potential negative outcomes for the environment and/or human 
communities considered? If so, what were the mitigation strategies? 
 Were these changes related to the recent change in government, from the NDP 
(political left) to the Liberals (political right)? 
 
2) How have forest corporations responded to the 2003 policy changes over time?  
 Has the number and distributions of sawmills and fibre flow changed over time? 
 Did these changes in forest policy help industry? If so, in what ways? 
 Did the forest industry participate in the formulation of the policies? 
 
 
To answer these questions regarding the forest industry, I collected and analysed 
data regarding timber harvesting, sawmill distribution, lumber markets, as well as 
employment and economic trends. The data that I collected was restricted in both time and 
space. The time frame in which data was collected was limited to the period between 1997 
and 2011. The focal point on the British Columbia landscape was the Prince George Timber 
Supply Area. Next, I conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants who were 
involved in the forest industry within the Prince George Timber Supply Area between 1997 
and 2011, and who had specific knowledge regarding the various stages of the forestry policy 
formation that came into being under the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003. The 
purpose of the interviews was to solicit their explanations as to the findings of my secondary 
research of official records and documents.   
The remaining structure of this thesis begins with Chapter 2, where I lay a 
foundation of historical background of forest policy and provide context by discussing how 
forest dependent communities in northern British Columbia and neoliberal ideology are 
related to forest policy. This discussion will be followed by a review of the literature in 
Chapter 3 where I situate my research by discussing the changing dynamics of forest policy 
and the forest industry in British Columbia. Next, in Chapter 4, I present the methodology 
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and methods I used to answer my research questions and discuss the ethical considerations I 
had in undertaking this research, my choice of using a case study as my research design, my 
use of a mixed methods approach to collect data, and my methods of data analysis.  
In Chapter 5, I present the results of my research which provide evidence as to how 
the rationalization of the forest industry unfolded and its impact on employment, where 
timber was harvested and processed, how much revenue the Crown received for the timber, 
and what people connected to the forest industry had to say about these topics and the events 
surrounding the legislative changes to forest policy in 2003. In Chapter 6, I discuss the 
findings of my research and how they answer the research questions. Finally, I conclude the 
thesis in Chapter 7 by suggesting possible forest policy pathways for British Columbia, 
discussing the limitations of my research, and making recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2:  Background and Context 
2.1. Introduction 
To understand the present state of the forest industry in the Northern Interior forest 
region of British Columbia it is important to discuss aspects of British Columbia forest policy, 
forest dependence in relationship to the communities situated there (Bowles et al., 2002; 
Markey et al., 2008; Power, 2006; Waggener, 1977), and the relatively recent shift to a 
neoliberal political ideology in British Columbia (Summerville, 2010; Young, 2008). All of 
these topics underpin both the historical and lived realities of communities located within the 
Northern Interior forest region and are useful for understanding the significance of the shifts 
that have occurred within this forest industry. Moreover, to understand the changes made to 
legislation in 2003 by the Forest (Revitalization ) Amendment Act 2003 (Bill 29) it is helpful 
to provide the context in which the forest industry was working in British Columbia prior to 
2003 and the conditions which may have led the government to make these policy choices. It 
is also useful to discuss the events that followed the changes brought in by Bill 29 because 
they provide the context for this research.  
2.2. Background   
British Columbia has been described as a unique forest jurisdiction in that 95% of its 
land base is public land (Luckert et al., 2011). Thus, because the majority of the land base is 
public land, when the expansion of the forest industry and the conservation of the resource 
are juxtaposed, the governments of British Columbia have historically, with a few exceptions, 
ensured that ownership of land remained with the Crown (Clark 1985; Marchak, 1983). 
Given that the majority of timber harvested in the province is from public land, and that 
rights to Crown timber are allocated through a variety of timber tenures, discussion of forest 
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policy regarding how timber has been allocated historically is warranted. While it is evident 
that the evolutions of several key forest policies surrounding Crown timber, its disposition, 
its regulation, and its price, have strongly influenced the development of British Columbia’s 
forest economy (Hayter, 2000; Marchak, 1983), changes made to forest policy have emerged 
from the midst of conflict as private firms benefit from utilizing a public resource (Hayter, 
2000; Hoberg, 2001; Howlett, 2001; Marchak, 1983). For better or worse, changes made to 
forest policy have served the purpose of the time (Clark, 1985).  
The formation of a timber tenure system in British Columbia was undertaken as a 
means of timber allocation, but the underlying goal was to create favourable economic 
conditions that would promote and support a forest industry (Howlett, 2001). The forest 
industry was supported by making the timber supply available to investors (Howlett, 2001). 
Though the number and types of timber tenures have expanded over time, the initial goal 
remains unchanged (Howlett, 2001). British Columbia was successful in attracting many 
multinational forestry corporations, with large amounts of external capital (Drushka, 1999); 
these players obtained the largest forms of timber tenures available (Drushka, 1999; Hoberg, 
2000), the forest licence and the tree farm licence (Howlett, 2001). In 1996, 82% of the 
provincial allowable annual cut (AAC) came from tree farm licences and forest licences 
(Hoberg, 2000). The control over the provincial timber supply is not a recent development; 
rather, its roots go back to the beginning, when the alliance between government and private 
sector firms in the forest industry was forged (Howlett, 2001; Marchak, 1983).  
From a forest management standpoint, the history in British Columbia can be 
divided broadly into the unregulated (1858-1945) and regulated (1945 to present) periods. 
That is not to say that there were no regulations pertaining to forest management in during 
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the unregulated period, rather, that regulations were sparse and, more importantly, that timber 
rights were less secure. Between 1858 and 1865, the only way to access timber in British 
Columbia was to purchase the land on which it grew (Clark, 1985). In 1865, the government 
made changes in policy which enabled it to lease the rights to Crown timber (Clark, 1985). 
Leasing rights allowed the government to retain ownership of the land while simultaneously 
encouraging a timber manufacturing sector (Clark, 1985). Interestingly, in order to obtain 
these rights the lessee had, “to own and operate a sawmill” (Clark, 1985, p. 5).  
By 1905, under the leadership of Premier Richard McBride, British Columbia was 
desperate for revenue and began to sell off timber rights for a pittance (Clark, 1985). 
Coincidently, the broad relaxation/removal of regulation occurred at the same time that the 
conservation movement was gaining significant momentum in the United States (Howlett, 
2001). An unprecedented wave of timber speculation followed and subsequent concentration 
of amassed holdings (Howlett, 2001) because these special licences were renewable and 
transferable (Clark, 1985). The era of timber speculation ended in December of 1907 and 
sparked the first Royal Commission, led by F.J. Fulton (Clark, 1985). Though this policy had 
generated substantial revenue for the province, Clark (1985) contends that it also set the tone 
for the management of the forest resource.  
Forest policy in British Columbia further developed through the recommendations 
and findings of several Royal Commissions, which were used by government as a means of 
both engaging and educating the public (Clark, 1985). The first Royal Commission was 
headed up by F.J. Fulton in 1910 and can be credited for the formation of the Forest Act of 
1912 (Howlett, 2001). The templates for volume and area based timber tenures stem from the 
Royal Commission on Forestry led by Chief Justice Sloan in 1945 (Howlett, 2001). One of 
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the outcomes of the Sloan Royal Commission of 1945 was the creation of the Private and 
Public Working Circles (Hayter, 2000). The Private and Public Working Circles, essentially 
management units, were the foundational structures for timber administration that were 
intended to bring both public and privately held timber rights under sustained yield forest 
management (Pearse, 1976).  
In order to bring privately owned rights to timber into the sustained yield model, 
compensation had to be given by the provincial government to the holders of these rights. 
Membership into the Private Working Circle was offered to those who held Crown land 
grants and timber leases (Pearse, 1976). In exchange for agreeing to regulate the harvest over 
the privately held area, the government offered additional Crown land which would be 
amalgamated with the existing private holdings into one area based licence (Clark, 1985). So, 
the Private Working Circle consisted of these area based licences, which are now known as 
tree farm licences (TFL) (Clark, 1985). The Public Working Circle consisted of the 
remaining Crown timber land base and was administered by government (Pearse, 1976). 
From the Public Working Circle management unit, timber was allocated through volume 
based licences (Clark, 1985), the largest of which is known today a forest licence (FL). The 
Public Working Circle was later divided up into Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYU), which 
then became the Timber Supply Areas (TSA) (Clark, 1985). 
The Private Working Circle licenses afforded their holders tremendous property 
rights, which they could leverage as assets (Howlett, 2001). The government then gave 
preferential treatment in awarding the volume based licences in the Public Working Circles 
to those who had mills or secondary manufacturing, which enabled many of the players in the 
Private Working Circles to gain a foothold in the Public Working Circles (Clark, 1985). Thus, 
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those who controlled the Private Working Circles quickly gained control of the Public 
Working Circles (Clark, 1985). 
The management regime of sustained yield, introduced by the Sloan Royal 
Commission, was seen as a means of managing the timber supply (Marchak, 1983; Prudham, 
2007). Sustained yield was also instituted to provide government with revenue, industry with 
timber, and communities with jobs (Prudham, 2007; Rayner, 2001). The normal forest is the 
underlying concept of sustained yield, which is the systematic conversion of primary forests, 
which are uneven-aged old growth, to even-aged ones (Zhang & Pearse, 2011). The strategy 
is to divide up the known timber supply, either by volume or area, over a projected time span 
of growth (at least 80 years in British Columbia) and harvest at a rate that liquidates the 
virgin forests over the allotted time (Zhang & Pearse, 2011). In the case of British Columbia, 
the timber supply is given out by volume and tracked on an annual basis, and the annual 
allotment of it is known as the allowable annual cut (AAC) (Rayner, 2001). 
One of the downsides of the strategy of sustained yield is that the total volume 
available in the harvest of virgin forests is far greater than what will be available in the 
subsequent harvests from regenerated forests (Zhang & Pearse, 2011). The volume difference 
between the initial and subsequent harvest is so large, it has been given the term ‘fall down’ 
(Zhang & Pearse, 2011). Another problem is that by employing a sustained rate of harvest 
there will also be a gap in available timber supply between the period when the old growth 
supply is exhausted, and the subsequent growth becomes available (Zhang & Pearse, 2011). 
The mid-term timber supply refers to the time period that follows once the old growth 
(natural and original timber) has been liquidated, but before plantations (second growth) are 
mature. Subsequently, the amount of timber available during this period is scarce. In British 
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Columbia, we have been approaching the fall down since the mid-1990s (Rayner, 2001). 
Although the recent mountain pine beetle epidemic has pushed the central interior of the 
province to this point (MOF, 2003b), the magnitude of the drop is much larger than anyone 
anticipated and there is not much chance of mitigating the impacts to the timber supply given 
almost all of the mature lodgepole pine, a significant contributor to the timber supply, is now 
dead (Westfall & Ebata, 2010).  
The development and expansion of British Columbia in the post war period was in 
large part due to the social-economic beliefs of the government led by W. A. C. Bennett 
(Bowels, Lytle & Paterson, 2002; Markey et al., 2008; Summerville, 2010; Wedley, 1990). 
The focus then was on creating an inviting investment environment for industries, which in 
turn would both establish and bring stability to communities (Bowles et al., 2002). W. A. C. 
Bennett was able to draw investment to the province by creating infrastructure, generating 
hydro-power, and establishing appurtenancy as part of the Forest Act (Markey et al., 2008; 
Summerville, 2010). The appurtenancy clause was a formal agreement between the 
Provincial government and forest companies where, in exchange for timber rights, forest 
companies holding major volume based forest tenures were to maintain timber processing 
facilities near to the origin of timber harvesting ; further, it is considered by many as a social 
contract, designed to bring stability and growth to forest resource dependent communities in 
British Columbia (Haley & Nelson, 2007; Luckert et al., 2011; Jackson & Curry, 2002).  
In northern British Columbia the majority of communities are small, and many of 
them are largely dependent upon, what Harold Innis (1933) described as staples economies. 
Sustained yield and the appurtenancy clause were established during the era of province 
building (Wedley, 1990) and understood then as a critical factor in promoting community 
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stability, and subsequently increased dependence on the forest resource (Power, 2006; 
Waggener, 1977). That these economies are becoming increasingly threatened in the context 
of the global economy makes the stability issue extremely important for people who live and 
work in northern British Columbia (Markey et al., 2008). The economic dependence of 
northern British Columbia communities upon natural resources is a well described and 
established phenomenon and is seen as a barrier to economic diversification (Bowles et al., 
2002). Additional barriers include lack of finances, lack of infrastructure, conflict within the 
community, capacity within the community, lack of human capital, social cohesion and 
inclusion (Ryser & Halseth, 2010).   
A function of the sustained yield timber supply regime was that it was supposed to 
insulate forest dependent communities from the instability of the forest product market 
business cycle over the long run (Zhang & Pearse, 2011). However, attempting to control a 
market that is driven by demand by controlling supply does not work (Zhang & Pearse, 2011).  
For example, between 1997 and 2008, a number of events occurred that had a negative 
impact on British Columbia’s lumber market. They were: the Asian economic crisis (Hoberg, 
2010); the rise in value of the Canadian dollar (Hoberg, 2010); the expiry of the Softwood 
Lumber Agreement with the United States (Zhang, 2007); the downturn, and subsequent 
crisis in the United States housing market (Hoberg, 2010); and, the general instability of 
national economies globally (Luckert et al., 2011). Further, volatile fluctuations in lumber 
markets have been shown to have negative impacts on forest sector employment, sometimes 
within as little time as two months (Byron, 1978). Add to these market issues the increasing 
global nature of the markets and the influencing sway of neoliberal ideology, and you have a 
seedbed for change in forest policy.  
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In British Columbia, the pressure of globalization and the dominant tenets of 
neoliberal ideology have been influencing the direction of government policies since the 
1980s (Summerville, 2010). In its most basic definition, neoliberalism is an ideology that is 
based in free market economics (Summerville, 2010), which is a stark departure from the 
Keynesian economic model that dominated the post-war era in British Columbia (Hayter, 
2000). One of the primary tenets of neoliberalism is that market freedom and greater 
prosperity are constrained needlessly by government subsidies, regulations, social policies, 
and general bureaucratic interference (Harvey, 2005; Summerville, 2010). The rise of 
neoliberal ideology is a phenomenon that can be seen globally (Harvey, 2005; Humphreys, 
2009). Notable leaders who helped usher in neoliberal ideology are Margaret Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom in 1979, Ronald Reagan in the United States in 1980 (Harvey, 2005; Savoie, 
1994), David Lange in New Zealand in 1984 (Roche, 1990), and Brian Mulroney in Canada 
in 1984 (Graefe, 2002; Savoie, 1994). While neoliberal ideology guided the dominant politics 
in the aforementioned jurisdictions, exactly how neoliberal agendas played out and to what 
extent varied dramatically in each country (Harvey, 2005) and even within Provincial 
jurisdictions of Canada (Graefe, 2002).  
The advancement of neoliberalism in Canada can be described as gradual, through 
the neoliberal agenda of fiscalization (Graefe, 2002). The term fiscalization: “refers to 
periods when financial concerns, especially considerations of expenditure restraint and deficit 
reduction, dominate deliberations on setting public policy priorities and contemplating social 
reforms” (Rice & Prince in Graefe 2002, p. 20). The neoliberal agenda was advanced amidst 
the pressure of globalisation and an economic recession via the empowerment of the 
Department of Finance in Canada’s provinces (Graefe, 2002). He also notes that there is a 
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lack of distinction between political parties, as fiscalization was applied in different 
provinces under the leadership of differing political parties. For example, these fiscalization 
policies were applied in Saskatchewan by Grant Devine (Conservative 1982-1991), in 
Ontario by Bob Rae (NDP 1990-1995), in Quebec by Robert Bourassa (Liberal 1985-1994), 
and in New Brunswick by Frank McKenna (Liberal 1987-1997) (Graefe 2002). In his study 
of provincial jurisdictions in Canada, Graefe (2002) notes that neoliberalism has been applied 
unevenly because the form and the extent to which different governments have adopted the 
ideology has varied.     
Harvey’s (2005) work on neoliberalism is based on the premise that 
neoliberalization is a “political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation 
and to restore the power of economic elites” (p. 19). With respect to class, Harvey (2005) 
explains that, “[w]hile neoliberalization may have been about the restoration of class power, 
it has not necessarily meant the restoration of economic power to the same people” (p. 31). 
Harvey (2005) uncovers its origin to be with the Mont Pelerin Society, whose ideology had 
its roots within liberal ideals, such as personal freedom, but with “adherence to those free 
market principals of neoclassical economics” (p. 20). Members of the Mont Pelerin Society 
included some of the most renowned economists of the 20th century including, Ludwig von 
Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman (Harvey, 2005). However, as Harvey (2005) 
points out, contradictions within the neoliberal position are many. In fact, neoclassical 
economics and liberal ideals are frequently diametrically opposed (Harvey, 2005). Therefore, 
he warns to take heed of, “the tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual 
pragmatics of neoliberalization” (Harvey, 2005, p. 21). Harvey (2005) says that while 
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neoliberalization has not been very effective in increasing global capital accumulation, it has 
been widely effective in either restoring or creating economic elite power.   
2.3. Context  
In 1997 the forest industry was struggling under the complex and expensive 
environmental regulatory regime of the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995, 
a quota system that regulated the flow of softwood lumber exports into the United States, and 
the unprecedented high level of stumpage charged for timber, known as super-stumpage that 
was rendered to the Crown (Grafton, Lynch & Nelson, 1998; Hayter, 2000). Earlier, in 1987, 
a new means for calculating stumpage was adopted by the province to appease the authors of 
a memorandum of understanding with the United States. This new method was known as 
comparative value pricing (CVP), which was essentially an ad valorem tax2 which was 
calculated using the market selling price of lumber and did not account for logging expenses 
(Grafton et al., 1998).  
Later in 1994, under an NDP government, the system was revised to increase the ad 
valorem at a higher rate as the market selling price of lumber increased, which was known as 
super-stumpage (Grafton et al., 1998). Meanwhile, the policies and regulatory regime created 
by the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995 significantly increased the cost to 
harvest timber and over time eroded the ability of companies to respond effectively to 
changes in market conditions (Hayter, 2000; Pearse, 2001). However, by 1997 the Asian 
economic crisis had negatively impacted companies like MacMillan Bloedel that primarily 
exported lumber to Japan. These companies suddenly found themselves without a market and 
insufficient quota to ship their product into the United States (Pearse, 2001; Zhang, 2007). 
                                                 
2 An ad valorem tax is a tax that is based on value. For example, municipal property taxes are based on real 
estate values (Klemperer, 1996, p.279).   
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There was recognition by the provincial government that the forest industry was in trouble 
and it began to institute changes to help streamline the costly regime created by the Forest 
Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995 (MOF, 1998). However, these changes were 
deemed insufficient by the Council of Forest Industries (COFI), which published its own 
ideas for improving the forest industry. The central theme of this document was that the 
forest industry needed to be globally competitive (COFI, 1999).  
The NDP, who were in government at the time, took note of the suggestions made 
by the forest industry and in 1999/2000 began the shift towards a more results-based model 
of forest practices than the prescriptive regime of the Forest Practices Code of British 
Columbia Act 1995. The new model was to be tested using five pilot projects (MOF, 2000). 
Further, the government was also beginning to explore a market-based pricing system that 
would generate stumpage values, knowing that stumpage values would be a critical factor for 
negotiating a new softwood lumber agreement with the United States (MOF, 2000). Despite 
the government’s efforts to relieve forest companies of the excessive and costly regulatory 
requirements, it would not alter its course in the way it collected stumpage (Pearse, 2001). 
Hence, companies struggled to balance the high cost of production with their softwood 
lumber quotas amid declining lumber prices in the United States (Pearse, 2001). All the while, 
the British Columbia forest industry faced an overall increase in competition from other 
timber producing regions (MOF, 2000). 
Market conditions for the forest sector continued to worsen through 2000 and into 
2001, and to make matters worse, the Softwood Lumber Agreement expired on March 31, 
2001 (MOF, 2001b). By April, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports in the United States 
had filed a petition with the Department of Commerce to investigate countervailing duties 
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and anti-dumping claiming that British Columbia lumber manufacturers received subsidies 
through stumpage collection and the prevention of log exports, and that lumber was dumped 
onto the market in the United States below cost (MOF, 2001b). The situation with the United 
States had become critical for the British Columbia forest industry, and while the provincial 
government tried to assist the federal government with negotiations, several forest 
corporations engaged in litigation with the United States (Zhang, 2007).  
In May of 2001 the BC Liberal Party was elected with a resounding majority. British 
Columbia was poised to embark into a “New Era,” in which the road to prosperity was 
guided by three pillars: fiscal responsibility; free enterprise; and, equality of opportunity and 
responsibility (BC Liberal Party, 2001). Meanwhile, in the lodgepole pine forests of British 
Columbia the largest mountain pine beetle (Dendroctonus ponderosae) epidemic in history 
(Westfall, 2001) began to seriously threaten the timber supply and the economies dependent 
upon it (MOF, 2003b). As the beetle infestation began to expand across much of the Northern 
Interior Plateau, government, the forest industry, and communities worked together to form 
strategies for managing the spread and damage caused by the epidemic (FLNRO, 2012b). As 
the epidemic progressed, these strategies shifted from mitigation of damage and spread to 
capturing losses (FLNRO, 2012b).   
The new government set to work on its mandate to assist the forest industry by 
giving it the flexibility to transform itself and become more competitive (MOF, 2002b). The 
government focused on changing the regulatory environment, such as moving to a market-
based pricing system for calculating stumpage and changing forest practices to a results-
based, rather than a prescriptive-based regime (MOF, 2002b). However, these changes took 
time so the forest industry and the government had to endure the market restrictions and 
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retaliations imposed by the United States (Hamilton, 2001). Still, the focus of the government 
remained steadfast: to reduce government influence over the business decisions made by the 
forest industry. Reducing government influence over the business decisions of the forest 
industry was the driving ideological force behind the impetus for legislative change (Hayter 
& Barnes, 2012; Hoberg, 2010).  
Amidst the first strategies for managing the epidemic were concerns about the 
regulatory and operational constraints that would prevent effective containment of the beetle 
spread (MOF, 2001a). Government paid considerable attention to policies that would enable 
the forest industry to maximize the harvest of beetle infested lodgepole pine by temporarily 
increasing the allowable annual cuts (AACs), repealing constrictive regulations, and 
subsequently directing the harvest to timber supply blocks considered to be the most heavily 
infested (MOF, 2003b). Increasing the availability of timber for harvest was one challenge, 
having the incentive to harvest was quite another. There were perceived limitations for 
processing, which included the milling capacity of industry (FLNRO, 2012b), adverse market 
conditions, and the constraints of the Softwood Lumber Agreement with the United States 
(FLNRO, 2012b; Zhang, 2007). One response by government was to change forest policy so 
that the industry could be more flexible in its response to market signals (MOF, 2003a).  
The most recent wave of changes to forest policy began in 2003 with the enactment 
of the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act, where major changes to the Forest Act 1996 
were made in order to accommodate the provincial government’s economic strategy for 
revitalization of the forest sector (MOF, 2003a). These changes were part of the Liberal 
government’s quest for prosperity; for example, Bill 29 – 2003, the Forest (Revitalization) 
Amendment Act 2003 repealed Section 14 (f) of the Forest Act 1982, which required holders 
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of forest licences to maintain a timber processing facility in the region where timber was 
harvested.  Legislative changes continued in 2004 with the Forests and Range Practices Act 
(FRPA). Considered by industry as overly regulated and unduly prescriptive, the Forest 
Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995 was slowly phased out in favour of the new 
results-based forest and range practices regime (MOF, 2002a).  
Despite the changes made to forest policy, by 2008 a severe downturn in the forest 
economy was experienced throughout British Columbia (BC). During the fervor of an 
accelerated harvest of beetle killed pine in the northern and central interior, the BC lumber 
manufacturing industry suffered severe blows to its lumber markets via the ongoing 
Softwood Lumber dispute with the United States, from 2001 to 2004 (Zhang, 2007), a drastic 
drop in housing starts in the United States in 2005, the rise in value of the Canadian dollar in 
2007, and the housing market crisis in the United States in 2008 (Hoberg, 2010). By 2008, 
sawmills throughout British Columbia began to close, some temporarily and some 
permanently (Hamilton, 2008), which threatened the very existence of many communities 
(Martin, 2013). The temporary loss of BC’s largest lumber importer prompted the provincial 
government to pursue Chinese lumber markets more aggressively (MFR, 2008a). These 
inroads made by government into China assisted the forest industry by providing markets so 
that mills remained viable (Bowles & MacPhail, 2016; FLNRO, 2012b).  
In February of 2012 a report was released by the Auditor General of British 
Columbia criticizing the lack of timber stewardship by the Ministry of Forests, Lands and 
Natural Resource Operations (AGBC, 2012). In May, a Special Committee on Timber 
Supply was formed and they toured the communities in the Northern Interior forest region of 
the province seeking input from citizens and stakeholders alike. This committee released its 
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report in August, in which it made numerous recommendations in relation to the mid-term 
timber supply crisis (SCTS, 2012). This report was followed in October by a response from 
the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations (FLNRO) that addressed a 
number of the Special Committee’s recommendations to the Legislative Assembly. The 
FLNRO responded by saying:  
 that they will conduct a review of sensitive areas in terms of potentially 
expanding the timber harvesting land base; 
 that they will investigate the use of intensive silviculture practices as a means of 
growing more fibre; 
 and, that they will create legislation that would enable the conversion of volume 
based forest licences into area based tree farm licences (FLNRO, 2012a). 
 
Provincially, it is estimated that approximately 800,000 hectares of timber was 
damaged by the mountain pine beetle in 2001; the current cumulative estimate, observed in 
2011, is a staggering 18.1 million hectares of timber damaged by the mountain pine beetle, 
which is still expanding north (FLNRO, 2012b). In the wake of the devastation caused by the 
mountain pine beetle, and the large scale salvage harvesting that has followed, is a landscape 
that has changed. The patchwork of clearcut areas, plantations, and mature timber has been 
replaced by extensive clearcut areas and remnant stands of rapidly decaying lodgepole pine 
(FLNRO, 2012a). Throughout this landscape are numerous communities, that are a part of 
this geography and which have been, and will continue to be, impacted by these agents of 
change (FLNRO, 2012a; Parkins & MacKendrick, 2007; Patriquin, Wellstead & White, 
2007). Unlike older communities located in the southern reaches of British Columbia, these 
communities were established during the province building era and, as such, were 
purposefully linked to the forest economy (Bowles et al., 2002; Markey et al., 2008). 
Consequently, the majority of communities in the northern interior of British Columbia 
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remain highly dependent upon the forest economy (Halseth et al., 2010; Horne, 2009). The 
forested landscape has changed and all of the things that depend on it, from people and 
communities to flora and fauna, have been forced to adapt.  
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 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction 
The forest industry has long been an economically important sector for British 
Columbia (Hayter, 2000; Marchak, 1993). Not only is the industrialized forest sector 
important, but so are the forest policies that govern it, as they have the capacity to impact 
aspects of the province’s natural environment and its human communities (Burda & Gale, 
1998; Markey et al., 2008). It is understandable then why major forest policy developments 
of recent decades, such as the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995, the 
Forest and Range Practices Act 2004, and to some degree the Forest (Revitalization) 
Amendment Act 2003, have drawn research interest from a diverse group of scholars, from 
disciplines ranging from biology to sociology.  
While the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995, and the Forest and 
Range Practices Act 2004 were/are about the regulation of forest operational and 
management practices, the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003 brought about 
changes to the conditions by which private firms must abide in order to acquire and/or 
maintain long term rights to harvest public timber. The focus of my research concerns how 
the forest industry responded to the specific forest policy changes brought about by the 
Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003. I approached my research from the 
understanding that forest management involves complex interactions between natural 
ecosystems and human systems and as such requires insight from the disciplines of both the 
natural and social sciences.  
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In my broad survey of the literature regarding forest policy and the forest industry in 
British Columbia, I focused specifically on the literature that spoke to change dynamics in 
forest policy and the forest industry. This literature draws primarily from four disciplines: 
political science; economics; sociology; and geography. Scholars from these disciplines have 
sought to understand the dynamics of forest policy change as well as change dynamics within 
the forest industry using a variety of theories, which are rooted in their specific disciplinary 
ontologies. Despite the disciplinary focus, at least two separate but related paradoxical 
observations continued to surface in this literature, in one form or another. The first 
ambiguity described in the literature is that despite various changes in forest policy, business 
carries on as usual. The second is that certain forest policies persist though they have been 
shown not to be achieving their intended goals. It is the pursuit to understand these 
contradictions surrounding British Columbia forest policy that makes this literature important 
to my research.  
The literature of change dynamics in forest policy and the forest industry lends itself 
to understanding the unique nature of the British Columbia forest sector as well as 
identifying potential factors that have influenced the dynamics of change within it over the 
past several decades. I will begin by discussing what scholars have looked at in terms of 
forest policy change. This discussion will be followed by a review of the various responses of 
the forest industry to changes in forest policies in. Finally, I will discuss what scholars have 
identified as enduring forest policy legacies.  
3.2. Forest Policy Change in British Columbia   
 Forest policy in British Columbia has traditionally been studied by scholars within 
the social science disciplines of political science and economics (Lindquist & Wellstead, 
 26 
2001). Policy as it is used in this research is defined as, “the regulation of how, when, and 
where” (Hessing, Howlett & Summerville, 2014, p. 3). Broadly speaking, policies can be 
developed by any organization or group, however, for this inquiry the regulations are 
developed by the provincial government (Hessing et al., 2014). Lindquist and Wellstead 
(2001) contend that prior to the late 1980s, scholars studying forest policy change in the 
province assumed a rather simplistic state of policy making between the provincial 
government and the forest industry, and as such, little attention was paid to the actual 
development of forest policy in British Columbia. Rather, the efforts of political scientists 
were focused on how a policy was implemented and economists evaluated the effectiveness 
of the outcomes (Lindquist & Wellstead, 2001). This section will show how the approach to 
analyzing forest policy has changed over the past few decades. 
Until the 1990s, the drivers of forest policy change in British Columbia remained 
relatively consistent due to the strong relationship between the forest industry, government, 
and labour (Hagerman, Dowlatabadi & Satterfield, 2010; Prudham, 2007). The era of implied 
simplicity came to a close in the latter part of the 1980s in British Columbia when the policy 
arena became more contested (Lindquist &Wellstead, 2001), triggered by the coordinated 
effort of environmental non-governmental organizations and First Nations towards a 
common interest in the environment (Lertzman, Rayner & Wilson, 1996). As the complexity 
in forest policy dynamics increased in British Columbia, traditional approaches to policy 
analysis became problematic so political scientists began to apply more robust theoretical 
frameworks such as policy networks/communities and agenda setting theories to better 
understand the forest policy dynamics occurring in British Columbia (Lindquist & Wellstead, 
2001).  
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Early investigations of theoretical frameworks to explain forest policy change in 
British Columbia began to emerge in the mid-1990s. What began as a controversy between 
the roles of ideas versus interests in policy dynamics (Howlett & Rayner, 1995; Lertzman et 
al., 1996; Hoberg, 1996) was later understood as an integration of ideas and interests 
(Howlett & Ramesh, 1998). Similarly, Hoberg and Morawski (1997) discovered that using 
policy network/sector theories to explain the dynamics occurring between the government 
and First Nations regarding forest policy in Clayoquot Sound were inadequate. Moreover, in 
his investigation of various agenda setting theories used to explain particular forest policies 
in British Columbia, Kamieniecki (2000) found that these theories could not account for the 
complexity of forest policy dynamics occurring in British Columbia.   
To overcome these deficiencies in understanding the complexity of forest policy 
dynamics, political scientists began to broaden their lens of inquiry, reaching beyond the 
specificity of their own discipline. This research informed the broader context in which 
British Columbia forest policy was taking place. In their comparative study of forest 
jurisdictions, Cashore and Vertinsky (2000) found that a firm’s response to an external 
pressure depends on the type of regulatory structure it is under as well as the type of 
relationship it has with the government, demonstrating the important role of institutions. 
Similarly, Bernstein and Cashore (2000) show how the globalization of economies and 
communication and the internationalization of trade have provided international actors and 
institutions with direct influence over domestic forest policies, citing the ability of the United 
States to directly influence forest policy through the Softwood Lumber Agreement.  
In the field of economics, forest economists draw from rationale choice theory and 
the policy instrument framework to guide their analyses of specific forest policies to 
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determine their economic efficiency (Lindquist & Wellstead, 2001). For example, in their 
assessment of British Columbia’s policy shift that resulted in British Columbia Timber Sales 
(BCTS) replacing the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP), Niquidet, Nelson 
and Vertinsky (2007) modeled characteristics of the sales that were thought to impact bid 
prices. They found that the new program of timber tenure delivery through BCTS to be more 
efficient than its predecessor, the SBFEP, though they suspected that resource rents may have 
been transferred from rural communities to the provincial government (Niquidet et al., 2007). 
Rational choice theory assumes that: “people’s preferences are static, society is a 
mathematical aggregation of homogeneous rational agents, public inputs are through market 
signals, and there is no role for any institution other than the market” (Kant, 2003, p. 40). As 
such, reasoning that is based on rational choice theory can be problematic as it involves 
minimal input parameters that results in an explanation that is over simplified (Kant, 2003). 
Oversimplification in the analysis of forest policy instruments is starting to be recognized and 
evidence demonstrating its limits can be found. For example, a long standing assumption by 
forest economists was that by strengthening timber tenure rights in British Columbia firms 
would make longer term investments in growing trees (Luckert, 2007; Zhang & Pearse, 
1997).  However, work by Arnot, Luckert and Boxall (2011) found that because there is no 
firm definition of tenure security, tenure security cannot be linked to economic behaviour. 
Further, Bogle and van Kooten (2013) have shown that government and firms have 
conflicting agendas when it comes to growing trees because firms view the task as a liability 
and constraint as opposed to an investment.  
While the above noted scholars have all made valuable contributions to the 
discourse regarding British Columbia forest policy, perhaps the most significant contribution, 
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in terms of understanding the dynamics of forest policy change in British Columbia, was 
made by Rayner et al. (2001). They argue that while the forest sector is made up of many 
sub-sectors, not all of them can be given equal scrutiny as some sub-sectors can be 
determined to be critical in the sense that they exhibit substantial influence over the dynamics 
occurring within the entire sector (Rayner et al., 2001). In their analyses of British Columbia 
forest policy changes in the 1990s, they identified three factors that affect policy change in 
the forest sector. First, that subsectors are organized around a small number of issues which 
attract specific policy networks, as policy networks are interest based. Second, that 
subsectors can be strongly linked together to support a policy goal, such as the policy of 
sustained yield. Third, those critical subsectors occupy a position of privilege, in that they 
“constrain policy development” (Rayner, et al., 2001, p. 329). They identified the tenure and 
timber supply subsectors as critical because of their direct link to the wellbeing of the forest 
industry (Rayner et al., 2001). In their research, Thielmann and Tollefson (2009) also found 
that numerous attempts to change land use policy were thwarted by the commitment of 
successive governments to uphold the forest industry and forestry jobs.  
3.3. Responses by the Forest Industry to Policy Change in British Columbia 
The historical relationship between the government of British Columbia and the 
forest industry has been well documented (Marchak, 1983), which had become firmly 
established following the Royal Commission on Forest Policy led by Sloan in 1945 (Prudham, 
2007). But, this relationship began to be tested by the late 1980s when the environmental 
movement and First Nations began to effectively challenge the historic relationship between 
government and the forest industry (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000). The following section will 
show how the forest industry in British Columbia has adapted to forest policy change in order 
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to survive. This section will also describe the internal and external contexts of these 
adaptations as the forest industry was not only responding to British Columbia forest policy, 
but to the forest industry’s place within the global economy.  
In their model to predict how firms will respond to external pressures, Cashore and 
Vertinsky (2000) employ both policy network and regulatory typologies; they classify British 
Columbia’s regulatory style as non-legal/discretionary and its forest policy network structure 
as a clientele-pluralist network. In this model, the regulatory style refers to the role of the 
courts, where the clientele-pluralist network is described as a network in which:  
business interests are policy participants within the sub-government; state agencies 
rely on business interests for advice; business interests essentially have a veto over 
policy change; and, other organized interests are relegated to roles as policy 
advocates (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000, p. 5).  
 
To demonstrate the progressive responses of firms to environmental pressure they use the 
example of Canfor, a British Columbia forest company. At the beginning, in the mid-1980s, 
Canfor used tactics of defiance, avoidance, and manipulation to thwart the pressure from 
environmental groups who were targeting old growth logging and pulp mill pollution 
(Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000). Here, Canfor outright dismissed the claims of the 
environmental groups while leveraging their connections to government agencies to avoid 
compliance with regulations (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000).  
It was not until environmental groups became more organized, threatening to bring 
their fight to the market place, that Canfor responded in an accommodating and proactive 
manner, voluntarily pledging to abate the pollution levels by building a modern pulping 
facility (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000). In this case, Cashore and Vertinsky (2000) argue that 
by taking a proactive stance Canfor was able: “to maintain the clientele-pluralist network and 
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discretionary legal setting under which they operated” (p. 15). Citing Canfor’s proactive 
approach in advocating for better forest practices and in obtaining sustainable forestry 
certification, Cashore and Vertinsky (2000) speculate that Canfor may not have prevailed 
within the market place or under a new government, formed by the NDP, had it not learned to 
adapt its responses. Thus, they contend that Canfor was able to effectively portray an 
environmentally friendly company to their customers while demonstrating to government 
that companies can self-regulate (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000).  
Prior to the recession of the early 1980s, Edenhoffer and Hayter (2013a) describe 
Canfor as a dominant integrated forest company operating primarily in the coastal region of 
British Columbia. However, in response to the recession, Canfor moved the majority of its 
operations from the coast to the interior of the province, and in 1983 became a publically 
traded company (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a). Using the investment dollars it received, 
Canfor embarked on its corporate restructuring plan, which involved consolidation through 
the acquisition of other firms, and rationalization through a number of cost saving measures 
(Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a). Canfor survived the 1980s recession, and as such, Edenhoffer 
and Hayter (2013a) postulate that at least parts of Canfor’s survival strategy were prevalent 
throughout the industry.  
A key aspect to this strategy of survival was the choice to pursue the mass 
production of low cost commodities rather than value-added commodities (Edenhoffer & 
Hayter, 2013a). They argue that not only did the pursuit of mass production lock in the 
industry’s evolutionary trajectory, but it reinforced the business cycle of booms and busts, 
which became increasingly more extreme and created greater instability (Edenhoffer & 
Hayter, 2013a). Further, they contend that the uncertainty surrounding timber supply, 
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markets, and land use in British Columbia have in some ways forced forest corporations 
towards making these kinds of choices (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a). They note that another 
key to Canfor’s survival was moving to the interior when it did. At the time, the timber 
supply in the interior was more robust and there was less contention with First Nations than 
there was on the coast (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a). Between 1980 and 2010 Canfor tripled 
in size in British Columbia while reducing its employment by half, and although Canfor 
made substantial capital investments in the interior of British Columbia in response to the 
mountain pine beetle, it has since made investments in the southern United States, using the 
money refunded from the illegal duties collected between 2001 and 2005 as part of the 
Softwood Lumber Agreement with the United States in 2006 (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a).    
In the broader context, Edenhoffer and Hayter (2013b) explain the evolutionary 
trajectory of the British Columbia forest industry by combining the industry life cycle model 
with the resource cycles model, as both models have similar phases, into what they call the 
resource industry life cycle. This life cycle consists of four phases. The first phase of the 
industry life cycle/resource cycle is that of pioneering/discovery, where the industry is 
dominated by competitive entrepreneurs and resource exploitation is focused on that which is 
in closest proximity and commands the highest value in the market. The second phase is the 
growth/rapid expansion, where entrepreneurs are replaced by larger vertically and 
horizontally integrated companies and extraction costs increase as the distance to the 
resource increases. The third phase is maturity/plateau, where the innovation and technology 
drive firms to gain competitive advantage and exploitation mentality depletes and degrades 
the resource. The final phase is decline revival/decline and abandonment, where the decline 
can be gradual until, in the case of industrialized forestry, the supply of timber collapses, but 
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until such time efficiencies continue to be sought and investments continue to be made 
(Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013b).  
Using the tenets of the resource industry life cycle model, Edenhoffer and Hayter 
(2013b) sketch out the development and evolution of the forest industry in British Columbia, 
noting that its prolonged boom period not only produced large integrated firms, but also 
helped to create what Freudenburg (1992) calls addictive resource economies. Although the 
plateau stage cannot be precisely pin pointed in time, Edenhoffer and Hayter (2013b) claim 
that the forest industry in British Columbia arrived on the plateau just as the recession of the 
1980s began. They describe the plateau stage in British Columbia as one in which the 
industry is dominated by large vertically and horizontally integrated firms, stating that as 
resource exploitation expands and moves farther away from distribution hubs companies 
must leverage economies of scale in order to keep costs down, which is accomplished 
through mass production (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013b). The pursuit of mass production is 
still predominant in forest industry as Nelson, Cohen, and Nikolakis (2009) found that mills 
in British Columbia favour maximizing production over maximizing value.        
Just like the plateau phase, the decline phase is not a precise point in time, rather, it 
can be tumultuous and drawn out, filled with short lived revivals (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 
2013b). Edenhoffer and Hayter (2013b) suggest that since the 1980s, restructuring in the 
British Columbia forest industry has been a matter of survival, stating that: “resource 
exploitation contains an internal dynamic of self-destruction and, as growth levels out in the 
plateau stage, decline and closure become possibilities” (p. 141). Despite the mountain pine 
beetle epidemic, Edenhoffer and Hayter (2013b) say that production in the forest industry 
peaked around 1987, which is indicative of the industry leveling out. They argue that the 
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recession of the 1980s was the catalyst of change for the British Columbia forest industry, as 
it was the crisis that triggered the softwood lumber trade dispute with the United States, the 
rise of societal protest against industrial forestry, and the subsequent re-regulation of the 
industry (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013b).  
In terms of the re-regulation of the industry, Binkley and Zhang (1998) measured 
the response of stock holders when the NDP government in British Columbia raised 
stumpage rates in 1994 in an effort to appease the Americans over the claim that the 
government of British Columbia was subsidizing industry. Using an event study of stock 
prices, they found that the stock prices of publically traded companies fell on the day that the 
government announced the changes to stumpage rates. Binkley and Zhang (1998) interpreted 
as a negative reaction by stock holders to the news of increasing stumpage rates. A similar 
study was done by Niquidet (2008) to measure the reaction in the stock market to the 
announcement of the Forest Revitalization Plan and the intended expropriation of 20% of the 
volume from major licensees. In his measure of thirteen forestry firms in British Columbia, 
only a few showed a significant negative response (Niquidet, 2008). Further inquiry 
prompted Niquidet (2008) to ascertain that the negative reaction had to do with a perceived 
loss of property rights.  
These findings are interesting, because the re-regulation of 1994 was quite different 
from the re-regulation of 2003. The 1994 stumpage rates were increased by $12/m3 on 
average, which does not seem like a substantial amount, but based on lumber prices at the 
time the increase came into effect on May 1, 1994, it represented an 81.1% increase for the 
Interior and 64.4% increase on the coast (Binkley & Zhang, 1998). The study by Binkley and 
Zhang (1998) shows the reaction of shareholders to the arbitrary increase made by 
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government to the price of timber. There is evidence to support that the increased stumpage 
in 1994 was viewed negatively by shareholders as it significantly increased the cost of supply, 
whereas in 2003, the timber expropriated was compensated for. Niquidet (2008) suggests that 
shareholders perceived a loss of rights and hypothesizes that the 20% take back of timber 
volume represented not only a loss of security, in the form of property rights, but would 
result in less control of the timber supply for major licensees. Niquidet’s (2008) hypothesis 
lacks supportive evidence given that expected compensation paid by the government to the 
licensees was to be $200 million, equating to approximately $24/m3. Further, Pinkerton, 
Heaslip, Silver, and Furman (2008) assert that the changes that accompanied the 
expropriation, specifically those changes brought in by Bill 29, allowed the major licensees 
to consolidate their control of the allowable annual cut (AAC) which further solidified their 
oligopsony.    
In their comparison of three forest jurisdictions, British Columbia, New Zealand, 
and Tasmania, Hayter and Barnes (2012) explore how neoliberal ideology has been 
expressed in these three different geographies. Although, neoliberal ideology began to 
influence the government regulation of the forest industry in British Columbia beginning in 
the 1980s and 1990s, Hayter and Barnes (2012) contend that neoliberalism was not directly 
applied to British Columbia forest policy until the 2000s. Lindquist, Langford and Vakil 
(2010) agree as they consider British Columbia behind the times in terms of neoliberal 
influence. Young and Matthews (2007) state that the BC Liberals, elected in 2001, directly 
ushered neoliberalism into the forest economy in three ways, by liberalizing licensee rights 
through Bill 29, by liberalizing the market through Bill 29, and by liberalizing space through 
various amendments to the Forest Act 1996 and through the Forest and Range Practices Act. 
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Similarly, Humphreys (2009) states that neoliberal mechanisms of marketization, 
public/private partnerships, and deregulation are found throughout international forest 
management. The BC Liberal Party may have ushered in neoliberal ideology in British 
Columbia, but according to Humphreys (2009): “[n]eoliberalism is very much the hegemonic 
ideology of our age” (p. 320). 
3.4. British Columbia Forest Policy Legacies 
The British Columbia forest policies that have been identified as legacies in the 
literature are policies regarding timber tenures, timber supply, and timber pricing. All of 
these policies support the larger underlying forest policy of regulating the forest harvest using 
the sustained yield model (Rayner et al., 2001). Despite mounting evidence that the policy 
does not work (Prudham, 2007), and that public expectation for sustainable forestry is rising 
(Rayner et al., 2001), the sustained yield forest regulation policy remains steadfastly in place, 
with the current provincial allowable annual cut (AAC) set at 75.8 million cubic metres per 
year (FLNRO, 2016b). The questions being raised in the literature are asking why these 
forest policies persist (Burda & Gale, 1998; Fréchette & Lewis, 2011; Prudham, 2007; 
Rayner et al., 2001).  
Following the Royal Commission on Forestry led by Sloan in 1945, changes were 
made to the Forest Act in 1947 which enshrined sustained yield forest regulation as the 
doctrine to liquidate old growth and create in its place an even-aged predicable flow of 
timber, revenue, and stability (Prudham, 2007). Rayner et al. (2001) agree, noting that in 
theory, sustained yield forest regulation would uphold the forest industry which in turn would 
provide revenue to the Crown and employment stability for communities. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the policy of sustained yield enabled the forest industry to expand into the 
 37 
Interior of the province during W. A. C. Bennett’s province building era (Marchak, 1983). 
However, although the sustained yield forest regulation model was institutionalized in British 
Columbia in 1947, it does not mean that this model has been effective (Prudham, 2007). 
Prudham (2007) argues that the ideology underpinning sustained yield forest policy: 
“allow[s] forests to circulate as financial capital” (p. 259). During the post-World War II era, 
the time period at which sustained yield forest policy was introduced, Prudham (2007) notes 
that: “ideas of nature and work were very much linked in BC” (p. 259); meaning that the 
forest policy fit easily with the context of the time and place. He notes that some of the 
unique aspects of this forest regulation model to British Columbia were that it granted private 
capital exclusive rights to harvest timber, was managed by scientific forestry and linked 
community economic well-being directly to the exploitation of the forest resources (Prudham, 
2007). Thus, he contends that support for sustained yield forest regulation was garnered 
because the forest industry, the state, and organized labour all stood to benefit from this 
model (Prudham, 2007). 
  Challenging the policy goal that sustained yield forest regulation to provide 
stability to communities, Byron (1978) examined unemployment in Quesnel and Prince 
George from the period of 1967 to 1975. In this research, he compared the degree of 
instability of employment in occupational groups for both cities. In the study, to allow 
reasonable comparison, Byron (1978) looked at the relative instability and absolute 
variability for each group. The data support the postulation that the volatility of lumber 
markets causes fluctuations in forest sector employment, in which there is a lag of one to two 
months between the cause and effect (Byron, 1978). Byron (1978) further argues that 
employment instability in small forest-dependent economies is a social issue which cannot be 
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solved using sustained yield forest policy concluding, “the permanence or survival of forest 
industry centres is neither assured by nor solely dependent upon the perpetual maintenance of 
nearby forests at or near sustained yield levels” (p. 61).  
Despite these findings by Byron (1978), sustained yield forest regulation has 
prevailed and as a result, the province’s allowable annual cut (AAC) has tripled since the 
1950s (Burda & Gale, 1998). Burda and Gale (1998) argue that the mass volume production 
of commodity products that dominates the British Columbia forest industry benefits private 
firms and does not maximize jobs, provincial revenue, or community stability. They identify 
that decreasing timber supply, increasing costs to extract timber, and increasing barriers to 
the market in the United States all pose significant threats to this timber manufacturing 
choice (Burda & Gale, 1998). Taking the aforementioned threats to the industry into 
consideration, Burda and Gale (1998) contend that a commitment to high volume depletion 
via sustained yield forest regulation has the potential to have crippling long term economic 
consequences for the province in the future.  
This policy of sustained yield has also survived the legislative changes of recent 
decades which govern the operational practices of the forest industry. While examining the 
various policy changes brought about by the NDP government in British Columbia in the 
1990s, Rayner et al. (2001) were interested to find that while the Forest Practices Code Act 
substantially changed the operational practices of industrial forestry to be conducted at a 
higher environmental standard, other policies, such as the allocation of timber through the 
forest tenure system and the allowable annual cut (AAC) remained virtually unchanged 
(Rayner et al., 2001). Although conflict between the environmental movement and the 
industrial forestry sector in British Columbia had been on the rise since the 1980s, Rayner et 
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al. (2001) note that by the 1990s, the environmental movement had gained considerable 
support and subsequent political influence. However, they also recognize that supporting the 
forest industry had itself become a policy, and a key mandate of the ministry responsible for 
forests (Rayner et al., 2001). Hence, because the forest industry remained an important 
economic feature in British Columbia, they argue that it continued to have substantial 
influence over forest policy stating that: “[…] authority over policy formulation and 
implementation remained in the hands of the same community of experts who, by and large, 
remained quite supportive of the status quo” (p. 325).   
In the 2000s, the Liberal government replaced the Forest Practices Code Act 1995 
with a results-based version, the Forest and Range Practices Act 2004, which is essentially a 
performance-based framework (Hoberg & Malkinson, 2013). However, unlike other forest 
jurisdictions, it is the licensee that sets the result or strategy to achieve the eleven values 
established in the Forest and Range Practices Act by government (Hoberg & Malkinson, 
2013). Peterson and Stuart (2014) contend that the traditional reliance by successive British 
Columbia governments upon the forest industry to provide jobs and stability via the 
extraction of timber has ultimately led to the erosion of the government’s regulatory power. 
Citing the mountain pine beetle epidemic, they claim that because of the Forest and Range 
Practices Act the government could not direct the licensees to harvest the mountain pine 
beetle infested stands (Peterson & Stuart, 2014). As a result, licensees harvested in the green 
timber longer than they should have, sacrificing long term viability for short term gain 
(Peterson & Stuart, 2014). While Peterson and Stuart (2014) argue that the forest industry 
continues to act in its own best interest and that the government has little ability to change the 
situation, they also note that the government appears to be committed to business as usual. 
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Nelson (2007) agrees that the forest industry focused on maximizing its own interests by 
harvesting as much profitable timber as possible. But, he also says that the forest industry 
only changed its focus to harvesting as much green timber as possible because it was 
unsuccessful in lobbying the government to address the growing mountain pine beetle 
epidemic (Nelson, 2007).  
There are several elements noted earlier in this section that merit further discussion 
as they provide greater insight into why sustained yield forest regulation persists in British 
Columbia. The first is that the underlying goal of sustained yield forest regulation, the 
accelerated liquidation of old growth timber, which is founded on an ideology that views the 
forest as a commodity to be exploited (Prudham, 2007). The second is that the relationship 
between the forest industry and government and, to a lesser extent, labour is founded on 
agreement to support sustained yield forest regulation (Prudham, 2007). The third is that the 
relationship between the forest industry and government is not exclusively between the 
elected officials and the forest industry, but between the forest industry and the bureaucracy, 
namely the ministry responsible for forests (Rayner et al., 2001). What the first two things 
tell us is that not only is the commitment to this model strong, but that the model of sustained 
yield has an ideological foundation. What the third thing tells us is that this ideology of 
sustained yield also has an institutional context.   
To consider change dynamics in the governance of forests one must consider 
underlying ideologies (Humphreys, 2007) and institutions (Fréchette & Lewis, 2011). 
Humphreys (2009) states that an ideology is very different from knowledge, in that the 
former offers both a critique on how things are perceived and an alternative to that which is 
being critiqued, whereas the latter is defined as fact that is both verifiable and believed. 
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Given that an ideology is based on morals, any individual or group may subscribe to the 
ideology, however, this is not to say that acceptance of a given ideology is universal, rather, 
that it is relative (Humphreys, 2009). Fréchette and Lewis (2011) regard institutions as 
enduring fixtures in human society that are resistant to change.  
It is helpful at this point to define what institutions are. For the purpose of this 
investigation, institutions are defined as: “the formal rules, compliance procedures and 
standard operating procedures that structure the relationship between people in various units 
of the polity and economy” (Hall, 1986, p. 7). As such, Fréchette and Lewis (2011) argue 
that: “[o]nce produced, rules may become entrenched for a number of reasons” (p. 583). 
They elaborate by saying that the rules can become entrenched for the following reasons: that 
rules exist in complex inter-dependent arrangements both vertically within the hierarchy of 
rules and horizontally with other rules; that changing the rules would often be considered too 
costly; and, they have a tendency to be captured by the interests that stand to benefit the most 
(Fréchette & Lewis, 2011). Moreover, Fréchette and Lewis (2011) argue that because 
institutions tend to provide greater certainty for vested interests, any change that would 
threaten that certainty would be opposed. Finally, they stress the importance of identifying 
what the rules to change the rules are, and who has the power to change them. In Canada, the 
authority to manage provincial forests resides with the respective governments of each 
province (Fréchette & Lewis, 2011).  
 In terms of the institutional context of sustained yield forest regulation, Prudham 
(2007) describes the British Columbia forest sector as a command and control system that is 
only accessible by those with elite knowledge, and that the professional forest management 
system is dominated by forest professionals, who occupy positions within the forest industry 
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and the bureaucracy. Sustained yield forest regulation was part of the scientific forestry 
model endorsed by Sloan as part of the recommendations in the 1945-1947 Royal 
Commission on Forestry in British Columbia (Prudham, 2007). That sustained yield is 
considered a component of scientific forestry means that it is part of the curriculum that is 
taught to aspiring forest professionals (Prudham, 2007). So, just as sustained yield forest 
regulation became entrenched within the ministry responsible for forests, becoming part of 
the institutional fabric, it also became a conduit for perpetuating the ideology through time 
because of its connection to the forestry profession (Prudham, 2007).  
In his discussion, Humphreys (2009) defines discourse as: “a set of linked 
understandings and ideas that structure how people think about, interpret and understand the 
world” (p. 319). He further argues that: “different discourses may achieve different degrees 
of political influence in social life […and] may gain considerable political influence while 
lacking a clear epistemic basis” (p. 320). What Humphreys (2009) is saying is that the power 
behind an ideological discourse is not in its ability to prove itself viable, but that it is morally 
accepted by those who adhere to it.  Given that sustained yield forest regulation remains in 
place, despite its failure as a policy instrument to secure employment and stabilize the 
industry of the forest sector, indicates that the ideology supporting it is predicated on moral 
rather than epistemic relativism (Humphreys, 2009). In summary, it could be argued that the 
persistence of sustained yield forest regulation in British Columbia can be explained by its 
institutional framework that is informed by ideology. Institutional frameworks are important 
because they: “define the ends and shape the means by which interests are determined and 
pursued” (Scott, 1987, p. 508).    
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Methods 
4.1. Introduction 
My research focuses on forest policy change in British Columbia, a subject matter 
that can be laden with contention and polarizing viewpoints (Howlett, Rayner & Tollefson, 
2009). Knowing this, I wanted to undertake my research in a more holistic manner with the 
goal to gain a balanced understanding of the data. I also considered what the constraints and 
barriers to this research might be and how I would be situated in this research (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2004). Methodology involves more than the way in which we collect and measure 
data, it is the framework from which we approach research, how we decide what to 
investigate, and how we will go about studying it (Guba & Lincoln, 2004). The framework of 
research comes from our own ontology, or how we see reality, and our personal 
epistemology, or how we go about understanding reality (Guba & Lincoln, 2004; Jones & 
Gomez 2010).   
I used a mixed methods approach, which leveraged both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to conduct my research. The mixed methods approach can add breadth and depth to 
the research, expanding the possibilities of discovery while allowing for triangulation 
(Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989; Moran-Ellis, Alexander, Cronin, Dickinson, Fielding, 
Sleney & Thomas, 2006). The concept of triangulation comes from the navigational 
technique of using two known points to calculate the location of a third point, in the same 
way, data gathered from different sources and analysed in different ways converges in 
support of the findings (Jick, 1979; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). My intention in using 
mixed methods was also to allow for the expansion of discovery, where the findings from 
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one source of data informed the collection of subsequent data (Greene et al., 1989), which 
also enforced the rigour of my research (Baxter & Elyes, 1997).  
As a result of working for twenty years in different capacities within the forest 
industry in British Columbia I have a good understanding of the operational aspects therein. 
Therefore, I had to be all the more diligent to ensure that I applied rigour throughout my 
research process so that the research findings could be assessed as being trustworthy (Baxter 
& Elyes, 1997). As a means of enforcing the rigour in my research, checking my subjectivity 
(Bailey, White & Pain, 1999; Madge, Raghuram, Skelton, Willis & Williams, 1997), and 
monitoring for power relationships (Bailey et al., 1994; Katz, 1994), I adopted the practice of 
critical self-reflexivity when I first began formulating my research topic. I have used the 
practice of critical self-reflexivity throughout this research project not only to evaluate my 
goals and approaches, but to think about the ethical aspects of my research (Dowling, 2010). 
Therefore, disclosing my position as a member of the forestry profession when I introduced 
myself as a researcher became an important aspect of my research because it has undoubtedly 
influenced the questions that I have asked, the way that I perceived the data, and the way that 
I present the findings (Behar, 1996; Clifford, 1986; England, 1994).  
My position within this research is that I am both an insider and an outsider 
(England, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994). I am an insider in that I live and work within the case 
study area and my career is in the forest sector. I am a Registered Professional Forester, and I 
am a public servant with the province of British Columbia, working at the Ministry of Forests, 
Lands and Natural Resource Operations. I am an outsider in that my inside position has not 
afforded me a privileged or complete understanding. Rather, I am, “situated as dweller and 
sojourner within my own fields of knowledge” (Clifford, 1997, p. 218). The duality of my 
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position as the researcher, being both an insider and an outsider, has been challenging to 
manage. While my experience working within the forest sector for many years and in many 
roles has given me insight to aspects of forest policy and management, it has not given me a 
total comprehension. As Clifford (1986) contends: “[c]ulture, and our views of “it”, [are] 
produced historically, and are actively contested. There is no whole picture that can be ‘filled 
in’, since the perception and filling of a gap leads to the awareness of other gaps” (p. 18). I 
agree with Clifford (1986); during my research journey I no sooner understood some aspect 
of the forest industry or answered a particular question, only to unearth more gaps in my 
understanding in the process. Challenging the assumptions upon which my knowledge is 
based has been a humbling experience.  
4.2. Ethical Considerations 
My intention was to interview people as a means of collecting data for my research. 
It is common for academic institutions to require some form of ethical review when human 
subjects are involved in research (Dowling, 2010). Therefore, I sought approval from the 
University of Northern British Columbia Research Ethics Board and was granted approval on 
May 16, 2014. See Appendix 1 for a copy of the approval letter. Prior to embarking on the 
interview phase of the research I considered what some of the ethical challenges might be 
and decided that they would likely be: effectively managing power relationships; and, 
potentially crossing boundaries between my professional ethics and my own moral and 
ethical framework.   
Whether you are an insider or an outsider, as the researcher you must always 
consider the well-being of the participants that your research involves (England, 1994; 
Kobayashi, 1994).  Honesty in the approach of a topic and critical evaluation of self in the 
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context of being the researcher are important practices that can help the researcher, protect 
the participants from harm, and safeguard from the potential of the researcher exploiting the 
participants (Dowling, 2010; England, 1994; Nast, 1994). As the researcher, it was important 
for me to remind myself that power, knowledge, and ethics are interwoven (Madge et al., 
1997). Power relationships can be relatively equal in terms of what the researcher and 
participant stand to benefit or it can be unbalanced, either to the advantage, or disadvantage 
of the researcher (England, 1994). Power relationships can also be quite fluid, changing 
during the course of the research, or as a result of the research (Kobayashi 1994). There is no 
particular method that will eliminate the power relations inherent in qualitative research 
(Dowling, 2010; England, 1994; Gilbert, 1994, Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994, Nast, 1994). 
The best way to keep them in check is through self-reflexivity (Bailey et al., 1999; England, 
1994; Katz, 1994).  
Although I did not identify any tangible risks for those wishing to participate, I did 
fully disclose my identity as a knowledgeable practitioner of twenty years working in the 
forest sector and currently employed as a Registered Professional Forester with the Ministry 
of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations. I assured the participants that the 
research I was conducting was my own and not that of my employer. I gave disclosure of my 
position to potential participants during the solicitation process which helped to establish a 
baseline of honest communication between them and myself. To further ensure the protection 
and well-being of the participants, I have kept their identities confidential.  
What I discovered, however, was that there was more to preserving anonymity of 
the participants than just assigning a unique alpha-numeric identifier. There were things that 
were revealed by participants during the interview process that I could not report in my thesis 
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because to do so would compromise the anonymity of certain participants. Furthermore, I 
purposely chose not to cite participants in the themes generated through content analysis 
because I felt there was a risk of participants being identified through the associated theme 
tables. I even scrutinized the use of direct quotes in this section to ensure that I was not 
inadvertently revealing identities. 
4.3. Research Design 
I wanted to investigate how forest corporations have responded to the forest policy 
changes made by the government of British Columbia in 2003, which may have subsequently 
impacted the forest industry. My goal was to understand the context of these changes more 
comprehensively, and in so doing, perhaps uncover some linkages that may have eluded 
policy makers. Initially I was interested in grounded theory as a research technique. However, 
with a restricted time frame and resources this approach could not be employed and used 
properly. Instead, I decided to use a case study as a way of organizing my research 
strategically.   
Case studies have been used extensively in social science research and for a variety 
of purposes (Tight, 2010; Yin, 1994). Historically, ambiguity surrounds the use of case 
studies concerning the question of whether a case study is a method, a methodology, or 
merely an example of some specific phenomenon (Baxter, 2010; Tight, 2010; Yin, 1994). As 
such, many social researchers regard it as an inferior qualitative method; yet, it can provide 
robust explanations from complex social phenomenon (Baxter, 2010; Yin, 1994). The 
structure of the case study lends itself to the use of mixed methods, allowing the researcher to 
fully explore a given phenomenon within the context it is occurring (Baxter & Jack, 2008). 
The case study also provides a format in which the convergence of data can occur, which in 
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turn gives the research credibility (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Moreover, the construct of a case 
study research design permits the researcher to investigate ‘why’ and ‘how’ a phenomenon is 
occurring, which gives the findings of the research a degree of generalizability in that 
concepts uncovered can be transferred to other cases (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In this research, 
the case study was used as a research strategy to purposefully focus data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 1994).  
The topic of this research is complex, involving multiple variables whose 
relationships to the events in question are unclear. A case study is a research strategy that 
places boundaries around the topic in such a way that it focuses the data collection and 
analysis within the context of the real world (Yin, 1994). Though it appears very rigid 
because it places boundaries, it is in fact flexible and promotes the collection of evidence 
from multiple sources (Yin, 1994). To assist with the conceptualization of the case (Stake in 
Tight, 2010), I considered the following questions:  
1) Has the number and distribution of sawmills changed over time? If so, what has 
driven this change? 
 
2) Has the fibre flow changed? If so, how has it changed, and what does this change 
potentially mean for the forest industry?  
 
Asking these questions led me to decide to restrict the case study both in space and in time. I 
chose the Prince George Timber Supply Area as the geographic boundary and a fifteen year 
time period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2011.  
4.3.1. The Case Study  
I chose the Prince George Timber Supply Area as the geographic region for this case 
study. It consists of three forest Districts: Prince George, Vanderhoof, and Fort St. James (see 
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Figure 1 for a map of the study area). I chose to make the case study within the geographic 
boundaries of a Timber Supply Area (TSA) for two reasons: 1) the TSA is the geographic 
unit in which the allowable annual cut (AAC) is determined; and, 2) TSAs contain 
administrative units known as Districts, which are geographic units in which harvesting and 
scaling data can traced. The Prince George Timber Supply Area (TSA) includes the 
municipalities of Prince George, Fort St. James, and Vanderhoof, as well as other smaller 
communities such as Hixon, Fraser Lake, Sinclair Mills, Bear Lake, and McLeod Lake 
(Snetsinger, 2011). In addition, 24 First Nations have asserted traditional territories within 
the TSA (Snetsinger, 2011). I chose the Prince George TSA because it is unique in the sense 
that it has varying timber types across the forest District landscapes (Snetsinger, 2011), and 
varying levels of forest dependence within the communities (Horne, 2009). As well, this TSA 
is the largest contributor of volume in the province, and accounts for more than 40% of the 
Northern Interior forest region’s TSA contribution (FLNRO “AACTSA”, n.d.). I chose the 
period of 1997 to 2011 primarily for two reasons. The first was that I wanted to have data 
that would reflect the period prior to the change in forest policy in 2003 and the period 
afterwards. The second was that I began extracting numerical data from a publicly accessible 
provincial database in 2012 and the public records only go back for a span of 15 years. For 
this case, 1997 was the oldest year of data I could collect using public access. 
 50 
 
Figure 1.  Map of the Prince George Timber Supply Area 
Source: Map retrieved from http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/tsa/tsa24/map.gif   
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Finally, for the purpose of my research, I defined forest corporations as being major 
primary timber manufacturing companies with production capacities large enough to be 
classified as medium to large by the ministry responsible for forests3 in the province of 
British Columbia. In British Columbia, lumber manufacturing accounts for the majority of 
total primary manufacture of timber (FLNRO, 2011a), thus, my research focuses on lumber 
manufacturing companies within the Prince George Timber Supply Area.  
4.4. Data Collection and Analyses 
I gathered data from both primary and secondary sources using a mixed methods 
approach, with the collection and analysis of the secondary data preceding and informing the 
collection of the primary data. The essence and complexity of the bigger picture within my 
research questions demanded that I investigate more than one source of data. In fact, I believe 
that the following sources of data I have used are interrelated in terms of the research 
questions and cannot be understood independently as such (Gaber & Gaber, 2007). A mixed 
method approach to the analysis of the data was used because the data were not collected in 
the same way and as such cannot be lumped together and analyzed as an aggregate (Brannen, 
2005). All data collected, regardless of method, were within the scope of the case study 
parameters of both space and time. For clarity, I have chosen to present the methods of data 
collection and analysis by topic area the data were collected for.  
4.4.1. Mill Closures 
I used three sources to collect secondary qualitative data: media outlets; corporate 
annual reports; and official state documents (Bryman, 2008). These data were first collected 
between October 2011 and March 2012. I conducted a media scan of the Prince George 
                                                 
3 I am using the generic term ‘ministry responsible for forests’ to avoid confusion because the ministry has 
undergone several name changes throughout its time. 
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Citizen newspaper using an electronic database subscribed to by the University of Northern 
British Columbia. I searched for news surrounding closures, start-ups, shut downs, and 
upgrades involving lumber manufacturing companies located within the Prince George 
Timber Supply Area. From the data that I collected, I extracted specific information about 
lumber manufacturing companies, which I tracked in a table that I constructed in a Word 
document. To better understand the context of sawmill closures and openings within the 
Prince George Timber Supply Area, other events linked to the forest industry and occurring 
between 1997 and 2011 were mapped out alongside the sawmill closures and openings to see 
if there was any correlation between them (see Appendix II for details).  
I used annual reports from forest corporations and the provincial government that 
were available to the public, as well as official documents published by the Government of 
British Columbia through the ministry responsible for forests to further inform my 
understanding of the events taking place within the Prince George Timber Supply Area. I 
analyzed these data using qualitative document analysis techniques because I was interested 
in themes and patterns of words to provide context rather than in the mere frequency of 
words (Altheide, Coyle, DeVriese & Schneider, 2008).  I looked for themes that would help 
explain the trends identified in the numerical data and this inquiry yielded several themes 
which I added to the table tracking the closings, openings, and upgrading of sawmills. These 
themes were also used to help generate interview questions.  
During the examination of the results, I conducted a broader media scan regarding 
the closures of mills picked up in the initial media scan. The second media scan was used to 
uncover other details which might help to explain the particular circumstances surrounding 
each mill closure. In August of 2015 I looked for internet based media accounts of each mill 
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closure using the Google search engine as well as searching the Prince George Citizen and 
Vancouver Sun newspapers using an electronic database.   
4.4.2. Employment   
In February 2012, employment statistics were collected from BC Statistics using the 
electronic database for BC Statistics. The employment statistics were extracted by industry 
and development region, as well as employment/unemployment rates by industry for the 
Cariboo and North Coast/Nechako regions.  There was no secondary inspection of this data 
set.  The data were examined to see if there were any obvious trends. During this data 
collection from BC Statistics, I discovered a special set of analyses that had been done by 
Horne (2009) for the provincial government where data collected for BC Stats and Statistics 
Canada were reconfigured to align with Forest District boundaries. Unofficial job loss 
numbers associated with specific sawmill closures in the Prince George Timber Supply Area 
were collected in the broader media scan of sawmill closures that was conducted in August, 
2015.  
4.4.3. Timber Harvest and Valuation 
In British Columbia, the scaling of timber calculates the volume and grade (quality) 
of logs, and the timber mark tracks all timber volume from its origin to its destination. 
(FLNRO, 2011b). The appraisal of timber is regulated by the provincial appraisal manuals 
and stumpage rates for timber are set by the timber mark of the cutting authority (FLNRO, 
2011b). The Harvest Billing System (HBS), introduced in 2003, is the provincial electronic 
database that tracks and manages all of the timber that is harvested by managing the scaling 
data, which in turn in conjunction with stumpage rates are used to generate stumpage billing 
(FLNRO, 2011b). The Harvest Billing System (HBS) is an open database system containing 
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both current and historical scale and billing data. Historical data are limited depending on 
what is being queried. For this data collection, historical data were available up to 15 years 
prior to the year of inquiry. I used HBS to gather data on where timber in the Prince George 
Timber Supply Area was harvested and scaled, what species were scaled, and how much 
stumpage was collected for the timber scaled.   
To help answer the question of how industry was responding to the changes made to 
legislation I wanted to look at where timber was being harvested by forest licence holders 
within the Prince George Timber Supply Area and where it was being scaled. I extracted data 
from HBS in March of 2012. Initially I ran reports for every year from 1997 to 2011 setting 
the filter parameters to restrict the harvest to the District and by forest licences, and the report 
configuration parameters to be grouped by District scaled and scale site. I also included 
volume, value, species and grades within the report configuration parameters.  I discovered 
cruise based scaling in the 2010 and 2011 data so I had to run additional reports so that I 
could sort out the data. A cruise based scale means that the timber is scaled on the stump, in 
the District in which it is harvested in, rather than at the mill (MFR, 2010a). To extract the 
destination information I ran reports on each District cruise based scale site by timber mark 
so that timber marks belonging to forest licences could be extracted and the destinations of 
the timber could be adjusted accordingly.  
I also ran reports on each District from 1997 to 2011 setting the filter parameters to 
restrict the harvest by District and by Crown Land, and the report configuration parameters to 
be grouped by management type. Management types are: community forest agreements 
(CFAs); woodlots; tree farm licences (TFLs); outside (not under management) and; Timber 
Supply Area (TSA). Using the data in these additional reports, I was able to do two things: 
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compare the total harvest within a District to that under TSA and also determine the 
proportion of the TSA harvest that was under forest licence; and cross check the data I 
gathered to ensure the accuracy of the queries I used for generating reports. In all, 32 reports 
were generated for each District of the three Districts for a total of 96 reports.  
I conducted secondary analyses on the data collected in 2012. These analyses are 
considered secondary because the data were collected by another organization for a different 
purpose (Bryman, 2008). My purpose of doing these analyses was to answer questions 
regarding timber harvested by forest licences in the Prince George Timber Supply Area. 
Namely, where was timber harvested and what species were included in these harvests, 
where was the harvested timber processed, and what was the revenue generated through 
stumpage for the Crown. For these analyses I used Excel spreadsheets to manage and analyze 
the data. Though the data collection occurred in 2012, the analyses were conducted at various 
times as new information was acquired, or new gaps in knowledge were identified, with the 
exception of the fifth analysis, where data were extracted in 2015. The 2015 data extraction 
was done to simplify the extraction and amalgamation of data. Secondary analyses were also 
conducted with these data. 
In the first analysis I sought to answer the question of how much timber harvested 
within a District was also processed there, and so, I compiled the data by year, location of 
harvest, and scale. Next, I summarized how much of the harvest within each District was 
scaled in that same District for each year from 1997 to 2011. In the second analysis, I looked 
at the total amount of timber harvested within the Prince George Timber Supply Area and 
how much revenue it generated for the province. I compiled the total harvest for all three 
Districts for each year from 1997 to 2011 and compared it to the total revenue that was 
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generated from each harvest year for the Crown. Next, to account for inflation I used an 
online inflation calculator found on the Bank of Canada website to calculate each year’s total 
value to 2011 dollars (Bank of Canada, n.d.).  
Based on the results of the analyses noted above, as well concerns that were raised 
by a number of people I interviewed, I conducted a third analysis on lodgepole pine. In this 
case I looked at the data from 2000 to 2011 for each District. I chose the starting year of 2000 
for three reasons: 1) in 2000, the mountain pine beetle was active in all three Districts; 2) in 
2001, the first mountain Pine Beetle Action Plan was released, and; 3) in 2002, the first uplift 
in the allowable annual cut (AAC) was put into effect to address mountain pine beetle 
epidemic. For the third analysis, to determine the relative proportion of lodgepole pine 
harvested within each District by forest licences, I compiled the harvest data collected in 
2012 in a spreadsheet by District for the years 2000 to 2011. I sorted the data for each year 
by species where I was able to sum the volumes of lodgepole pine and the volumes of all 
other species. Using the total volumes of lodgepole pine and all other species, I was able to 
determine the harvest of lodgepole pine relative to all other species by year and by District.  
For the fourth analysis, I isolated the lodgepole pine data from all Districts and 
sorted it by year and then by log grade. Isolating the lodgepole pine gave me the ability to 
sum the log grades by year and see the distribution of log grades by volume proportion from 
2000 to 2011. For this inquiry, because there were changes made to the Interior log grades in 
2006 (FLNRO, 2011b), and that “Stand as a Whole Pricing” was introduced in 2010 (MFR, 
2010c), I decided to amalgamate the log grades into two categories: off grade and sawlog 
grade. The off grade category included grades 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, whereas the sawlog 
category included grades (blank), 1, and 2. It is important to acknowledge that there is a 
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difference between a scaled grade and a cruise based billing in terms of the timber appraisal. 
The term “scale based” means the stumpage payable is based on the scale of the timber in 
accordance with Part 6 of the Forest Act (MFR, 2010c, p. 1-5). Conversely, “Stand as a 
Whole (SAAW) Pricing” (cruise based) means that one stumpage rate is determined for all of 
the net merchantable timber on the cutting authority area. Therefore, for a cruise based 
cutting authority, the single stumpage rate applies to all of the net merchantable volume 
identified in the cruise conducted in accordance with the Cruising Manual, (MFR, 2010c, p. 
1-5). What I have termed grades, particularly grades 7 and 8, are actually billing codes in 
HBS (MFR, 2010a). So, for the purpose of this case, the term grade and billing code are 
considered to be the same.   
To better understand the decline in stumpage revenue from 2006 to 2011, I extracted 
data from HBS in December of 2015. As I was not interested in isolating the harvest by 
District for each year, a new data extraction would simplify the review. I ran a series of 12 
reports, one for each year starting in 2000 and ending in 2011. In each year I set the filter 
parameters to restrict the harvest by forest licences and organise the data by management 
type so that I could extract the data for the Prince George Timber Supply Area (Timber 
Supply Area 24). I also included in the reports volume, value, and species and grade. For the 
fifth and final analysis, I extracted the data from the reports into an Excel spreadsheet, with a 
tab for each year. With the data now assembled by year, I was able to sort by species and 
associated grades as well as sum volumes and associated dollar values.  
In this probe, for each year I separated the lodgepole pine from all of the other 
species. I then tallied the volumes and associated values so as to calculate the average 
stumpage rate paid by forest licences for lodgepole pine and for all other species. For each 
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year I used mathematical formulas to calculate the average stumpage rates for the following 
categories: all lodgepole pine; lodgepole pine sawlog grade; lodgepole pine off grade; all 
other species combined; all other species sawlog grade; and all other species off grade. Also, 
for each year, I summed the sawlog grades and off grades of the non-pine species each year 
to determine percentages. Finally, to account for the cruise based scale that occurred in 2010 
and 2011, I tallied volumes and associated values by sawlog grade (grade 1 and grade 2), off 
grade (grade 4 and grade 6) (MFR, 2010c), and cruise based grade (grade 7 and grade 8) 
(MFR, 2010a). I did these calculations for both 2010 and 2011 for all non-pine volume and 
then excluded the deciduous species and grades.   
4.4.4. Semi-Structured Interviews 
To provide further context and depth to my research, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews. I chose a semi-structured interview technique because it did not limit me to 
asking questions that reflected my research questions. Rather, it gave me the flexibility to 
explore other questions that arose from my background research, or to respond to information 
revealed by the participants (Dunn, 2010). I developed an interview guide (see Appendix III) 
to use during the interviews. This guide contained: the interview questions in sequential 
order; the context for the questions in the form of a preamble; and prompts, which served as 
reminders for me while I was conducting the interview (King & Horrocks, 2010). In 
developing my interview guide I consulted the seasoned researchers, who are part of my 
advisory committee, for input on the design of my questions and on the construction of the 
interview process. This consultation was very helpful, especially because I received sound 
advice for opening and closing the interview. As well, prior to finalizing my interview guide 
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I conducted two mock interviews with people who understand forestry in British Columbia to 
test both the clarity of my wording of the questions and to time the length of the interview.    
I chose purposive sampling for this research because I wanted to gain specific 
information that is relevant to this case (Yin, 2016). I used two purposeful sampling 
strategies to identify potential participants: criterion and snowball sampling techniques 
(Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010). I chose this sampling strategy because I wanted to get 
informed opinions from people who are involved in the forest industry and who could bring a 
specific understanding of the issues surrounding forest policy. The criteria I used to qualify 
participants were the following: 
 they had to have worked in forestry from at least between 1997 to 2011;  
 they had to have lived within the case study area for at least ten years and at 
least partially during the period of 1997 to 2011; 
 and, they had to be associated predominantly with industry, with government, or 
at arm’s length from one or both of these groups. 
 
Initially I identified potential participants using my own knowledge (Berg, 1998). From there 
expanded the sample by using the snowball sampling technique, in which I asked 
interviewees who they thought I should interview (Babbie, 2007). I used the same criteria, 
noted above, to select these potential participants with the added qualifier that they had to 
have been suggested by at least two interviewees, unless the potential participant had a 
unique perspective not yet sampled.  
One of the advantages of using the criterion sampling technique is that it allows the 
researcher to investigate a topic by identifying potential recruits who have specific 
knowledge regarding the research topic (Van den Hoonaard, 2012). Potential recruits are then 
identified using set criteria (Van den Hoonaard, 2012). I used the snowball sampling 
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technique as a way of limiting my own bias while getting the most variation in the sample 
(Yin, 2016). Another consideration for using this technique is highlighted Van den Hoonaard 
(2012), who says that it may serve as a means of accessing populations that are difficult to 
reach and/or identify. Berg (1998) agrees saying that by asking participants to refer other 
people that they may know who would fit the criteria and who may be interested in 
participating is a way to expand the target population. A strength of the snowball sampling 
technique is that it leverages the social networks of participants, but, it is also viewed by 
many as a weakness, in that the technique has a, “perceived potential for bias” (Stehlik, 2004, 
p. 39). The potential for bias is based on the perception that the researcher is limiting the pool 
from which the sample is taken by relying on informant referrals, which will not necessarily 
be representative (Atkinson & Flint, 2001).     
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the purposive sample is not meant to be a 
representative sample (Yin, 2016). As I was not interested in representing a population, I was 
not concerned about my sample size as it relates to statistical analysis (Atkinson & Flint, 
2001). But, I was interested in making sure that my sample was representative. I recognised 
that there was potential for bias in using the snowball sampling technique, both in the 
referrals received from informants, and as the researcher initiating the chain reference 
because I identified the initial informants. I was concerned that by relying on referrals that 
were provided by my informants I may be overly representing the opinions of those 
particular social networks (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). I was also worried that I might be barred 
access to certain social networks (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). Atkinson and Flint (2001) state 
that snowball sampling is in fact: “biased towards the inclusion of individuals with inter-
relationships, and therefore will over-emphasise cohesiveness in social networks and will 
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miss ‘isolates’ who are not connected to any network that the researcher has tapped into” (p. 
96). 
I employed a number of strategies to minimize bias and to enhance the reliability of 
the interview data. First, to ensure that I was not selecting participants from one specific 
group, I decided to select people from different employment/career groups. Second, within 
each employment/career group, I selected people from a range of positions within the 
hierarchy of each group. For the actual selection of the initial participants I used my own 
knowledge of having worked and lived in the Prince George Timber Supply Area since 2006 
to identify potential participants and also drew from the knowledge I had gained from 
studying background information about the case (Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010). For the 
snowball sampling, I applied the same qualifying criteria for referrals that I did to the original 
participants with the addition of the criterion that the person must receive at least two 
referrals or must bring a unique perspective, not yet sampled. I also used the snowball 
sampling as a method for cross checking my initial participant choices. 
I began the interview process in late October of 2014 by soliciting potential 
participants using a formal invitation via email, or by letter. Once potential participants 
contacted me by email expressing their interest in participating, I sent the information and 
consent form (see Appendix IV) for them to review and approve. Once they reviewed the 
information and consent form, arrangements were made to conduct the interview. 
Participants were also given the option to have the interview questions in advance of the 
interview. The interviews were conducted in November and December of 2014. I used a 
digital recording device to record each interview but also used the interview guide that I had 
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constructed to navigate the questions and to write notes during and after the interview (Dunn, 
2010).   
Once an interview was complete, I downloaded the digital file from the recording 
device on to my computer and then erased the file from the recording device to ensure 
security. Given that I am learning to do research, I chose to do a full transcription of each 
interview myself for two reasons. First, doing a full transcription meant having a text version 
of the interview. Second, doing the work myself gave me the opportunity to re-visit the 
interview and become more familiar with the data (King & Horrocks, 2010). I used the 
transcription module from the Olympus Dictation Management System software package 
with the AS-2400 transcription kit which included the RS27 footswitch. I used this software 
and hardware package because it enabled me to control the speed of the digital track but also 
control the pause and play using the footswitch, making the task of transcription more 
efficient.   
Member checking is an important part of the interview process and enforces the 
rigour of the research (Baxter & Eyles, 1997). Upon completion of each interview transcript I 
then made a copy for editing in which I removed all of the ‘ums’, ‘ahs’, various slang, and 
otherwise distracting elements used in spoken language from the transcribed text.  I then 
emailed this transcript to the participant in Word document format encouraging participants 
to read through the document and to make any changes that they wanted to what they said. 
The process from interview to return of the transcript to the participant for checking and 
input took between two and four weeks. I asked participants to email me back their approval 
or disapproval of the transcript and to also include a copy of the changed transcript should 
they have made any changes. Once a participant approved of the transcript, with or without 
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changes, that version of the transcript became the official record. Allowing participants to 
edit what they said not only ensures that you have captured what they said, but allows them 
to articulate what they meant to say or reconsider what they said. Asking participants to give 
their approval or disapproval of the transcript gave them every opportunity to withdraw their 
participation if they so wished.  
I used two approaches to analyzing the interview data: template and content 
analyses. I used template analysis for the specific research questions and the more 
conventional approach of content analysis to identify themes that occurred outside of the 
interview questions (King & Horrocks, 2010). Prior to conducting the analyses, I assigned a 
unique alpha-numeric identifier (P1-P15) to each interviewee and corresponding transcript to 
preserve the anonymity of each individual during the analyses. These alpha-numeric 
identifiers were also cross-referenced with the group number. Keeping the identity of the 
participants anonymous for the analyses served to: guard against my own interpretation or 
embellishment of the data based on my recollection of the interviews; and from being 
inadvertently influenced by knowing which transcript belonged to which participant (Van 
den Hoonaard, 2012). This strategy also served to reinforce the rigour of my research 
(Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010).   
Template analysis lends itself to a flexible coding structure where the researcher can 
predetermine the themes in advance of the investigation by constructing a hierarchical theme 
template (King & Horrocks, 2010). The majority of the interview questions that I asked were 
very specific because I was seeking clarification and greater meaning to themes I had already 
identified in the review of other data. I was also using this data as a means to check the 
validity of my initial conclusions from the other data (Greene et al., 1989). One of the 
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strengths in using template analysis is that it allows the researcher to look for trends among 
various participant perspectives (King & Horrocks, 2010).  Therefore, because these 
particular interview questions were already established themes and the questions were asked 
across three different groups of people (King & Horrocks, 2010), I decided to use template 
analysis for the specific interview questions.  
For the specific interview questions I constructed a template using an Excel 
spreadsheet that I set up ahead of time with the alpha-numeric identifiers and corresponding 
group numbers for each question/theme (for question/themes used in this examination, see 
Appendix V).  Before I began putting information into the template I re-read each transcript 
and the answers to the questions in a separate Word document. I then summarized each 
participant’s answers further and entered the data into the spreadsheet template. After 
entering all of the participant’s answers I was able to examine all of the answers given to 
each question and look for trends within the whole and among the groups.  
Not every question that I asked was part of a theme that was analyzed using 
template analysis. These questions and other dialog were analyzed separately using content 
analysis. To identify themes within the remainder of the discussion that flowed out of the 
interviews I began with open coding and progressed to focused coding and finally to the 
formation of themes (Van den Hoonaard, 2012). I began by re-reading each transcript several 
times. Using open coding I took notes of words that seemed to occur often (Van den 
Hoonaard, 2012). I then sorted the interview transcripts by group and compiled all of the 
interview transcripts into one Word document per group, removing the text that belonged to 
me.  
 65 
Creating these three master Word documents allowed me to maintain individual 
anonymity for the study, but retain the group identity. Using the word search navigation 
function of Microsoft Word, I was able to find and tally specific words. I conducted both 
manifest and latent content analyses (Dunn, 2010) using the words I had recorded earlier 
when reading through the transcripts as well as synonymous or associated words. Thus, I was 
able to tally the number of times a word was used by group and in what context. I used an 
Excel spreadsheet to track and tally the words searched by group. The next step was to use 
focused coding to sort the words into subthemes (Van de Hoonaard, 2012). Once the search 
words were sorted into subthemes I classified the words as subtheme identifiers (see 
Appendix VI). 
Next, I needed a method of separating sub-themes that did not have a specific 
context as well as the data that were already analyzed in the template analysis. So after 
forming subthemes I assigned each subtheme the value of either ‘general’ or ‘specific’, as it 
related to the context of the subtheme. Subthemes assigned ‘general’ were those that had a 
very general context whereas subthemes assigned the value ‘specific’ had specific context. In 
addition, all the subthemes were identified as to whether or not they were covered by the first 
analysis. These subthemes were assigned the value ‘direct’. Those subthemes not covered by 
the first analysis were assigned the value ‘indirect’. Subthemes that were both ‘specific’ and 
‘indirect’ were then sorted into themes, which were topical and contained more than one 
subtheme. Those subthemes that did not form a theme can be seen in Appendix VI. 
The subthemes that had been identified as both ‘specific’ and ‘indirect’ were placed 
into an Excel spreadsheet where the subtheme identifiers could be tallied by subtheme and by 
theme. To identify which themes were important to the interviewees, I used the absolute sum 
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of subtheme identifiers to rank the themes (see Appendix VI for details). After re-reading the 
transcripts, I inferred that an absolute sum of 100 or greater meant that the theme was 
important to the interviewees (Gray & Densten, 1998). In other words, the transcripts 
affirmed that the themes scoring higher than 100 were important because they were easily 
found within the documents, whereas themes with scores less than 100 were more obscure 
and difficult to find within the documents. Using this technique was a way for me to limit the 
power I have as the researcher, deciding what to present and what not to present (Dunn, 
2010).  
I revisited the participant transcripts to ensure that what came out of both analyses 
were in fact what the interviewees were communicating. The accuracy checking procedure 
involved re-reading each interview transcript several times from start to finish and 
subsequently checking specific transcripts for specific details. The procedure not only served 
to check the accuracy of both analyses, but also to check my own subjectivity. The themes 
that were deemed important are presented in the next chapter. For all the themes identified I 
also made tables that included the subthemes with the relative frequency of subtheme 
indicators by group. I made these theme tables to demonstrate how often a group talked about 
the subtheme relative to the other groups, and to identify if there was any solidarity within 
the groups themselves (see Appendix VI for details).       
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Chapter 5: Results and Analyses 
5.1. Introduction 
My research data were acquired through a variety of sources and the scrutiny of 
these data were as complex as their acquisition. Therefore, for clarity, I have chosen to 
present the findings in the same format and order that I did in the Data Collection section of 
Chapter 4. I will begin with what I found out about mill closures from the media scans and 
document analysis which will be followed by a summary of employment. Next, I will reveal 
the results of my inquiries regarding the timber harvest and valuation information I obtained 
from British Columbia’s Harvest Billing System (HBS). Finally, I will demonstrate what I 
discovered in the breakdown of the semi-structured interviews that I conducted.   
5.2. Mill Closures 
The media scan of the Prince George Citizen newspaper revealed that during the 
period between 1997 and 2011, within the Prince George Timber Supply Area, a total of 
eight lumber manufacturing facilities were closed, one was opened, and two received 
substantial upgrades. These mill closures were as follows: Northwood PG Wood, Canfor 
Netherlands, Canfor Upper Fraser, Winton Global Lumber, Canfor Rustads, and Canfor 
Clear Lake in Prince George District; Pope & Talbot Inc. and Stuart Lake Lumber Co. Ltd. in 
Fort St. James District. There was also the loss of a plywood plant in the Prince George 
District due to a fire. Six of the nine closures occurred between 2008 and 2011. During the 
same time period there was one sawmill opening within the Fort St. James District, one 
sawmill upgrade within the Vanderhoof District, and one sawmill upgrade within the Prince 
George District.  
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As there appeared to be no direct correlation between the mill closures and the 
changes to legislation in 2003, I needed to look for other explanations for the closures. To 
compare and contrast the sawmill closures and openings within the Prince George Timber 
Supply area to other events happening, I constructed an event timeline (see Appendix II). The 
types of events that I included were those having to do with the mountain pine beetle 
epidemic, lumber markets, forest policies, and legislation. Looking at all of the events within 
the context of the forest industry and time period, the event timeline provided me with clues 
as to why the mill closures occurred. On the surface, mill closures and openings seemed to 
coincide with events occurring within the lumber markets. An ancillary investigation of the 
internet for news regarding the mill closures identified above revealed that for some mills, 
the official closing date was years after the fact (Canfor, 2011). So, for the purpose of this 
inquiry, the closing date is the date when production ceased.  
Using the mill closure criteria listed above, the additional investigation revealed that 
the six closures within the Prince George Timber Supply Area occurred between 2007 and 
2010. In 2007 Winton Global Lumber (Hoekstra, 2011), Stuart Lake Lumber Co. Ltd, and 
Pope & Talbot Inc. (Hamilton, 2008) were closed. In 2008 Canfor Corporation (Canfor) 
closed its Rustad mill (Hoekstra, 2010), and then its mill in Clear Lake in 2010 (Hoekstra, 
2011). Meanwhile, the mills that remained open reduced their production capacity by 
reducing the number of shifts at various times (Canfor, 2008; Hamilton, 2008). As for the 
two defunct mills in Fort St. James, both were purchased by other companies in 2009. Pope 
& Talbot Inc. was purchased by Conifex Timber Inc., who re-opened the mill in 2009 (Tice, 
2009). However, Dunkley Lumber Ltd. chose not to re-open the mill when they purchased 
Stuart Lake Lumber Co. Ltd. (Nielsen, 2011). Incidentally, Canfor did not rebuild its 
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plywood plant that was destroyed by a fire; rather, the insurance money was used to invest in 
upgrades for other facilities (Canfor, 2008).  
To understand some of the reasons why these mills were closed, it is useful to look 
at what was occurring elsewhere in the province. In fact, the Prince George Timber Supply 
Area was not the only location to experience sawmill shutdowns as there were massive 
shutdowns occurring throughout the province at that time, both in the Coast and the Interior 
forest regions (Hamilton, 2008). For example, Pope & Talbot Inc., a company based in the 
United States with numerous lumber and pulp operations in British Columbia, filed for 
bankruptcy protection in October of 2007 (VanderKlippe, 2007). For many forest companies 
like Pope & Talbot Inc., the decline in profitability began in late 2006 when lumber prices 
began to fall as a result of declining housing starts in the United States. Profitability was 
further confounded in 2008 when the housing market crisis in the United States began to 
unfold (Hoberg, 2010). Not only were lumber prices reaching historic lows, the value of the 
Canadian dollar was high (Hoberg, 2010).  
Furthermore, the United States was still British Columbia’s largest consumer of 
lumber products (BC Stats, n.d.) so these downturns in the lumber market would have had a 
significant negative impact on the lumber manufacturing sector. The housing crisis in the 
United States was not the sole cause of the problems facing Pope & Talbot Inc. 
(VanderKlippe, 2007) or other forest corporations (Hamilton, 2008). Most companies were 
already stretched financially due to the lengthy legal battle with the United States over 
softwood lumber and the ensuing high tariffs imposed by the US Department of Commerce 
in the form of countervailing and anti-dumping duties (Zhang, 2007). From 1997 to 2001 the 
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export of Canadian lumber into the United States was controlled by quotas established by the 
Softwood Lumber Agreement of 1996 (Zhang, 2007).  
5.3. Employment 
BC Stats reveals that there has been a steady decline in employment in the forest 
industry since 1997, with an overall decline of 43% within the forest industry in British 
Columbia. However, employment in the forestry and logging sector has had a much greater 
decline (57%) than that of the wood manufacturing sector (33%) (see Table 1). What is 
interesting is that if you look at the annual change there are three relatively large negative 
declines in the forestry and logging sector, 2001 (10,700), 2004 (6,000), and 2008 (6,900). In 
contrast, the wood manufacturing sector shows only one significant negative decline, it 
occurred in 2008 with a loss of 10,100 jobs.  Cumulative losses from 1997 to 2011 are 
18,900 jobs in the forestry and logging sector and 14,700 jobs in the wood manufacturing 
sector. 
Table 1: British Columbia Employment by Detailed Industry, Annual Averages. 
NAICS*  Sector 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
Forestry ŧ  1000s 32.9 30.2 29.9 35.5 24.8 25.2 27.1 21.1 21.3 21.4 24.2 17.3 13.9 16.1 14.0 
 Resource 60% 59% 62% 68% 61% 67% 61% 61% 58% 50% 52% 39% 35% 40% 35% 
 Goods 8% 7% 8% 9% 7% 7% 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 4% 3% 
 All 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% - - - - 
Product § 1000s 44.8 43.1 42.1 45.9 48.7 43.5 48.4 45.7 45.1 43.8 43.7 33.6 26.8 28.7 30.1 
 Manufacture 23% 22% 22% 23% 25% 22% 24% 22% 23% 23% 22% 18% 17% 17% 18% 
 Goods 11% 11% 11% 11% 13% 11% 12% 11% 10% 10% 9% 7% 6% 7% 7% 
 All 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Source: Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey (unpublished data). Prepared by BC Stats, 
February 2012.*NAICS – North American Industry Classification System;  
ŧ Forestry and Logging with support activities; § Wood Product Manufacturing. 
Percentages reflect the relative representation to the specific sector, the Goods-Producing Sector, and All 
Industries.  
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The significant loss of 10,100 jobs in the wood manufacturing sector in 2008 can 
definitely be linked to the large number of mill closures throughout the province that year 
(Hamilton, 2008). However, the significant losses experienced in the forestry sector in 2001, 
2004, and 2008 require a more protracted explanation. As jobs in the forestry sector are 
linked to the timber side of the business rather than the manufacturing side, one needs to look 
at those factors which may have influenced the harvesting activities of firms.  
In 2001, the forestry sector experienced a loss of 10,700 jobs. The forest industry 
had been under the costly regulatory regime of the Forest Practices Code of British 
Columbia Act1995 since 1994 (Hayter, 2000; Pearse, 2001), and expiration of the Softwood 
Lumber Agreement in 2001 created unsavory business conditions (Zhang, 2007). However, it 
was likely a combination of the high countervailing duties placed on lumber and the high 
price of stumpage that had the greatest impact on forest sector jobs (Hamilton, 2001; Jackson 
& Curry, 2002). Given that the forest industry in the Coast forest region of the province was 
having much more financial difficulty, due in part that logging costs there superseded those 
elsewhere in the province (Grafton et al., 1998; Pearse, 2001), it is reasonable to assume that 
that most of these job losses likely occurred there.  
In 2004, the loss of 6,000 jobs in the forestry sector can likely be partially attributed 
to changes in technology (MOF, 2001b). Changes in logging and trucking technology 
allowed companies to reach higher levels of efficiency (Stirling, 2004), which meant greater 
production and fewer jobs. As for the 6,900 job losses in 2008, these can be linked to the 
slowdown in the economy triggered by the housing crisis in the United States (Hoberg, 2010). 
As a means of preservation, forest companies drastically curtailed the production of lumber 
and their harvesting operations (Canfor, 2008; Hamilton, 2008).  
 72 
More specifically to the Prince George Timber Supply Area, an analysis conducted 
by Horne (2009) compared forest industry employment in 2006 between the Prince George, 
Vanderhoof, and Fort St. James Districts (see Table 2).  
Table 2: 2006 Direct Employments in Logging and Other Wood Manufacturing Sectors. 












Prince George 2443 8% 2931 10% 26% 
Vanderhoof 752 18% 992 24% 45% 
Fort St. James 290 19% 418 28% 49% 
Source: Horne (2009).  
Note that in terms of relative importance, the employment in the Vanderhoof and Fort St. 
James Districts is nearly double that of the Prince George District. Horne (2009) also 
produced a special report for the ministry responsible for forests in 2009 where he 
reconfigured the alignment of data collected by BC Stats and Statistics Canada in 2006 from 
Regional District to Forest District boundaries. This data reveal the economic dependency of 
each Forest District in the province, where it is described using indicators such as regional 
diversity, dominant basic income sources, dependence on forestry and wood processing, 
forest sector vulnerability, dependence on underground resources, and dependence on 
tourism. From this information it is clear that the Vanderhoof and Fort St. James Districts are 
extremely dependent upon forestry, (see Table 3 for details).  
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Fort St. James Forest 
District 
Regional Diversity 2 1 = Least Diversified 1 = Least Diversified 
Dominant Basic 
Income Source 
Public Sector Forestry &Wood 
Processing 
Forestry & Wood 
Processing 
Dependence on 
Forestry & Wood 
Processing 
21-26% 27-70% 27-70% 
Forest Sector 
Vulnerability 
4 5 = Most Vulnerable 5 = Most Vulnerable 
Source: Horne (2009).  
In addition to the analyses done by Horne (2009), approximate job losses associated 
with the closing of mills between 2007 and 2010 in the Prince George Timber Supply Area 
were obtained from the ancillary media scan (see Table 4). For the three year period, there 
were an estimated 767 direct jobs lost in the wood manufacturing sector in the Prince George 
Timber Supply Area. The purchase of Pope & Talbot Inc. sawmill by Conifex Timber Inc. in 
2009, which was reported to employ approximately 230 people (Tice, 2009), are included in 
the final total estimate of 767 direct jobs. 
Table 4: Approximate Direct Employments Loss Due to Mill Closures in the PGTSA. 
Mill Closure Closure Year Affected Employees District 
Winton Global 2007 ~ 220 Prince George 
Stuart Lake Lumber 2007 ~ 100 Fort St. James 
Pope & Talbot Inc. 2007 ~ 272 Fort St. James 
Canfor – Rustad 2008 ~ 220 Prince George 
Canfor – Clear Lake 2010 ~ 185 Prince George 
Source: Data for Canfor - Clear Lake (Hoekstra, 2010), all other data (Hamilton, 2008) 
Specific employment figures for the Prince George Timber Supply Area are not 
available to the extent that the provincial figures are. However, the similarities between the 
timing of mill closures locally and provincially indicate that the Prince George Timber 
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Supply Area likely experienced similar job losses in the forestry and wood manufacturing 
sectors. Also important to note is that the estimated 767 job loss in the wood manufacturing 
sector cannot be added to the work done by Horne (2009), as his analysis was done using 
official census data and by splitting jurisdictions.  
5.4. Timber Harvest and Valuation 
For the inquiry using the Harvest Billing System (HBS) data, an assumption was 
made that logs are processed where they are scaled. Although trading does occur between 
timber processing facilities, it is assumed that the majority of logs are transported directly to 
where they will be processed because handling and transporting logs is expensive. Thus, it is 
assumed that for economic reasons, logs are sorted at the point of harvest so that they are 
delivered directly to where they will be processed. One particular limitation of using scale 
data from the Harvest Billing System is that the majority of the logs in the British Columbia 
interior are weigh scaled (FLNRO, 2011b). As defined by the Scaling Manual (FLNRO, 
2011b), weigh scaling is a statistically valid method of scaling where only a sample of the 
population is measured. So ultimately, the method of weigh scaling results in a certain 
amount of averaging of the scale data.   
Hence, when a truckload of logs arrives at a mill site the truck is weighed and the 
logs it is carrying are placed into a stratum by the weigh scale operator. A stratum is a 
defined species mix ratio that is predetermined on an annual basis and are unique to the scale 
site (FLNRO, 2011b). Each stratum has its own sampling frequency, which determines how 
often loads are sampled (FLNRO, 2011b). So, after the truck load of logs is placed into a 
stratum and weighed, the logs are then unloaded and the truck is weighed again on the scale 


















































































































































From 1997 to 2011 the majority of the timber that was harvested in the Prince 
George Timber Supply Area (PGTSA) by forest licence holders was also scaled in the 
PGTSA. In fact, throughout the entire time span, with the exception of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2006, at least 97% of the timber harvested within the PGTSA was scaled there as well (see 
Figure 5). The most notable scaling gap occurs: in the Fort St. James District between 2006 
and 2011 (see Figure 2); and in the Vanderhoof District from 2003 to 2006 (see Figure 3). 
Though the majority of the missing scale volume from Fort St. James and Vanderhoof 
Districts can be accounted for as being scaled in the Prince George District, and, therefore, 
within the PGTSA, it does not account for the entire scaling gap.    
A closer examination of the scale data shows that the majority of the harvest and 
scale gap outside the Prince George Timber Supply Area (PGTSA) can be accounted for. In 
the Fort St. James District the majority of timber was scaled in Nadina District for 2004, 
2005, and 2006. In the Vanderhoof District, timber was being scaled in Skeena Stikine 
District for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and less significantly in Nadina District for 2003, 
2004, and 2005. In the Prince George District, timber was scaled in the following Districts: in 
the Quesnel District in 2003, 2004, and 2005; in Mackenzie District for 2004 and 2005; and, 
in the Peace District for 2003 and 2004. What is less clear is the explanation for the scale 
gaps of 2003 to 2006 outside of the PGTSA.  
There are several factors that could help to explain why timber was scaled elsewhere 
during that time period. First, in 2002 and 2004 the allowable annual cut (AAC) for the 
Prince George Timber Supply Area (PGTSA) was increased to accommodate the salvage of 
lodgepole pine being killed by the mountain pine beetle (Pedersen, 2004). Second, according 
to annual reports compiled by the Economics and Trade Branch of the ministry responsible 
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for forests regarding the major primary timber processing facilities in British Columbia, there 
were two companies, Canfor and West Fraser, which had timber processing facilities in other 
Districts besides those within the PGTSA (MOF, 2004a; MFR, 2005; MFR, 2006a; MFR, 
2008b). A final factor could have been that companies were investing in capital upgrades for 
their mills (Canfor, 2003). The allowable annual cut (AAC) had been increased in the Prince 
George Timber Supply Area (PGTSA) due to the mountain pine beetle, but the industry at 
the time may have not had the capacity to mill all of the timber that could be cut. Further, in 
terms of timber profile, the majority of the timber being harvested was lodgepole pine. 
Therefore, it is not difficult to suppose that companies were shipping the timber where they 
needed it most, or where it made economic sense to do so.  
So, looking at the scale gaps again, assumptions can be made between the timber 
harvested, where it was scaled, and the major licensees operating within the Prince George 
Timber Supply Area. Timber that was harvested from the Fort St. James and Vanderhoof 
Districts and scaled in Nadina District could have been timber cut under licence by Canfor 
and/or West Fraser, as both companies had mills located in the Nadina District. These mills 
in the Nadina District were located in Houston (Canfor) and Burns Lake (West Fraser). In the 
case of timber harvested in Vanderhoof District being scaled in Skeena Stikine District, the 
timber may have been shipped by West Fraser, as they had a mill located in Smithers. The 
West Fraser mill in Smithers could have been experiencing a shortfall in timber supply since 
the collapse of Skeena Cellulose, but also because of increased competition for fibre from 
larger producers, like the Canfor mill located in Houston. Timber that was harvested in the 
Prince George District and scaled in the Quesnel, Mackenzie and Peace Districts could have 
been harvested by Canfor, as they not only had several mills in the Prince George District, 
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but mills located in Quesnel (Quesnel District), Mackenzie (Mackenzie District), and in 
Chetwynd and Fort St. John (Peace District).  
When looking at the total revenue generated for the Crown from the timber 
harvested by forest licences, it is important to note that revenue has declined significantly 
over time, showing a negative correlation beginning in 2000. The decrease becomes 
particularly steep between 2006 and 2007. The sharp decline continues to 2010 when it 
becomes clear that there is no apparent correlation to the amount of revenue collected and the 
volume harvested (see Figure 6 for details).  
 
 




















































































Total Volume Harvested by Forest Licences in the  
Prince George Timber Supply Area  
Versus the Revenue Collected  
































































































































































































The resulting data show a steady deterioration of log grade over time with the 
exception of 2007, were the quantity of off grade logs decreased. Though the move towards 
salvaging lodgepole pine was gradual, the degradation of this timber from the time of death 
was progressive (Lewis & Hartley, 2006). As such, the degradation would have affected the 
overall grade of the timber being harvested, and subsequently the stumpage rates applied, as 
the years from death increased. The decrease in off grade timber volume in 2007 can be 
explained by the log grade changes made to the Interior log grades in 2006 which changed 
the definition and categories of sawlogs (FLNRO, 2011b).  
While the changes made to the Interior log grades seemed to temporarily delay the 
off grade status of dead lodgepole pine being harvested in 2007, it did not seem to make 
much of a difference in terms of the overall stumpage revenue collected. Initially, I thought 
that the increased proportion of lodgepole pine being harvested, in combination with the 
decline in the associated log grade, would explain the decline in stumpage revenue. I 
expected that the increase in off grade would produce a decline in stumpage revenue because 
there is a significant difference in dollar value between the stumpage rate of sawlog grade 
and off grade. Currently in British Columbia, the minimum stumpage rate in the Interior is 
$0.25/m3 (Forest Act, Minimum Stumpage Regulation). The minimum stumpage rate is 
applied to conifer off grades, which is currently defined as grade 4 and grade 6 in the Interior 
Appraisal Manual (FLNRO, 2015b). 
Clearly the Interior log grade changes alone do not explain the dramatic decline in 
stumpage revenue over the entire timber profile. It is more likely that the decline in stumpage 
revenue had more to do with how timber was appraised than how it was graded. There were 
two changes to how timber was appraised. The first occurred on July 1, 2006 when the 
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market pricing system replaced comparative value pricing as the method used to calculate 
stumpage in the Interior (MFR, 2006b). The second occurred on July 1, 2010 when the cruise 
based, stand as a whole, pricing mechanism was introduced (MFR, 2010b; MFR, 2010c). 
Basically, the market pricing system takes prices determined through competitive auctions, 
which are administered by BC Timber Sales, and these prices then feed into a complex 
calculation that determines stumpage rates (MOF, 2004b). However, the stand as a whole 
calculation of stumpage was introduced by government as a means of encouraging more 
utilization of low value timber. At the same time, the ministry responsible for forests made 
adjustments to the market pricing system to make it more responsive to market signals (MFR, 
2010d). 
 It was not until I looked at the stumpage and log grade details of the non-pine 
component of the harvests that I realized stumpage rates overall were declining. A 
comparative analysis was done to calculate the average stumpage paid by forest licence 
holders annually from 2000 to 2011 for lodgepole pine versus all other species (see Figure 
12). When looking at stumpage collected for the timber harvested in the Prince George 
Timber Supply Area between 2000 and 2011, the average stumpage paid by forest licence 
holders for lodgepole pine decreased from $31.82/m3 in 2000 to $1.15/ m3 in 2011, with the 
lowest average stumpage paid being $0.89/m3 in 2010. For all other species, the average 
stumpage collected also declined over the time period, from $33.31/m3 in 2000 to $2.58/ m3 
in 2011. It is interesting to note that there appears to be a positive correlation between the 
average stumpage price for lodgepole pine and all other species from 2007 to 2011 (see 




Figure 12: Annual average stumpage paid for lodgepole pine versus all other species.  
When the stumpage collected between lodgepole pine and all other species was 
examined, there was a significant decline in the stumpage rates for non-pine species starting 
in 2007 (see Figure 12). An important point to emphasize is that the component of off grade 
for non-pine species averaged 20% between 2007 and 2009 but averaged 41% in 2010 and 
65% in 2011 (see Figure 13). A final inspection of the non-pine harvest showed that from 
2000 to 2009 there was a fairly consistent proportion of off grade to sawlog grade, averaging 
18%. However, there were significant increases in the off grade for 2010 and 2011 (see 
Figure 13). A closer examination of data in 2010 and 2011 revealed the significance of the 
cruised based scale. For the coniferous non-pine harvest, 27% of that harvest was billed as 
cruise based in 2010 and 57% in 2011 (see Figure 14). Note that in Figure 14, the off grade 
























































































Further inspection of the data revealed that the increase in the off grade component 
was due to the cruise based component in the billing record. Moreover, the average stumpage 
rate for the sawlog component of the non-pine coniferous species that was weigh scaled was 
four times the average stumpage rate for the non-pine coniferous species billed as cruise 
based. In fact, when the volume billed as cruise based is assigned an 80% sawlog recovery 
rate, and the average sawlog stumpage rates are used to calculate the revenue, the calculation 
produces an additional 1.8 million dollars in 2010 and 5.2 million dollars in 2011. Finally, it 
is important to note that in scrutinizing the cruise based scale data the relative proportions of 
lodgepole pine to other coniferous species was also examined. It was found that the 
coniferous non-pine volume contribution did not exceed 30% in either 2010 or 2011, but that 
the average billed volume in both years consisted of 70% lodgepole pine and 30% other 
species.   
5.5. Semi-Structured Interviews 
The participants involved in my research all had informed opinions regarding issues 
surrounding forest policy and the Prince George Timber Supply Area because they have 
worked in forestry and lived in the research area. A total of 18 people were solicited, 11 were 
identified by me and 7 were identified by others. The snowball sampling also confirmed 6 of 
the 11 potential participants that I identified. In the end, I interviewed 15 people from three 
employment/career groups: those who work primarily for industry; those who work primarily 
for government; and those who work at arm’s length to one or both of the other groups. The 
average number of years working in forestry was 33 years and the average number of years 
living in the area was 24 years (see Table 4 for details).  
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Table 5: Interview Participant Statistics. 









Number Solicited 8 6 4 18 
Number Interviewed 5 6 4 15 
Years Working in Forestry (Average) 33 35 31 33 
Years Working in Forestry (Range) 25-40 30-37 27-34 25-40 
Years Living in the TSA (Average) 28 20 26 24 
Years Living in the TSA (Range) 24-36 13-34 21-33 13-36 
 
My intent is to remove as much of myself as possible in the presentation of the 
interview findings and I have written this section to incorporate as many of the participants’ 
voices as possible. Although I am earnest in my endeavor to present the voices of the 
participants and extract myself, I cannot fully achieve my goal within the constraints of a 
Master’s thesis because I have had to make choices as to which quotes to include and which 
to exclude from the body of my work. As such, I will be summarizing what participants have 
said as well as using direct quotes to emphasize particular points.   
The themes that I identified from the interview process were both developed 
beforehand in the form of the interview questions themselves, and derived from the interview 
transcripts. Moreover, though the participant groups were formed as a means of ensuring 
variability in the sample (Yin, 2016), there were no significant trends found within any 
particular group. The lack of significant trends within the groups is an interesting finding 
because it seems to indicate that interviewees were communicating their own perspectives. 
This is not to say that the perspectives expressed were not those of the employment/career 
group, rather, that there was significant variability within each employment/career group. As 
such, specific reference to the employment/career groups in the presentation of the research 
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findings is limited to the construction of the last four themes. These first seven themes were 
derived from the findings from the other sources and then were woven into specific interview 
questions so as to obtain specific opinions.    
Theme 1: The Legislative Changes to Forest Policy in 2003 
In 2003 a suite of legislative changes were made to forest policy under various bills. 
These legislative changes were connected to the Liberal election platform in 2001 and 
specifically to their plan to revitalize the forest industry. This theme involves the specific 
changes brought about by Bill 29 which allowed the holders of forest licences to consolidate 
and subdivide forest licences, and transfer agreements. It also allowed companies to 
determine the number and location of their timber processing facilities. My development of 
interview questions around this theme flowed from my desire to understand why the changes 
were made, and ultimately to find out if the changes were successful in strengthening the 
forest industry. Therefore, I was interested in what participants had to say about events that 
may have precipitated the changes, what they thought were the factors were that influenced 
this change, and, what pressures they thought may or may not have been on the government 
of the day.  
When I listed off the particular changes brought about by Bill 29, the majority of 
participants thought that the changes were good because it freed the industry to operate like a 
business (P2, P6, P7, P8, P11, P14 & P15). As participant P15 expressed: “I think those were 
good changes because they allowed business decisions to drive industry directions, and let 
market forces play a bigger role rather than social engineering” (p. 3). Many also felt that the 
industry had been unduly over regulated for too long (P4, P7, P8, P9, P11 & P14). As 
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participant P4 said: “[s]ometimes if we do try to constrain market forces too much, then we 
sometimes get undesired outcomes” (p. 3). However, there were also participants who were 
concerned about how the industry would respond to the changes (P1, P10, P12 & P13). 
Participant P10 stated: “[…] I was very worried about a number of them, the ability to 
consolidate was one big one that bothered me, and the appurtenancy issue was another […]” 
(p. 2). 
All of the interviewees thought that the reason legislation was changed by Bill 29 
was because the forest industry was not doing well at the time.  A key reason for the 
condition of the industry was that the lumber manufacturers were struggling to compete in 
the global market.  According to participant P6: “[a]t one time the forest industry in British 
Columbia pretty much had a lock on things, but it got very competitive very quickly” (p. 4). 
But global competition was not the only contributing factor in the minds of participants. 
Some believed the ongoing softwood lumber dispute with the United States of America also 
played a large role (P4, P7, P8 & P10). According to participant P7: 
[…] getting a new Softwood Lumber Agreement that was part of it. I think without 
question, some of it was driven by political ideology. […] There was also, I think, 
recognition that the forest industry wasn’t all that healthy and that there was some 
structural problems there that needed to be addressed (p. 3).  
 
With all the pressures for change, many participants felt that the changes made to 
legislation were inevitable (P2, P3, P4, P6, P7 & P15). Participant P7 said of the changes: 
“[…] some things would have changed anyway. But I think the amount of change and the 
pace of change was significantly greater because we did have a change in government” (p. 4). 
However, most also stated that the Liberal government did have a choice in what those 
changes looked like (P1, P2, P6, P7, P9, P12, P13, P14 & P15). As described by participant 
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P6: “[…] I don’t think that they were forced to do it, it was something that they ideologically 
believed was the right thing to do” (p. 5). Still, other participants believed that what the 
changes targeted and how they were implemented was the product of the Liberal 
government’s political ideology (P1, P6 & P11). While explaining how the Liberal 
government was aligned with business, participant P1 revealed: “[…] at the time they came 
into power, their overall economic philosophy took some heavy cues from Alberta” (p. 5), 
and participant P11 surmised: “[t]he easiest way to say it is if we would have had a different 
government in there, I don’t think we would have had the same result” (p. 5).  
Upon concluding the discussion regarding the changes to legislation brought about 
by Bill 29, several participants commented that in hindsight the timing of the changes was 
serendipitous, allowing the industry to reconfigure itself to deal with the mountain pine 
beetle epidemic (P7, P8, P11& P14). This was expressed by participant P11: 
Probably the timing in this one was probably really good, it would be interesting to 
see what would have happened if we didn’t have mountain pine beetle issues to deal 
with. How it all would have played out, because there was a sense of urgency to 
capture value with timber […]. And you know, I think it helped us get there faster, 
as far as having less mills and more optimum ways to run (p. 3).  
 
Even the participants who were initially concerned about the legislative changes 
acknowledged that they understood the need for change (P1, P10, P12 & P13). Which was 
described by participant P12 who said: “I’ve come to see at least that industry needs to be as 
competitive as it can be and it has allowed them to be more competitive. But it was not good 
for a lot of communities” (p. 2). The sentiment was also echoed by participant P10: “I 
understand that you shouldn’t force things to stay open that aren’t economic, except that 
there is that social component to it” (p. 5).  
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Theme 2: The Evolution of the Forest Industry 
When developing this theme I was thinking about how the forest industry might 
have changed over time and wondered if these changes were connected to the changes made 
by Bill 29. I also wanted to know that if the changes in the forest industry were connected to 
the changes in legislation and, if so, how. I asked participants about changes that they saw in 
the forest industry and if they thought they were influenced by the changes made by Bill 29. 
Further, I also asked them to give me specific examples of how they thought they were 
connected. Finally, I asked participants how they felt about the changes and why.  
All of the participants agreed that changes made to legislation in 2003 definitely 
played a role in the evolution of the forest industry because it allowed business decisions to 
be made which in turn facilitated the consolidation and rationalization of the industry. Most 
of the participants felt that this change had been positive for the following reasons: it had 
unlinked the timber supply to the processing facility (P4 & P9); it allowed the industry to 
increase utilization and production (P2 & P12); and it resulted in an industry that is more 
stable and competitive (P3, P6, P9, P10, P14 & P15). One participant felt that the industry 
was more diverse because the constraint of where timber processing was located in relation 
to the timber harvest was removed (P11). Other participants felt that by increasing utilization 
and production, the industry was able to efficiently face the challenges created by the 
mountain pine beetle (P7, P8 & P12). As participant P12 emphatically stated: “[w]ell, I 
believe we have if not the most efficient, certainly one of the most efficient sawmilling 
industries in the world” ( p. 5). Regarding the increased stability of the industry, participant 
P1 commented on the lumber manufacturing sector’s resilience during the last recession: 
“[…] there’s no doubt in my mind that the recession, the 2007 to 2009 recession, it would 
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have been way worse I think in the forest sector, had it not been for those policy changes in 
2003” (p. 7). The stability was further explained by participant P7: “[…] if you’ve got fewer 
mills that have a higher margin, they can operate through different parts of the market cycle 
[…]” (p. 7). Conversely, a few participants had the opposite view as to the evolution of and 
the state of the forest industry, in particular that it was far less diverse in the number of 
players, especially in the value-added sector (P1 & P13), and that there were far less jobs in 
the industry (P5). Regarding the strength of the forest industry post 2003, participant P13 
said the following: 
I don’t know that we are stronger, […] I think we’re more one or two people operate 
on the land base scenario, is where we are at. And I think we would have been 
stronger having a more broad, group of companies (p. 7). 
 
Theme 3: The Centralization and Capitalization of Manufacturing 
The third theme emerged from results that I found from the media scan of sawmill 
closures, the employment statistics from BC Stats, as well as the harvesting and processing 
information I analyzed from British Columbia’s Harvesting Billing System (HBS). What I 
found was that there were many closures of sawmills within the case study, primarily in the 
Prince George District, while over time manufacturing remained constant. As well, the 
employment statistics revealed that over time, there were fewer people employed within the 
forest industry. What I wanted to know from participants is if they thought the current 
industry was stronger as a result and why. I also was interested in what participants thought 
the implications were for forest dependent communities. 
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All of the participants agreed that the consolidation and capitalization of the lumber 
manufacturing sector was hard on communities, especially those whose economies were 
more reliant on forestry. The following participants noted:  
[…] our mills are incredibly efficient. They have smart people running them. The 
ones that weren’t smart aren’t in business anymore. […] Unfortunately, it means 
fewer jobs. They’re producing more lumber with fewer people, way fewer people 
[…] (P12, p. 5).  
 
[…] there’s always a human cry when a mill goes down, or there’s some 
consolidation or a mill burns […]. People depend on those mills for jobs and 
community stability and they don’t see what another option is for them (P6, p. 9).  
 
Nevertheless, despite being hard on communities, the majority of participants felt that the 
industry was stronger because investment in capital made the industry more efficient (P1, P2, 
P3, P4, P12, P14 & P15), more flexible (P5, P7, P8, P9, P10, P14 & P15), and able to operate 
within smaller economic margins (P1, P6 & P11). None of the participants were that 
surprised by the consolidation of industry because, according to participant P15: “[…] the 
investment in technology and infrastructure leads to concentration of the manufacturing into 
fewer areas, fewer communities” (p. 5). Again, as noted by participant P9: “[t]hey can move 
the wood to wherever they need it for their other mills. So it’s allowed probably more big 
mills, more efficient mills, or more modern mills to evolve” ( p. 4). Participants also revealed 
that Prince George has always been a hub of industrial activity (P2, P7, P12 & P14). As 
participant P8 explained:  
Prince George has always been the centre for consolidating and the accumulation of 
all the bush mills, Sinclair, Penny, southeast, they all come to Prince George, so I’m 
not sure that the concentration issue has changed that much over the decades (p. 6). 
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When speaking specifically about the impact on communities, participants 
generalized beyond the geographic scope of the Prince George Timber Supply Area 
commenting that there were definitely communities that benefited and those that did not. 
Despite the fact that communities were negatively impacted, many participants still felt that 
communities benefit from having an industry that is more stable (P2, P3, P6, P7, P8, P9, P12, 
P14 & P15). As well, the forest industry may still be a part of the community economy even 
though it does not have a timber processing facility. Participant P2 explained: “[s]o what 
ends up happening in those smaller communities is we have a community of loggers but we 
don’t have a community of millers” (p. 6). Conversely, though the Prince George Timber 
Supply Area as a whole may not be among the most economically vulnerable to changes in 
the forest industry, it still has communities that are. The outcome for these forest dependent 
communities, according to participant P4 is that: “[…] stability and employment is no longer 
a given. […] it means that the communities are more susceptible to industry reallocations of 
timber supply and logging” (p. 5). There will be even bigger implications in the future 
because as the timber supply declines and the industry is reconfigured (P1, P2, P4, P6, P7, 
P8, P11, P12, P14 & P15), communities will need to learn to adapt:  
It has kind of forced some unpleasant things on communities with regards to the 
resource sector, but it, it’s a cyclical nature of the business. And I think that if you 
are a town or your principal economy is based on forestry, the real answer should be 
is if you understand the business and the cycle, then you have to recession proof 
your economy for when things aren’t good (P11, p. 7).  
 
Theme 4: Other Changes in the Industry 
This theme of other changes in the industry arose from wanting to know from 
participants what other changes they observed in the forest industry since the changes made 
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by Bill 29. The questions I developed for this theme allowed me to explore aspects of change 
within the forest industry that I had not thought of, and that may or may not be connected 
with Bill 29. Therefore, I asked an open-ended question because I wanted to know what 
participants observed and considered important to mention, with regards to other changes 
within the industry. 
Not all of the participants commented, but those that did noted the following 
changes: the move from the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995 (Code) to 
the Forest and Range Practices Act 2004  (FRPA) (P1, P3, P5, P8, P11 & P13); the rise in 
the number of community forests (P4, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11 & P15); the increased 
participation with and opportunities given to First Nations (P7, P8, P10, P14 & P15); the 
creation of BC Timber Sales (P3 & P8); and,  the modernization and mechanization within 
the logging sector (P4 & P6). The move to the FRPA was a move away from government 
being overly prescriptive to a more results based model. The magnitude of the shift was 
commented on by participant P3: “[s]o huge changes in terms of the long industry 
involvement in meeting objectives and the whole move to professional reliance […]” (p. 6). 
While the transition from the Code to the FRPA was occurring prior to the Liberals coming 
to power, participant P8 speculated the following:  
[…] I think the changes were thought out, that FRPA and appurtenancy and all those 
things were all linked together I think, to help transition that move from the 
Practices Code, to industry being  responsible and government stepping back from 
managing (p. 5).  
 
As for the increased involvement with and for communities and First Nations, the 
involvement was seen as a positive by many and as a means of both creating opportunities as 
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well as providing compensation (P4, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P14 & P15). The sentiment of 
redistribution was held by participant P7, who said: 
[…] the whole Bill 28 take back, and redistribution of some of the volume. Clearly, 
that has helped facilitate a couple of things: 1) more smaller community-based 
tenures, which has been interesting and has been, I think, generally positive, and the 
same thing with First Nations volume. You know, government buying that back that 
volume has provided the opportunity for a whole lot more First Nations groups to 
have a more active part in the forest industry, which I think really helps (p. 8).  
 
Theme 5: Timber Stewardship 
During the mountain pine beetle epidemic the choice was made to accelerate the 
harvest to accommodate the salvage of lodgepole pine timber before it lost its economic 
value. One of the consequences of the choice to accelerate the harvest for the study area is 
that there will be a substantial reduction in timber supply for the mid-term. Further, in 2012 
the Auditor General of British Columbia criticised the stewardship of timber in British 
Columbia. Both the accelerated lodgepole pine salvage harvest and the Auditor General’s 
criticism served as the context in which I developed this theme. I wanted to know from 
participants if they thought that timber stewardship had been compromised by the changes 
made through Bill 29.   
At different points during the interviews many participants made reference to the 
transition from the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act 1995 (Code) to the Forest 
and Range Practices Act 2004 (FRPA), and these references continued during the discussion 
about timber stewardship. Several participants felt that the Code, for all its flaws, was a 
superior stewardship regime to that of the FRPA (P1, P5, P12 & P13). While for others (P2, 
P3, P6, P9 & P15) the suggestion that timber stewardship and Bill 29 were connected seemed 
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inconceivable. As participant P6 said: “I don’t think that the stewardship and the actual 
milling of the timber are connected at all” (p. 14). The sentiment of separation between 
stewardship and harvesting was also alluded to by participant P3, who said:   
Did 2003 really help, particularly, the shift to the professional reliance model helped 
bring more accountability on the industry side, I personally think that… if you go 
back into the 80s, there is just no comparison as to the Code era and into FRPA era, 
significant improvements on the stewardship side of the business (p. 7). 
 
While the majority of the participants were of the opinion that the timber resource 
had not been compromised (P1, P2, P3, P4, P6, P9, P11, P14 & P15), some thought it could 
have been managed better (P4, P6 & P11). As participant P4 stated,  
I think some of the fundamental issues around stewardship of the resource weren’t 
addressed in the Forestry Revitalization Act because even when you’re talking about 
Community Forests it sounds great, but I mean essentially it’s about reallocation of 
timber rights and harvesting to certain people (p. 7). 
 
There were also participants who thought that the stewardship of the timber may have been 
compromised (P7, P8, P10 & P12), but their reasons varied. For example, participant P10 
thought that a lack of timber stewardship arose from different factors:  
We have had some problems for a while, and I think it comes outside of those Acts, 
just lack of funding coming into inventory, lack of funding going into research and 
those kinds of things, which weren’t necessarily linked with the Acts (p. 6).  
 
While the others felt that the timber stewardship may have been compromised because the 
timber resource has been over allocated (P7, P8 & P12), as participant P8 pointed out, “[…] 
there’s too many players on the land base” (p. 11). Still, others believed that the timber 
stewardship had been compromised primarily because of a shift in governance (P5 & P13). 
As participant P5 explained:   
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I thought that the period in history when we went through CORE and LRMPs, was a 
highlight of good governance. I thought we did a very good job reaching 
accommodations and restoring the public’s faith in the landlord of the province, and 
I thought that that as well secured the future of the forest industry. I actually think 
we’ve taken a step back […] (p. 5). 
 
Theme 6: The Conversion of Forest Licences to Tree Farm Licences 
In the spring of 2013, the government unsuccessfully tried to introduce legislation 
that would allow the conversion of forest licences to tree farm licences. Prior to 2013, in 
August 2012, the Special Committee on Timber Supply released its report and one of the 
recommendations made to the legislature was to explore the possibility of converting volume 
based tenures to area based ones. I was curious if government was indeed acting on the 
recommendation of the committee so I asked participants about this theme. 
When I asked the participants about what they thought motivated government some 
thought that it was to provide industry with more security (P2, P3, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12 & 
P14), while others thought that it was a mitigation strategy for the mid-term timber supply 
(P1, P4, P5, P6, P7 & P15) as well as to provide investment incentives while transferring 
silviculture liabilities (P7, P8 & P13). In reality, all of the aforementioned reasons could be 
connected with the mountain pine beetle epidemic, which was summed up by Participant P15 
who said: “[m]y short answer is that I think it was a desire to improve stewardship and 
investment in the forest basically” (p. 7). 
There was a lot of discussion by a few participants (P2, P4, P6 & P15) regarding the 
fallacy that equates area based tenures, as opposed to volume based tenures, with better 
stewardship. The aforementioned logic is typically based on a set of assumptions made 
regarding the greater certainty offered by area based tenures: that greater certainty will lead 
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to better investment on the land base; and that better investment in silviculture can potentially 
lead to a larger timber supply (P2, P6 & P15). However, as participant P2 argued: “[p]eople 
have to want to increase stewardship and they have to want to increase timber supply […] 
area based tenures have not done that […]” (p. 8).  
The participants were almost equally divided on the question of whether or not they 
supported the idea of such a large timber tenure conversion. However, even those who did 
support it would only support the conversions where it made sense to do so, not a broad-
based conversion of all forest licences (P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P11, P12, P14 & P15).  
Participant P4 said: 
Part of the problem of volume based tenures is that, by their nature, they don’t 
promote the culture of stewardship and care of the land base… if you are worried 
about where your volume is coming off it, and you are competing with many other 
people, you can’t have thoughtful stewardship (p.8). […] So I think where it’s 
economically or ecologically appropriate, area based tenures are a very good thing 
(p. 9). 
 
There were several participants who were not in support of converting forest licences into 
tree farm licenses. A few participants thought that the conversion would equate to giving 
lumber producers tree farm licences (P1 & P13). Another participant thought that the 
conversion was not practical, citing that government would have to find suitable land base in 
the midst of needing to fulfil commitments made to First Nations (P2). Finally, participants 
did not support the conversion given the general uncertainty surrounding the implications of 
a declining timber supply over the mid-term (P10 & P13). The uncertainty was addressed by 
participant P13, who said:  
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You and I can’t predict what’s going to happen five to ten years from now with our 
land base, or the issues that any government or any community is going to face, so 
putting it under tenure for sawmills might not be the right thing (p. 13).  
 
Theme 7: Future Forest Policy Needs 
I developed this theme of future forest policy needs because, despite all of the 
change that has occurred within the past fifteen years, the forest industry is still facing 
multiple challenges moving forward. Policy must continually evolve to remain effective and 
relevant to that which it governs. I purposely left the questions open-ended so as to find out 
from participants what they deemed important to ensure that the forest industry remained 
strong now and into the future.   
The conversation with participants about future policy needs that would ensure the 
survival of the forest industry ranged from managing the land base, to managing our 
obligations to First Nations and communities, to managing the timber supply. On the subject 
of managing the land base, several participants thought that the Forest and Range Practices 
Act 2004 needs be updated because government needs to be clearer about what it wants from 
the land base (P3, P6, P7, P8 & P13). Some participants talked about all of the provincial 
land use plans and the need to have them updated (P4, P6 & P14). Participant P6 commented: 
We’ve got good land use plans, however, I think the land use plans need to be 
updated, I think they need to be modernized, I think they need to be nurtured and 
cared for in a Crown land model. I think the government needs to be clearer on its 
objectives (p. 16). 
 
Other participants recognized the significant role that First Nations will play moving forward 
(P3, P6, P7 & P14). Participant P14 observed: “[…] the natural evolution and development of 
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public policy I think will change significantly based on the Tsilhqot’in decision4 of this past 
summer” (p. 12). Participant P7 agreed, and made the following recommendation: 
So I think collectively we’ve got to get our heads around, how do we transition to a 
place that recognizes the fact that there is title out there and that First Nations have 
to get benefits, how do we transition to that in a way that doesn’t unduly impact the 
finances of either the companies or government (p. 10)? 
 
 
There was also considerable discussion around what the implications of a reduced 
timber supply would look like for industry as well as for communities. Some participants felt 
that the industry needs to be more diverse and that there should be more area based tenures 
on the landscape (P1, P9, P10 & P12). As well, timber rights need to be more secure (P4 & 
P12) and processes streamlined (P11). There was certainly concern regarding how 
communities would fare as the timber supply shrinks and the forest industry reconfigures 
itself once more. As participant P3 pointed out:  
[…] we have a number of communities that will be hit pretty dramatically so that’s 
probably the biggest thing to watch, is how we handle diversification with the 
limited opportunity that we have in a declining AAC […] (p. 10). 
 
Some participants felt that government should give communities more say regarding the 
forests that surround them (P5 & P10). But, as participant P10 warned: 
[…] government has to be more engaged in developing the whole package, or 
helping to support that anyways. People are incredibly entrepreneurial if you can 
give them an opportunity and some education and a way to make money that hasn’t 
been considered before. You can’t just throw land at people and expect it to work 
out (p. 7). 
 
 
                                                 
4 The Tsilhqot’in decision was a recent historical ruling in which the Supreme Court of Canada established 
that the Tsilhqot’in Nation had both rights and title to a specific area within their asserted traditional territory 
(Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014).    
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A few participants discussed the need for creating industrial forest zones, where 
intensive timber management could be practiced so more volume per hectare would be 
produced (P2 & P15). One participant talked about the need to create a plan for how to divide 
a reduced timber supply amongst many licensees (P13), while others talked about managing 
cumulative effects (P3) and adjusting timber pricing to reflect changing conditions (P6).  
However, regardless of the repercussions the industry will face during the mid-term, 
participant P9 was hopeful about the long term timber supply, saying: “I think the forest 
industry is going to survive alright, just because we have lots of area and lots of trees out 
there; so we just have to wait for them to grow up” (p. 11). 
These next themes were identified from the interview transcripts through a number 
of iterations to formulate and amalgamate subthemes. Each of these themes has an associated 
table that shows the relative number of times the subtheme was discussed by each group. 
These four themes were deemed relevant because they scored greater than 100 for all 
subthemes and groups. See Appendix VI for the remaining themes identified. As well, in 
these last four themes, the relative frequencies of subtheme indicators by group are shown in 
tables to demonstrate the theme construction (see Tables 6 to 9).  
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Theme 8: Factors that Influence Business Decisions 
Table 6: Theme 8 subthemes and the relative frequency of subtheme indicators by group. 
Theme 8: Factors that Influence Business Decisions 






Economic Bottom Line 45% 36% 18% 
Centralization 0% 0% 100% 
Compensation 50% 50% 0% 
Labour Force 42% 34% 25% 
Logistics 17% 0% 83% 
Shareholders 9% 27% 64% 
Timber Profile 25% 50% 25% 
Transportation 22% 66% 12% 
 
Identifying what factors influence business decisions is helpful to understand why 
lumber producers make the business decisions that they do. Some of these business decisions 
have to do with where sawmills are strategically located, and some of the factors that 
influence these decisions are not as obvious as others. For example, the top three factors 
identified by participants were the economic bottom line, labour force availability, and 
transportation (see Table 5).  The interconnected nature of these factors was explained well 
by participant P8, who said: 
One of the economic decisions that is made is where logs should be delivered to 
enable a profit to be made. If factors such as mill technology, work force 
availability, operating costs (such as energy costs) transportation availability (ie 
trucks or rail) allow a facility to run at a profit and conversely another mill at a loss, 
business decisions would now allow the wood to be hauled to a profitable facility 
rather than a non- profitable facility (p. 7). 
 
Participants discussed other factors that influence the business decisions of lumber 
manufacturers, such as the following: the centralization of manufacturing, as a matter of 
capturing the economies of scale; the compensation paid to the industry by government for 
the loss of timber harvesting rights; and, the reality that many lumber manufacturing firms 
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have shareholders to whom they must answer. Almost everything influencing a business 
decision can be traced to improving profitability and viability. Even operational factors like 
logistics (the location of timber versus the mill, versus the market) or the timber profile (the 
species, size, and grade of timber being harvested) influence business decisions. As described 
by the following participant:      
[…] they don’t have a lot of duplication in their operations. What I mean by that is 
where you might have had two or three stud mills before, and one dimensional 
lumber mill, maybe depending on how you revamped your operations with regard to 
your timber supply […], you might be able to position those mills in better places 
depending on what the products are coming in (P11, p. 5). 
 
Perhaps the most surprising factor influencing the business decisions of lumber 
manufacturers is labour force availability. Finding capable employees is, as participant P7 
noted, “[…] another complicating factor which is that rural BC… rural Canada’s all moving 
to town” (p. 7), and the problem is ongoing. It is not only finding people who want to live in 
smaller communities, but having to compete with the oil and gas sector:  
Drawing people to some of the smaller communities is problematic given the 
shortage of workers today. I don’t think the province or industry at the time realized 
how difficult it is to draw good people to some of the outlying locations (P8, p. 15). 
 
Theme 9: The Competitive Log Market 
Table 7: Theme 9 subthemes and the relative frequency of subtheme indicators by group. 
Theme 9: The Competitive Log Market 






BC Timber Sales 35% 53% 12% 
Log 36% 50% 14% 
Log Market 0% 100% 0% 
Tenure Reform 0% 100% 0% 
Value-added Sector 22% 41% 37% 
High End Products 40% 20% 40% 
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During the interview discussions participants had quite a bit to say about the 
competitive log market, particularly the value-added sector, or lack thereof. This theme is 
important because the development of a competitive log market was a key component of the 
Forest Revitalization Plan. As participant P1 explained:  
[…] when you read the Forest Revitalization Plan there was a whole suite of 
outcomes that they expected around stimulating the value-added wood industry, […] 
and those things have not come to fruition. The value-added wood sector has 
actually withered under the Forestry Revitalization Plan […] (p. 5).  
 
According to the participants, one cannot discuss the impact of Bill 29 without considering 
the role that Bill 28 played. Bill 28 involved the ‘take back’ of timber volume by government 
from the forest licence agreement holders in order to reallocate timber for community forest 
agreements, First Nations, and woodlots, as well as provide volume for BC Timber Sales 
(BCTS) (Bill 28, 2003).  
The key role of BC Timber Sales (BCTS), as explained by participants, was to 
provide a competitive log market. The creation of BCTS served two purposes: to create the 
Market Based Pricing System, upon which provincial stumpage rates were generated; and to 
provide a supply of logs for other would be entrants to the market. Some participants felt that 
the forest industry has become more diversified as a result. Still, despite a diverse group of 
players, many participants felt that there is still too much focus on lumber manufacturing. 
Participant P14 noted:  
We’re still not there as an industry when you take a look at some of the species that 
we have in the province of British Columbia and you take a look at just making 
commodity based lumber out of it. There seems to be a disconnect […] (p. 17). 
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While a few participants believe that the value-added sector was just not a profitable 
venture, especially given the high costs of labour and transportation, others suggested that the 
absence of the sector had more to do with a lack of timber supply for would be investors. 
Referring to the lumber manufacturing firms, participant P5 stated: “[t]he big boys didn’t 
want it, so they killed it” (p. 9). Participant P12 explained:    
Most of them focus way too much on dimensional lumber. And they don’t look 
enough at alternate markets. In fact, they don’t want alternate products to succeed.  
They didn’t want the value-added sector to succeed, so the value-added sector didn’t 
succeed… for the most part because the big boys didn’t want that competition. […] 
For the wood! Not the market, because it’s a totally different market (p. 6).  
 
Although participants did not agree on the reasons for the absence of a flourishing value-
added sector, many agreed that too many high value logs are converted into commodity 
lumber, as was voiced by participant P10,    
I really think we need to start making better investments into figuring out better 
ways to use every cubic metre that we have. Changing that industrial model, not 
100% away from what it currently is, that’s always, probably always be the bread 
and butter for BC (p. 8). 
 
Theme 10: The Disposition of Timber Rights 
Table 8: Theme 10 subthemes and the relative frequency of subtheme indicators by group. 
Theme 10: The Disposition of Timber Rights 






Timber Allocation 59% 21% 20% 
Timber Rights 42% 31% 27% 
Operating Area 50% 50% 0% 
 
The disposition of timber rights in the future will be increasingly important, 
particularly moving into a much smaller mid-term timber supply where the competition for 
timber supply is already fierce. As participant P11 illustrated: 
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[…] what we never really thought about is, on the land base, there are always too 
many constraints, and so, how do we make it all fit? And you know, if you look at 
some of the other future states, of what the tenure system might look like, how to try 
to fit in First Nation Woodland Licences for example, at the end of the day you only 
have so much pie, and right now the pie’s pretty much already spoken for (p. 4). 
 
Though it seems inevitable that the shrinking timber supply will force another rationalization 
by the forest industry, concern remained among participants as to what these changes will 
mean for the timber rights currently held. To confound the issue is the reality that 
government has some outstanding obligations to fulfill to First Nations:      
[…] [it is] absolutely critical that as we look at mid-term timber supply and then we 
look at adjustments to annual allowable cuts, how that reduction in cut is handled 
and how it is proportionally shared between big companies and small companies. 
[…] The other challenge for us will be again the Tsilhqot’in decision has made it 
very clear that First Nations will play a much much larger role on the landscape, and 
what does that mean in terms of timber supply […] (P14, p. 11). 
 
Participants explained that many licensees have seen their operating areas shrink 
over time due to increased constraints and the number of licensees operating on the same 
land base. The uncertainty around timber rights has caused considerable angst for them not 
only in terms of timber supply, but in terms of managing the land and running a business. A 
few participants noted that in some cases the overlap of tenures has created so much 
competition that different licensees are literally chasing the same tree. It is not just about who 
can get ribbon around the timber first, it is about who can log the timber first.  
Despite the situation of an already crowded land base, many participants 
acknowledged the importance of involving First Nations and giving them timber tenures on 
the land base. The primary concern expressed by many participants was that any reallocation 
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of timber supply needs to ensure that it is both inclusive and equitable to all. However, as 
participant P8 reminded me:  
Government has to govern for the best outcomes for the province and communities 
need to ensure benefits, employment, sustainability, and sound forest management 
on the forests that directly affect them. The debate of who owns the trees, the rights 
to manage the forests, and the economics generated from the forests will always be 
there (p. 8). 
 
Theme 11: The Lumber Manufacturing Business 
Table 9: Theme 11 subthemes and the relative frequency of subtheme indicators by group. 
Theme 11: The Lumber Manufacturing Business 






Dimensional Lumber 19% 70% 11% 
Residual Products 52% 36% 12% 
Crown Revenue 66% 24% 10% 
 
Participants discussed various aspects regarding the lumber manufacturing business, 
which makes this theme important because it gives a broader perspective, which will foster a 
greater understanding of the current forest industry. The key to the success of any lumber 
manufacturer is to maximize the utilization of the entire log profile and to keep costs as low 
as possible, which involves not only creating efficiencies, but utilizing the waste stream. The 
concept was explained well be participant P8, who said:  
By-products directly from the forests or from sawmill facilities is a significant 
portion of revenue/costs for any forest company. To reduce costs there must be an 
outlet for the by-products, such as chips, sawdust, log waste. The industry has 
responded well in the past decades with pulp mills, pellet plants and now energy 
plants. These facilities exist as a result of the primary harvest and saw milling 
components of the forest industry (p. 8). 
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The concept of maximizing utilization of the log is particularly true for lumber manufactures 
in the Prince George Timber Supply Area given the cost of capital investments and distance 
to markets. For example, “[t]o continue to produce commodity based lumber, you are looking 
at a 100 million dollar investment to be competitive with modern day scanners” (P14, p. 5). 
Then the product has to get to markets around the world: 
[…] these are mills in northern British Columbia that have to mill their product and 
get it to markets that are a long way away. They’re not sitting in the southern United 
States, or on the eastern seaboard. They have to ship their product all the way from 
northern BC into Chicago, down the railroad, into the southern US, or into Texas, 
into California, it has to go a long way, or across the ocean into Japan or Europe 
(P6, p. 6). 
 
According to some participants, the investment in capital upgrades for sawmills that 
are strategically located has meant that more lumber can be produced more efficiently with 
less waste, and that those waste products have a market. Further, the high production capacity 
of these modern sawmills is flexible, in that it can be increased or decreased by adding or 
subtracting shifts. The flexibility of production has allowed producers to be more responsive 
to market demand, as well as respond to the milling demand created by the mountain pine 
beetle epidemic.  
On the harvesting side of production costs, participants noted that the logging 
systems and trucking configurations have also adapted to the pressure of greater production. 
For example, logging systems switched to roadside processing and short log lengths, which 
enabled the short log truck configurations to haul more logs per truck load. Participants 
explained that the change on the harvesting side of the business was a necessary shift because 
the harvest in the Prince George Timber Supply Area was focused on salvaging lodgepole 
pine, which meant Forest Licensees were traveling greater distances from their milling 
facilities for timber that was of marginal quality and relatively small. 
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Another cost of concern when producing lumber, as explained by participants, is the 
price that is paid for the timber; the price of stumpage. While lumber producers are always 
concerned about how much they are paying for timber, there was some concern among 
participants that stumpage in the future might be increased to accommodate revenue sharing 
with First Nations, which would most certainly make lumber production costs prohibitive. 
Meanwhile, some participants were concerned that the current appraisal system unfairly 
discounts the publicly owned resource in favour of lumber producers. Although this concern 
could not be substantiated by any facts, participants were unwilling to discuss the issue 
further, citing the ongoing softwood lumber dispute with the United States. 
5.6. Conclusion 
  These research findings have demonstrated the interconnectedness of seemingly 
independent events within the broader context of the forest industry, the forest economy, and 
the forest landscape through time following the forest policy choices of that were set in 
motion in 2003. While certain aspects of particular events have been explained, the 
explanations are incomplete because of the influence exerted by other events that were 
happening simultaneously. Hence, this story is only a partial story of about how lumber 
manufacturing companies in the Prince George Timber Supply Area responded to the 
changes made to legislation in 2003 by Bill 29. In the next chapter I will draw upon the 




Chapter 6: Discussion  
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will connect the key findings from this case study to the theories 
explained in Chapter 3. The chapter will begin by discussing the key findings and impacts 
resulting from the rationalization of the forest industry, which will be followed by a 
discussion regarding the timber harvest and valuation. Next, the impact of the mountain pine 
beetle will be discussed in light of how the forest industry and government responded to the 
crisis. Finally, the discussion will shift to answering the research questions which will 
determine how the theories explained in Chapter 3 inform this case study and where this case 
study fits within the broader context of British Columbia.   
6.2. Rationalization of the Forest Industry 
 Although the closure of Pope & Talbot Inc. and Stuart Lake Lumber Co. Ltd. could 
be linked to financial difficulty (Hamilton, 2008), according to several interviewees (P1, P2, 
P4, P6, P7 & P14), as well as documentation found within an annual report (Canfor, 2011), 
the remaining mill closures in the Prince George Timber Supply Area were part of the 
ongoing rationalization being undertaken by local forest companies as a means of remaining 
competitive in the global marketplace. Decisions were made as to which mills to close and in 
which mills to make capital investments. These business decisions considered things like the 
geographic location of the mill relative to the location of an appropriate timber supply, which 
was one of the driving reasons for the closure of Canfor’s Clear Lake sawmill (Canfor, 2011). 
In the case of Canfor’s Rustad sawmill, the cost of upgrading was deemed too costly (Canfor, 
2011).  
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Perhaps the greatest impact of the consolidation and capitalization of the lumber 
manufacturing sector was the negative impact that it had on many communities, particularly 
those whose economy was dependent on the forest industry. While all of the interviewees 
agreed that the consolidation of the industry had a negative impact on communities, some 
interviewees (P7, P8, P11, P14 & P15) felt that the overall stability of the industry had 
improved. Still other interviewees (P3 & P15) speculated that these negative impacts to 
communities were in some cases partially mitigated by the timber volume expropriated by 
Bill 28, which allowed government to reallocate those timber resources to communities in the 
form of community forest agreements (Bill 28, 2003). In terms of First Nations communities, 
several interviewees (P7, P10, P14 & P15) noted that there has been a significant increase in 
participation by First Nations within the forest industry, in the form of partnerships with 
other industry stakeholders, revenue sharing agreements, and the allocation of timber tenures.  
Provincially, the job losses in the forestry sector for 2004 and 2008, and the wood 
manufacturing sector for 2008 were directly related to the changes brought about by Bill 29.  
By freeing the industry to rationalize the lumber manufacturing business, companies were not 
only free to decide how to best configure the manufacturing side of their business, but, the 
timber harvest as well. So, the process of rationalization impacted employment within the 
wood manufacturing sector and the forestry sector. According to interviewees, the logging 
sector underwent a period of consolidation and reconfiguration which reduced the number of 
logging contractors. Forest companies were now able to demand leaner business practices 
from their logging and trucking contractors and technology provided the means to do so (for 
more information see Theme 11: The Lumber Manufacturing Business in the previous 
chapter, pages 111-113).  
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In terms of diversity within the forest industry in the Prince George Timber Supply 
Area, there were mixed views held by interviewees. A few interviewees felt that the industry 
as a whole is more diverse as a result, citing the rise of the bio-energy sector (P3 & P11), 
whereas others thought that the industry was less diverse, stating that there are only one or 
two companies and virtually no value-added sector (P1 & P13). Yet, it appears that in the 
Prince George Timber Supply Area, at least in the lumber manufacturing sector, that there is 
a good mix of medium and large sized companies. Of the eleven large lumber manufacturing 
mills located within the Prince George Timber Supply Area in 2011, five are owned and 
operated by larger publically traded companies, three are medium sized independent 
companies that work cooperatively together, and two are medium sized independent and 
family run companies (FLNRO, 2015a).  
From an employment standpoint, diversity which includes smaller independent 
lumber manufacturing companies may bode well for communities as recent studies have 
shown that these smaller firms may offer more stable employment. In one study, smaller, 
more specialized timber processing firms located in the southern interior of British Columbia 
were found to be more stable in terms of employment and more resilient to economic shocks 
(Pinkerton & Benner, 2013). Furthermore, another study that examined employment stability 
in the wood processing sectors in the United States and Japan between small, medium and 
large companies found that the greatest employment instability was found in the large 
companies (Lee & Eckert, 2002). 
Since the rationalization of the forest industry through the 2000s, one factor 
regarding employment has changed, it is that people in rural areas are commuting for work 
more than they did in the past (Haan, Walsh & Neis, 2014). An increase in commuting was 
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noted to occur within the Prince George Timber Supply Area by a few interviewees (P4, P7 
& P8), who said that people do not necessarily live where they work anymore. Haan et al. 
(2014) term the phenomenon, employment related geographical mobility, which they 
describe as a non-traditional form of commuting where people in Canada are not just 
commuting from rural places to the city, but from the city to rural places, or from rural places 
to rural places. The increase in commuting has to do with the increasing demand for the 
workforce to be more flexible (Haan et al., 2014), but also because people are more willing 
to live where they want to live and travel to work (Halseth & Sullivan, 2003). 
The trend of increased commuting for work between rural areas and from urban to 
rural areas is interesting to note because as of December, 2011 there were a total of 11 large 
lumber manufacturing mills located within the Prince George Timber Supply Area (FLNRO, 
2015a), and over half of these mills were located outside the boundaries of nearby 
municipalities. Perhaps the shift in workforce flexibility could also be seen as a result of the 
changing work place location. According to interviewees, there are several strategic 
advantages to having these geographic locations (for more information see Theme 8: Factors 
that Influence Business Decisions in the previous chapter, pages 106-107). The first is that 
these companies do not have to pay the taxes associated with being located inside a 
municipality (Martin, 2013). The second is that they can draw employees from more than one 
municipality (Haan et al., 2014).  
The potential advantage of locating outside of municipal boundaries can be 
illustrated using companies located within the Prince George Timber Supply Area. For 
example, Canfor has a mill located at Bear Lake and another at Isle Pierre. Bear Lake is 
located approximately 74 km north of Prince George and 109 km south of Mackenzie, while 
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the Isle Pierre mill is located approximately 50 km west of Prince George and 50 km east of 
Vanderhoof. Similarly, Dunkley Lumber Ltd. has a mill located at Strathnaver, which is 
approximately 79 km south of Prince George and 43 km north of Quesnel. Many 
interviewees identified that there is an ongoing shortage of labourers, millwrights, and 
professionals. So perhaps choosing to keep and invest in mills situated mid-way between 
communities has allowed companies to draw from a larger labour pool (for more information 
see Theme 8: Factors that Influence Business Decisions in the previous chapter, pages 106-
107).  
Perhaps stability for individual people does not mean what it used to. In other words, 
the kind of stability that accompanied the booming forest industry of the 1960s in British 
Columbia does not meet with the same standard today. In the 1960s, individual personal 
stability likely meant living in the same town that you worked in and that you had a steady 
well-paying job throughout your entire career. Whereas today’s definition may be more 
flexible in that people are expected to have to change careers multiple times in throughout 
their lives. Maybe individual personal stability today means having enough steady income to 
be able to live where you want to. In which case, the location of the lumber manufacturing 
facility would be less important to employees than the resilience of the mill.   
6.3. Timber Harvest and Valuation 
The results from the harvest data and interview analyses clearly demonstrate that 
both the Prince George District and the Prince George Timber Supply Area (PGTSA) serve 
as processing hubs, for the Timber Supply Area itself and for the northern interior. As the 
PGTSA is the largest contributor to the provincial allowable annual cut (AAC), it was 
important to investigate the concerns raised by interviewees, that too much non-pine and 
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spruce was being harvested. The fact that the ministry responsible for forests (MFR, 2007) 
and this research show that the expectations of the Chief Forester appear to have been met 
does not mean that the concerns raised have no validity. On the contrary, I think that their 
concerns speak to the stewardship of the timber resource rather than to the specific adherence 
to the Chief Forester’s expectations. In short, concern that harvesting more green timber now 
means less available for harvest later, for the mid-term. Recently, both Canfor and West 
Fraser were found to be harvesting more green timber than they were supposed to be in the 
Morice Timber Supply Area (Hunter, 2015).  
In the Prince George Timber Supply Area licensees were also found to be harvesting 
more non-pine leading and spruce leading stands in the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 fiscal 
years and less lodgepole pine (Forest Practices Board, 2014). Both cases revealed that the 
alleged violations would not or could not be enforced by government. In the case of the 
Prince George Timber Supply Area, the allowable annual cut (AAC) uplifts (Pedersen, 2004) 
and subsequent partitions (Snetsinger, 2011) are classified as expectations of the Chief 
Forester, which are not bound by legislation and, therefore, are not enforceable (Forest 
Practices Board, 2014). The evidence noted above is by no means conclusive, yet, it does 
suggest that perhaps government expectations of licensees do need to be regulated through 
statutory law so that they can be enforced.   
While my research did not find any excess harvest of non-pine coniferous timber, it 
did reveal that the cruise based appraisal of non-pine coniferous species produced a much 
lower stumpage value than the conventional appraisal method in 2010 and 2011. 
Unfortunately the stumpage appraisal system is complex, consisting of a myriad of variables, 
all of which are used to calculate stumpage rates. Some of the factors that feed into the 
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stumpage calculation include, but are not limited to: administration costs; development costs; 
road management costs; basic silviculture cost estimates; low grade percentage adjustments; 
market pricing system selling prices; estimated winning bid variables; log transportation; 
specified operations; and a consumer price index (MFR, 2010c). It is because of the above 
noted complexity that there is no way to know for certain if there was a loss in stumpage 
revenue due to the cruise based appraisal, when a full appraisal may have yielded similar 
stumpage rates. What is certain is that forest licence holders were increasingly using the 
cruise based method of stumpage billing, which demonstrates that there was an economic 
advantage to do so, be it through lower stumpage rates or reduced administrative costs.  
Still, in terms of revenue, British Columbia is receiving less in the form of stumpage 
than it ever has in the past, with stumpage revenues falling in the Prince George Timber 
Supply Area from $292 million to $15 million from 2000 to 2011. As my results show, part 
of the revenue decline was due to the focus on harvesting lodgepole pine and part is due to 
the degrading timber and the application of the minimum stumpage rate.5 Finally, despite the 
complexity of the appraisal system, it may be that the factors that feed into the calculation of 
the stumpage rate are the variables that explain the much lower stumpage rates from 2007 to 
2010.  The Market Pricing System began to be used in 2006 for the Interior timber appraisal 
process, as a system of reflecting market conditions more accurately. Hence, it could be 
argued that the extremely poor lumber market conditions from 2007 to 2010, combined with 
factors that were reflecting more costly development and logging costs as the lodgepole pine 
                                                 
5 The current minimum stumpage rate of $0.25/m3 was established by Order in Council 1935 (OIC 
1935/1987) on September 24, 1987, and it has been in effect ever since. This new minimum stumpage rate of 
$0.25/m3 was part of the comparative value pricing package put in place to change the way stumpage was 
calculated (Grafton et al., 1998). While it is known when and why the minimum stumpage rate was changed to 
$0.25/m3, I could not ascertain why the minimum stumpage rate was set to $0.25/m3, nor could I find any 
justification as to why this minimum rate has not changed since 1987, not even to reflect inflation; if inflation 
were taken into account, the minimum stumpage rate would have been $0.44/m3 in 2011. 
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harvest moved further away from processing centres, contributed to the low average 
stumpage rates.   
Another important aspect to consider is that the interests of the forest industry are 
not necessarily the interests of government, or at least they should not be. The business 
interests of the forest industry are driven by profit, as illustrated by Canfor’s President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Donald B. Kayne, in his address to shareholders: 
In 2011, Canfor made substantial progress in delivering on our vision to be the 
world’s most competitive forest products manufacturer. Our strategy is three-
pronged: to aggressively build global demand for our products, to secure the high-
quality, sustainable fibre supply to meet the demand we create, and then run 
efficient production facilities to make high-quality products cost effectively (Canfor, 
2011, p. 4). 
While it is true that our provincial economy benefits from a healthy forest industry, the 
benefits to the province have been clearly demonstrated by this case to be declining. The 
above noted strategies are all components of mass production, a strategy that maximizes 
production and minimizes cost (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a; Nelson et al., 2007). 
Ultimately, the owner of the timber is interested in getting the highest price for the log, 
whereas the manufacturer wants to buy the timber at the lowest possible cost. Clearly there is 
a conflict between the two interests which cannot be easily reconciled. 
6.4. The Impact of Mountain Pine Beetle 
 Although the significance of the mountain pine beetle epidemic did not seem to be 
on the government’s radar at the time that Bill 29 was being established (MOF, 2000; MOF, 
2003; Nelson, 2007), the changes brought about by Bill 29 allowed the forest industry to 
respond effectively to the crisis. Indeed, many interviewees (P7, P8, P11, & P14) commented 
that had it not been for the changes made through Bill 29, the industry might not have been 
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able to deal with the magnitude of the salvage harvest. As it was, the epidemic drove 
companies to modernize with new technologies and capital improvements to lumber 
manufacturing facilities to leverage the economies of scale.  
The increasing degradation of quality in the lodgepole pine logs also forced the 
increased utilization of the logs, as there was increasingly poor lumber recovery. Increased 
utilization by the industry was confirmed by interviewees who explained that finding value in 
the waste stream is critical for making lumber production economically viable (for more 
information see Theme 11: The Lumber Manufacturing Business in the previous chapter, 
pages 111-113). These investments also mean that the industry is able to produce more 
products using fewer mills and a much smaller labour force; it also means that the industry is 
more flexible in terms of production, by simply modifying the number of shifts operating at 
any given time a company can reduce its output and its expenses. The question is what will 
happen when the timber supply to these mills is reduced?  
From a timber supply perspective the falldown for the mid-term supply in the Prince 
George Timber Supply Area will be significant in that the allowable annual cut (AAC) is 
predicted to be half of what it is today (Snetsinger, 2011). The successive increases to the 
allowable annual cut (AAC) to accommodate the rapid salvage of lodgepole pine killed by 
the mountain pine beetle epidemic helped to create a very efficient lumber manufacturing 
industry by design, one that processed a lot of inexpensive timber over a very short time. 
How will these high volume manufacturers be able to maintain their economic viability 
without compromising either the future timber supply or the fair remuneration to the Crown 
in the form of stumpage once the timber supply is reduced?  Perhaps the most important 
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thing to ascertain when the reduction in allowable annual cut (AAC) occurs is just what is a 
sustainable level of harvest, and for whom?    
According to some interviewees (P2, P7, P8 & P11), companies are, at least for the 
interim, augmenting their supply from other Timber Supply Areas (TSAs), like the 
Mackenzie TSA. In the same way that timber cut in the Prince George Timber Supply Area 
was processed in other locations outside of the Timber Supply Area (TSA), likewise timber 
cut in another TSA can be processed in the Prince George Timber Supply Area. However, 
some companies are already transitioning in light of the reduced timber supply and are 
invoking the ability to transfer their timber tenure agreements. For example, in 2013, Canfor 
announced that it would close its sawmill in Quesnel in early 2014, and that it was making a 
deal with West Fraser to exchange its timber harvesting rights in the Quesnel TSA and some 
in the Lakes TSA for some West Fraser timber harvesting rights in the Morice TSA (Canfor, 
2013). In this case, the agreement would have benefited both companies, as West Fraser had 
substantial investments in Quesnel (Quesnel TSA) and Burns Lake (Lakes TSA), whereas 
Canfor had substantial investment in Houston (Morice TSA). While the full impact of a 
reduced timber supply has not yet come to fruition for the Prince George Timber Supply 
Area, several interviewees (P2, P7, P8 & P14) indicated that the reduction in timber supply 
will force another round of rationalization by the forest industry.   
There was also speculation from a few interviewees (P1 & P8) that forest 
corporations will choose to invest outside of British Columbia in the future. In fact, there is 
evidence that companies within the Prince George Timber Supply Area are investing 
elsewhere, specifically, Canfor (Canfor, 2015), West Fraser (West Fraser, 2016), and Conifex 
(Penner, 2015). One motivation might be for companies to shock proof their investments 
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given the short-lived and volatile nature of the Softwood Lumber Agreement (Penner, 2014), 
another  may be that companies are looking for an alternative and inexpensive source of 
softwood fibre, like Conifex, which recently purchased a sawmilling facility in the State of 
Arkansas (Penner, 2015). It is also possible that forest companies in British Columbia are 
choosing to invest in the Southeastern United States because the regulatory burden is 
significantly less there than it is in British Columbia (Cashore, Mcdermott, Auld & Newsom, 
2006). 
In the case of Canfor, it has been consistently investing and divesting in assets as a 
strategy to improve its market share for some time. Canfor began applying the strategy in 
2000 with the purchase of Northwood Inc. in British Columbia (Canfor, 2000). The strategy 
was continued with the following acquisitions: a small sawmill in Quebec in 2003 (Canfor, 
2003); Slocan Group in British Columbia in 2004 (Canfor, 2004); New South Companies 
Inc., with facilities located in North and South Carolina (Canfor, 2006); a sawmill located in 
Darlington, South Carolina in 2007 (Canfor, 2007); and, the solid wood processing facilities 
from Tembec Industries Ltd. in British Columbia in 2011 (Canfor, 2011). Throughout the 
2000s Canfor has not only acquired mills, it invested in upgrading for some while closing 
others, and sometimes it invested in upgrades only to close the facility a short time later 
(Canfor, 2000-2011). At present count, Canfor has invested in 17 timber product 
manufacturing facilities in the Southern United States, 12 of which were acquired since 2011. 
By comparison, Canfor has 18 such investments in Canada, 16 in British Columbia and 2 in 
Alberta (Canfor, 2015).     
It is important to look at how the forest industry and government conducted 
themselves because it may be that while dealing with the multiple crises that occurred during 
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the past decade, a resource economy that is addicted to low cost commodity exports (Burda 
& Gale, 1998; Freudenburg, 1992) helped to create an industry that is committed to mass 
production and one which may now be addicted to a low cost supply of timber. It also shows 
that perhaps the forest industry is indeed in the final stages of its lifecycle (Edenhoffer & 
Hayter, 2013b). 
6.5. Research Questions Revisited 
Though British Columbia may have not been leading the way globally in terms of its 
forest governance mechanisms, it is recognized as being relatively progressive among forest 
jurisdictions in Canada (Luckert et al., 2011; Haley & Nelson, 2007). In fact, other forest 
jurisdictions in Canada are following British Columbia’s lead (Haley & Nelson, 2007). For 
example, in 2011 the Ontario government revealed its plans to change its forest tenure 
arrangements to something similar to those brought into effect in British Columbia by Bill 29 
(OMNRF, 2011). So, while my research did not reveal any indication that British Columbia 
looked to other forest jurisdictions for insight for its forest policy reforms, numerous 
interviewees in this study (P1, P2, P5, P9, P12 & P13) stated that the BC Liberals consulted 
heavily with the forest industry regarding forest policy changes. In fact, several interviewees 
in the government group suggested that the forest policy changes of 2003 did not follow the 
normal course of policy development in that the new government did not consult the ministry 
responsible for forests. Rather, the government came in to power with the policy changes 
ready to implement. 
Looking back to my research questions, I do believe that the legislative changes 
brought about by Bill 29 did help forest companies become globally competitive, but I 
wonder if the cost to do so was worth it for British Columbia. Burda and Gale (1998) warned 
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that British Columbia’s addiction to low cost commodity forest products would compromise 
its future, yet, British Columbia still subscribes to the model of sustained yield forest 
regulation, which continues to support the current forest industry. I argue that this case study 
demonstrates that Bill 29 has weakened the overall forest economy of British Columbia by 
reducing the contribution of the forest industry to the provincial GDP and limiting the 
choices of future governments.   
The recent consolidation of the forest industry was facilitated by Bill 29 in two 
ways: by repealing the appurtenancy clause from the Forest Act 1996; and by allowing the 
consolidation and subdivision of forest licences, as well as the ability to transfer forest 
licences (Bill 29, 2003). The removal of the appurtenancy clause provided forest companies 
with the investment flexibility to decide which mills to invest in and which to close without 
incurring contractual penalties (Bill 29, 2003). The result was the consolidation of timber 
processing facilities through rationalization. Consolidation of the forest industry also 
occurred by reducing the number of corporate groups and companies that hold major timber 
tenures in the province and as a result, concentrating the bulk of the available timber rights 
into fewer hands. 
In the Prince George Timber Supply Area, there is substantial evidence of the 
rationalization of timber processing facilities. This rationalization is illustrated best by 
Canfor’s decisions to close the Rustad and Clear Lake mills in the Prince George District 
while making capital investments in the Plateau mill in the Vanderhoof District. However, 
when Dunkley Lumber Ltd. purchased the holdings of the Stuart Lake Lumber Co. Ltd., the 
choice to not re-open the mill in Fort St. James District was more than just an illustration of 
investment flexibility. The purchase made by Dunkley Lumber Ltd. is a prime example of 
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how some forest companies were able to take advantage of the crises that were impacting the 
financial viability of other forest companies in British Columbia. With no appurtenancy 
clause company holdings, which included forest licences, could be sold without the 
obligation to run the mill originally attached to the forest licence.  
Provincially, in 2011, the top five corporate groups and companies held 23% of the 
existing major timber tenure agreements in the province (excluding woodlot licences and 
community forest agreements), and 55% of the available timber supply (FLNRO 
“Apportionment”, n.d. ). There was not much difference in March 2000, where the top five 
corporate groups and companies held 19% of the existing major timber tenure agreements 
and 50% of its available timber supply (FLNRO “Apportionment”, n.d.). But, a closer 
evaluation reveals that 26% of the major licence holders had greater than a 1% share of the 
provincial allowable annual cut (AAC) in 2000 as opposed to only 17% of the major licence 
holders in 2011 (FLNRO “Apportionment”, n.d.). The situation has continued to worsen and 
as of April of 2016, only 13% of the major licence holders in the province had greater than a 
1 % share of the provincial allowable annual cut (AAC) (FLNRO “Apportionment”, n.d.).  
As for the Prince George Timber Supply Area, not much changed in the 
apportionment between 2000 and 2011 (FLNRO “Apportionment”, n.d.).  The exception 
being that Dunkley Lumber Ltd. acquired an additional renewable forest licence: A18169, 
which formerly belonged to Stuart Lake Lumber Co. Ltd. This is not to say that companies 
with processing facilities located within the Prince George Timber Supply Area did not 
purchase renewable forest licences in other Timber Supply Areas, or that they have not 
purchased such licences since 2011. Bill 29 has enabled a trajectory of acquiring timber 
rights, but the full extent of its reach has yet to be comprehended. Bill 29 also allows the 
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transfer of timber rights from one Timber Supply Area to another (Bill 29, 2003). As such, it 
could be argued that the transferability of timber rights further strengthens sustained yield 
forest regulation and the conversion to a normal forest.   
In terms of contributing to the provincial economy, the forest industry is providing 
far less jobs today than it once did. In 1998, the British Columbia Council of Forest 
Industries (COFI) estimated that there were approximately 275,000 direct and indirect jobs in 
forestry in British Columbia (COFI, 1999). However, in its recent economic impact report, 
COFI estimated that there were approximately 145,800 direct and indirect jobs in 2013 
(COFI, 2015). Provincially, the employment figures provided by the British Columbia 
Council of Forest Industries (COFI) indicate a 47% decrease in jobs between 1998 and 2013. 
While COFI claims that the British Columbia forest industry is still important to the 
province’s economy, in terms of its contribution to the provincial GDP, the forest sectors 
contribution to that GDP has fallen nearly 48% since 1998, from $23 billion (in 2015 dollars) 
(COFI, 1999) to $12 billion (COFI, 2015). Given the reduced provision of employment and 
contribution to provincial GDP it could be argued that the forest industry will garner much 
less political capital going forward. However, given the entrenched commitment by the 
government of British Columbia to continue to support the forest industry, it is unlikely that 
the forest industry will lose its political capital anytime soon. 
The irony of sustained yield forest regulation in British Columbia is that it was not 
just about supporting communities, or mollifying the boom and bust business cycles of 
commodity markets; it is primarily about liquidating old growth in order to produce a normal 
forest, which is as idealistic as it is simplistic (Prudham, 2007). As the sustained yield forest 
regulation model has neither supported communities by offering stable employment, nor 
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mitigated the boom and bust cycles of commodity markets (Byron, 1978; Edenhoffer & 
Hayter, 2013a), it can be assumed that it only supports the liquidation project of producing a 
normal forest. Furthermore, the commitment to sustained yield forest regulation has 
entrenched the commitment of British Columbia to continue to support the forest industry 
(Prudham, 2007).   
One does not have to look very far back in time to see that the government of British 
Columbia is still committed to sustained yield forest regulation and the support of the forest 
industry. Consider the mountain pine beetle epidemic. A natural disaster of this magnitude 
has the potential to have significant environmental repercussions, yet, the government framed 
the mountain pine beetle epidemic as a timber supply problem, not an environmental one 
(Nelson, 2007). As well, the government also felt that it needed to create incentives for 
industry to utilize more of the low value timber profile by introducing stand as a whole 
stumpage appraisal (MFR, 2010d). 
It is interesting that the government felt it needed to provide incentives to the forest 
industry to utilize low quality timber, because according to a number of interviewees creating 
value from the residual products of lumber manufacturing is necessary for the business to 
remain economically viable (for more information see Theme 11: The Lumber 
Manufacturing Business in the previous chapter, pages 111-113). Of course, the utilization 
has to do with processing a log that has already been delivered to the mill, not the timber in 
the forest. But with increasingly economically marginal stands being harvested the forest 
industry will maximize utilization because it reduces costs. It could also be argued that the 
government provided these financial incentives not solely for the purpose of encouraging 
utilization, but so that licensees would harvest these economically marginal stands.  
 130 
The commitment of British Columbia to support the forest industry is within the 
mandate of the ministry responsible for forests and is embedded within the timber tenure and 
timber pricing systems (Rayner et al., 2001). The regime of sustained yield forest regulation 
has been in place nearly 70 years and any attempt to make any change it would be difficult as 
it is an institution in its own right (Prudham, 2007; Fréchette & Lewis, 2011). Not only are 
there substantial legislative changes to contend with (rules), but, the existing sub-sector, 
which is made up of the timber tenure and pricing systems, has so far been very effective at 
blocking any attempt to thwart the trajectory of supporting the forest industry (Rayner et al., 
2001). Further, the regime, which is rooted in ideology, is also a tenet of scientific forestry in 
British Columbia and, therefore, within the curriculum taught to those studying forestry. 
Students who go on to become forest professionals then have the position of elite expertise, 
occupying positions within the forest industry and government (Prudham, 2007). Finally, 
membership is restricted to government and the forest industry (Rayner et al., 2001).  
Perhaps the government of British Columbia has gone too far with placing forest 
management in the hands of the forest industry. Although government does set the objectives 
for managing components of forest ecosystems,6 it is constrained by the very legislation it 
has created to manage the forest resource and regulate the forest industry (Petersen & Stuart, 
2014). These legislative changes, that were influenced by neoliberal ideology (Hayter & 
Barnes, 2014; Young & Matthews, 2007), have granted a much more significant role to forest 
companies (Petersen & Stuart, 2014). Specifically, Bill 29 removed several major constraints 
of holding timber rights which effectively granted unfettered access to public timber to the 
wood manufacturing sector. These legislative changes may have also challenged the 
                                                 
6 The specific objectives set by government objectives can be found in the Forest and Range Practices Act 
under the Forest Planning and Practices Regulation, Part 2, Division 1. 
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institutional relationship between the provincial government and the forest industry. 
Although the provincial government still has the constitutional authority to make the rules 
that apply to provincial forests (Fréchette & Lewis, 2011), the power to decide what the rules 
are may have shifted to the forest industry (Petersen & Stuart, 2014).  
One thing that is clear: should the government of British Columbia wish to retract 
timber rights from existing timber tenures it would have to compensate the holders of those 
rights (Luckert et al., 2011). The compensation for the 8.2 million cubic metres of timber 
retracted through the Bill 28 allowable annual cut expropriation was budgeted to be $200 
million dollars (Niquidet, 2008). Given that the current volume held by replaceable forest 
licences in the province is 28.7 million cubic metres (FLNRO, 2016b) the compensation that 
would have to be paid for these existing timber rights would be unaffordable. It is more likely 
that the current regime of sustained yield forest regulation will have to run its course before 
any substantial changes can be made to British Columbia’s timber tenure and pricing systems. 
As Edenhoffer and Hayter (2013b) have stated, the current forest industry in the province’s 
Interior forest region is most certainly in the final stages of its life cycle. It is possible that 
like the Coast forest region (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a; Pearse, 2001), once the viable 
timber supply is exhausted, the forest corporations that currently dominate the forest industry 
in the Interior forest region will divest themselves from British Columbia to make way for 
the much smaller, but more diverse value-added timber processing sector. In the meantime, 
there most certainly will be further rounds of rationalization in the Prince George Timber 
Supply Area once the timber supply is drastically reduced.     
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  Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 7.1. Introduction 
 British Columbia’s choice to support the forest industry has had mixed results. On 
one hand the support likely enabled the investment and expansion of the forest industry into 
the northern interior of the province, providing good paying jobs and initial wealth. But, the 
choice to support the forest industry has played a significant role in creating the forest 
industry we see today, an industry dominated by a few companies. It is easy to criticize 
decisions that were made in the past when you have the benefit of hindsight and that was not 
my intent. Rather, my intent was to understand the context in which these decisions were 
made and some of the repercussions of those decisions. What my research demonstrates is 
that the current forest management regime in British Columbia is rooted in institutions that 
are driven by ideology. As such, both the present condition of the forest industry and the 
contextual condition limit the choices available for forest management in British Columbia 
moving forward.  
7.2. A Way Forward 
What will actually play out post mountain pine beetle in the Prince George Timber 
Supply Area remains to be seen. Whatever forest policies the government intends to use to 
combat the issues surrounding the dilemma of a reduced timber supply, it would also do well 
to remember to pay close attention to the regulatory environment of other competing forest 
jurisdictions and the influence of the global economy (Cashore et al., 2006). Meanwhile, with 
a declining timber supply post mountain pine beetle, Patriquin, Wellstead and White (2007) 
predict that negative impacts to communities will be unevenly distributed so their advice to 
government is to tailor the response to each community.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, decisions regarding the forest economy will be 
much more difficult to make going forward.  Perhaps small incremental changes in the 
current institutions will begin with a much smaller timber supply in the post mountain pine 
beetle reality. With insufficient timber supply to fuel their ambitions, perhaps companies will 
divest themselves from British Columbia as so many companies did in the Coastal forest 
region in the latter part of the 1990s (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a; Pearse, 2001). Maybe 
then, just like the Coastal forest region (Edenhoffer & Hayter, 2013a), the Interior forest 
region will support a much more robust value-added sector.  
7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
One limitation of my research was the scope of the case study that I chose. Both the 
size and complexity of the study area itself made data collection and analyses challenging. 
Yet, some analyses like the low stumpage rates from 2007 to 2011 for coniferous non-pine 
species would have benefited from a provincial scope. Another limitation was that I chose to 
only draw upon public information. My choice to use only public information limited the 
type of queries that I could generate for the Harvesting Billing System (HBS) which 
consequently constrained my analyses.  
There are several topics for future research that I can think of that can stem from this 
case study:  first, a study of the market pricing system in the Interior region of the province; 
second, a study of First Nations involvement in the forest industry post Tsilhqot’in decision 
and; third, a study of the ministry responsible for forests. A study of the market pricing 
system in the Interior from 2006 until post-mountain pine beetle that looks at the prices 
generated from auction and the appraised stumpage charged to licensees. This study would 
be difficult to accomplish because researchers would need to have access to government 
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databases so that timber harvest activity could be linked to the corresponding information 
supplied for the appraisal of that timber.  In light of the Tsilhqot’in decision, the government 
has committed itself to giving more timber rights to First Nations. It would be interesting to 
see what the outcome of this decision would be and what the outcomes are of business to 
business relationships that are formed between forest companies and First Nations. Finally, it 
would be fascinating to explore how the ministry responsible for forests has changed 
throughout time, particularly since 2001 and how these changes have impacted forest 
management in British Columbia.  
In closing, I am leaving the reader with an excerpt from a poet who explored his 
own life experiences growing up in the forest resource dependent town of Quesnel, British 
Columbia. In reading his personal account, I could see him wrestling with his morality as he 
struggled to come to grips with the economy of the forest sector and his concern for the 
impact that this economy has had on both human and wild environments. The story he shared 
spoke volumes to the collision that occurs between the exploitation of a resource, and the 
natural ecosystem and raises the question of how we as humans will survive if we are the 
cause of our own undoing. He is not alone in this quandary, and his words speak to me. 
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stage 6 
the working forest 
in the way dust collects on the bark of fallen trees 
in the way lending seems to outweigh return 
the swing of economies  
to extract and make ready 
waiting for the language  
to fall, to be weighed out 
caulks and leather hands on chain and teeth 
diesel smoke climbs and steel cables skid 
prescription and outcome 
are of different realities 
and the contexts move 
politics of the nonhuman 
washed out by the sound of economics 
stumpage left lingering 
as subtle violence 
and they don’t get time at the bargaining table 
when our wants out-weigh our needs 
consumption becomes a marker of status 
the nexus of parts 
as we work towards some tragic end 
non-reciprocal relationships emerge 
and debt is at the tip of every tongue 
on paper it suggests otherwise 
but still the forest remains 
unemployed  
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Appendix II – Event Time Line 1997 to 2011 
Year Local Mill Opening/Closing  * Mountain Pine Beetle (MPB) 
Epidemic ** 
Lumber Market Impacts *** Forest Policies **** Legislation **** 
1997     Asian Economic Crisis (Hoberg, 2010) Jobs & Timber Accord   
1998 Closure - Northwood P.G. Wood (Prince George)       Forest Act - Community 
Forest Agreements 
1999 Closure - Canfor Netherlands (Prince George)                                                      Forest Practices Code - 
Results Pilots 
2000  MPB - All Districts Lumber Prices Decline Protected Areas Strategy Nisga'a Treaty 
2001     Expiry of Softwood Lumber Agreement 
(SLA) (Zhang, 2007) 
MPB Action Plan   
2002     MPB substantial Vanderhoof 
 First AAC uplift to address 
MPBŧ 
SLA counter veiling Duties      
2003  Closure - Canfor Upper Fraser  (Prince George)                                          
 Upgrade - Canfor (Prince George) 
MPB substantial Prince George              
 
SLA counter veiling Duties  BCTS created 20% volume take 
back 
Bill 29 - BC Economic 
Revitalization Plan 
2004    MPB over run Vanderhoof                 
 Second AAC uplift to address 
MPBŧ 
New Softwood Lumber Agreement (Zhang, 
2007) 
MPB Action Plan Update                                           
 
Forest and Range Practices 
Act 
2005 Upgrade - Canfor Plateau (Vanderhoof)   US Housing Starts Peak (Hoberg, 2010) MPB Action Plan 2005-2010                                          
 
  
2006   MPB substantial Fort St. James    Interior Log Grades 
changed                                
 Market Pricing established 
in the Interior 
  
2007     High Canadian Dollar (Hoberg, 2010)     
2008  Closure - Winton Global Bear Lake (Prince 
George) 
 Closure - Canfor Plywood Plant (burns) (Prince 
George) 
  US Housing Crisis (Hoberg, 2010) Forestry Roundtable 
Established 
Regulations amended to 
include use of fibre for 
bioenergy  
  Closure - Pope & Talbot (Fort St. James)                                                    
 Closure - Stuart Lake Lumber  (Fort St. James) 
      
2009 Open - Conifex Mill (Fort St. James)   New Markets Accessed to China     
2010 Closure - Canfor Clear Lake (Prince George)    Lumber prices rise Cruise Based Appraisals   
2011 Closure - Canfor Rustad (Prince George)   AAC partition for Fort St. Jamesŧ       
* Source: Prince George Citizen 1999-2011 using UNBC Library Electronic Database 
** Source: BC Forest Health Survey - Pest Overview of Mountain Pine Beetle (1999-2007) GIS Layers available through the Provincial Land and Resources Data Warehouse 
*** Source: Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations website unless otherwise noted, http:www.gov.bc.ca/for 
**** Source: Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations website, http://www.gov.bc.ca/for 
ŧ Source: Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations website, https://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/tsa/tsa24/index.htm 
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Appendix III – Interview Guide 
Preamble:  I want to investigate how forest corporations have responded to the forest policy 
changes made by government in 2003 which were designed to revitalize the forest industry, 
and how this may have subsequently impacted the forest industry.  
I am currently employed with the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations, however, this research is in no way related to the duties of my employment, nor 
am I representing my employer. I am conducting this research independently and want to 
assure you that what you say during this interview will be kept confidential and that your 
anonymity will be protected.  
Before we begin the questions about the forest policy changes, I would like to find out more 
about you and the role you have played in the forest industry. I myself have worked in 
forestry for almost twenty years both in the private and public sectors.  
 
The personal information that you provide in Question 1 will be used by me for analysis 
purposes only and will not be documented so as to reveal your identity, rather it will allow 
me to establish your experience and background for the questions that will follow.  
 
 
1.  How long have you been involved in forestry?  
 
 What sorts of roles have you played? 
 
 How long have you worked in the Prince George Timber Supply Area? 
 
 What was your position from 2001 to 2003?  
 
 What is your position now? 
 
Preamble:  The Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003 was aimed at revitalizing the 
forest industry. The changes made to legislation enabled forest corporations to: consolidate 
and subdivide forest licenses, transfer agreements, and determine the number and location of 
timber processing facilities within British Columbia. 
 
2.  Were you directly or indirectly involved in the formation of the policies that 
ended up in the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003? 
 
 Were you in favour of these changes? 
 
o Why or why not? 
 
3.   In your opinion, what precipitated these changes to the legislation? 
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 What role, if any, do you think that globalization has played? 
 
 
 Do you think that there was pressure from the British Columbia forest 
industry or other governments to make these changes? 
 
 
o In other words, do you think that the Liberal government had much 
choice in the direction that they took with the legislation? 
 
CHECK IN POINT 
 
4.  Looking back over the last decade, do you think that these changes have influenced the 
way in which the forest industry has evolved? 
 
 
 If yes… 
 Can you give me some specific examples? 
 
Data I have already collected shows that there has been a decrease in the number of 
lumber manufacturing facilities within the PGTSA in the last 15 years, and that this 
manufacturing has been concentrated within the Prince George District. Further, BC 
employment statistics show a dramatic decline in both the forestry/logging sector and 
the wood product manufacturing sector over the past 15 years. 
 Given this data, can you comment on what makes the present forest industry 
stronger?  
 
o How do you think this translates for communities whose economies are 
reliant upon the forest industry? 
If no… 
 
 Can you elaborate on why you think the changes were not helpful to the forest 
industry? 
 
 Why do you think that this attempt to strengthen the forest industry was not 
successful?  
 
o What would have had to be different to make it successful? 
 
Data I have already collected shows that there has been a decrease in the number of 
lumber manufacturing facilities within the PGTSA in the last 15 years, and that this 
manufacturing has been concentrated within the Prince George District. Further, BC 
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employment statistics show a dramatic decline in both the forestry/logging sector and 
the wood product manufacturing sector over the past 15 years. 
 Given this data, can you comment on what makes the present forest industry 
stronger?  
 
o How do you think this translates for communities whose economies are 
reliant upon the forest industry? 
 
CHECK IN POINT 
 
5.  Have you witnessed any other changes over the past fifteen years in the forest industry 
that you believe are connected to these legislative changes? 
 
Preamble:  Despite that Prince George Timber Supply Area is one of the more diverse 
Timber Supply Areas in the central interior, it too is facing an imminent reduction to its 
Annual Allowable Cut because of the devastation caused by the mountain pine beetle and 
subsequent salvage logging. In 2012 a Special Committee on Timber Supply was struck in 
response to the Auditor General’s report which criticized the stewardship of timber in BC.  
 
 
6. In your opinion, do you think that stewardship of the timber resource has been 
compromised in any way by these legislative changes?   
 
 Can you elaborate? 
 
CHECK IN POINT 
 
Preamble:  Following the report released by the Special Committee on Timber Supply, the 
government tried to introduce legislation in the spring of 2013 that would enable volume 
based Forest Licences to be converted to area based Tree Farm Licences.    
 
 
7. In your opinion, what do you think motivated the government to attempt to 
make these changes?   
 
 Do you support the idea of converting Forest Licences to Tree Farm Licences? 
o Why or why not? 
 
 Who would benefit from a change like this? 
o Industry? Community? Government? 
 
8. Moving forward, what sort of changes do you think need to be made to forest policy 
to ensure the survival of the forest industry in British Columbia? 
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Preamble:  In closing, I would like to ask you a few more questions to ensure I have been 
thorough.   
 
9.  Is there anything else that you would like to tell me about that we haven’t already 
covered?  
 
10.  Is there anything that you would like to ask me? 
 
11. Are there other individuals who are knowledgeable in this subject that you think I 
should interview? 
 
Thank you for taking the time to do this interview with me and participate in this research. I 
will forward you a summary of the interview when I have completed the transcription so that 
you can review and edit anything that was said. Please don’t hesitate to contact me at any 
time if you have any questions or concerns about the interview, or the research process.   
  
 159 
Appendix IV – Information and Consent Form 
Research Topic:  Prosperity or Crisis? Examining the Efficacy of British Columbia’s Forest 
Policy Choices to Support the Forest Industry 
Disclosure:  I am currently employed with the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural 
Resource Operations, however, this research is in no way related to the duties of my 
employment, nor am I representing my employer. I am conducting this research 
independently. 
Purpose:  This research will examine the response by forest corporations to policy changes 
brought in by the Forest (Revitalization) Amendment Act 2003, which were aimed at 
revitalizing the forest industry. The changes made to legislation enabled forest corporations 
to, consolidate and subdivide forest licenses, transfer agreements, and determine the number 
and location of timber processing facilities within British Columbia. While these changes 
were designed to strengthen the forest industry by providing greater flexibility, and in turn 
benefit the citizens of British Columbia, these benefits have yet to be determined. 
How You Are Being Asked to Participate:  You are being asked to voluntarily participate 
in an interview with the researcher, Tammy Baerg. You are not being asked to represent your 
employer, rather you are being asked to express your own opinions based on your own 
observations. This will be a semi-structured interview that will be recorded using a digital 
recording device and will last approximately 45 minutes. In this interview you will be asked 
to answer several questions regarding the specific forest policy changes made by the Forest 
(Revitalization) Amendment Act in 2003 that were designed to assist the forest industry. You 
will also be asked your opinion as to what you have observed over time as a result of these 
changes.   
How You Were Chosen:  You were identified either by the researcher, Tammy Baerg, or by 
other local people, as someone with considerable knowledge of the Forest (Revitalization) 
Amendment Act 2003, as well as either the events that led up to it, or the events that followed 
as a result, or both.  
Anonymity and Confidentiality:  Neither your name, or any other information that may 
identify you, will be used in any of the material that is reported. As well, the information that 
you provide in this interview will be kept in strict confidence by the researcher. All written 
records will be kept in a locked cabinet in a room at the researcher’s residence that is only 
accessible to the researcher. All electronic records of written materials will be stored on the 
password protected computer that belongs to the researcher and it will be kept in a locked 
research space at UNBC.  As this research is part of completing a UNBC Master’s degree, 
the final thesis will be available to the public in the UNBC library. All information pertaining 
to this interview will be kept for two years after the publication of the researcher’s thesis, at 
which time they will be destroyed.   
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Potential Risks and Benefits:  This project has been reviewed by the UNBC Research 
Ethics Board.  As the sole researcher of this project, I have not identified any risks to your 
participation, nor has my supervisor. I believe that your contribution will provide a richer 
explanation to the research questions being asked and could very well serve to inform not 
only future forest policy, but future policies surrounding other natural resources.   
Voluntary Participation:  Your participation in this interview process is entirely voluntary 
and as such you have the right to discontinue the process at any time. You may also choose 
not to answer particular questions or may change your mind about how you answered. The 
interview will be audio recorded and the researcher will provide you with a summary for you 
to review. You will then have two weeks to provide the researcher with any changes that you 
want made. You have the right to end the interview at any time or withdraw from 
participating. Should you withdraw your participation you also may request that any 
information that you have provided be destroyed.   
Complaints:  If you have any complaints or concerns regarding your rights as a participant 
in this research please contact the UNBC Office of Research at (250) 960-6735 or by e-mail 
at reb@unbc.ca.  
Research Results:  Please advise the researcher if you would like a copy of the completed 
thesis and one will be provided to you. Also, should you have any questions regarding the 
research results please contact the researcher, Tammy Baerg, or her supervisor, Tracy 
Summerville.  
Contact Information:  
Researcher - Tammy Baerg, phone 778-349-4907, email baergt@unbc.ca   
Supervisor - Tracy Summerville, phone 250-960-6637, email  Tracy.Summerville@unbc.ca 
 
I have read the above description of the research and I understand the conditions of my 
participation.  My signature indicates that I agree to participate in an interview.  
 
___________________ _____________________        
 __________________ 
Name (please print)   Signature  




Appendix V – Template Analysis Themes/Questions 
Theme 1:  The Legislative Changes to Forest Policy in 2003 – Why did it happen? 
What precipitated the changes?  
What were the factors of influence? 
Were there external pressures on government to change? 
 
Theme 2: The Evolution of the Forest Industry – What were some of the consequences? 
Did the changes influence the evolution, if so how?  
Was this a good or bad thing and why? 
Theme 3: The Centralization and Capitalization of Manufacturing – What are the 
implications? 
What makes the industry stronger?  
What does this mean for forest dependent communities? 
Theme 4: Other Changes in the Industry – What other changes may have been an influence? 
What other changes have been observed over the last 15 years? 
Theme 5: Timber Stewardship – Did the policy changes influence behaviour by licensees? 
Has stewardship of the resource been compromised? 
Theme 6: The Conversion of Forest Licences to Tree Farm Licences – Recently proposed 
policy 
What motivated the proposal?  
Who would benefit from a change like this?  
Theme 7:  Future Policy Needs – What are changes that need to be promoted for the future? 
 What policies need to be pursued to ensure the survival of the forest industry? 
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Appendix VI – Content Analysis and Theme Development 
Subtheme Subtheme Indicators  
Allowable Annual Cut AAC, Allowable Annual Cut 
Area vs. Volume Tenure Area based, volume based 
Asian Markets China, Asia 
BC Timber Sales BC Timber Sales, BCTS, Market Pricing System 
Benefits benefit(s), beneficiary, beneficial 
Bottom Line bottom line, cost, reduce, reduce cost, profit, revenue 
Business business(es) 
Business Cycle business cycle, cycle, cyclical, recession, market 
downturn, stability, stabilize, unstable, destabilize 
Business Decision business decision, rationalize, rationalization 
Capital Investment capital, mechanization, technology, technological, 
invest, investments, upgrades 
Carbon carbon 
Centralization centralization, centralize 
Choice choice 
Community community, communities, First Nation communities 
Community Forests community forest, CFA 
Compensation compensation, compensate 
Competition compete, competition, competitive 
Consolidations and Transfers consolidation(s), consolidate, transfer(s), 
amalgamate, amalgamation(s) 
Control by Community control(s) 
Control by Government control(s), cut control 
Control by Industry control(s) 
Cooperation cooperation, cooperate, working together, share, 
partnership, partner 
Crown Revenue stumpage, revenue 
Dimensional Lumber board, lumber, commodity, commodity lumber, 
commodity mill, product 
Diversity diversity, diverse 
Economic Drivers supply, demand, trade-off(s), price 
Economic Efficiency efficiency, economic, economically 
Economy economy 
Employment job(s), employment, unemployment 
First Nations Land Title Tsilhquo'tin decision, William’s decision, First 
Nations 
First Nations Participation First Nations 
Forest Industry industry, forest sector, forest industry  
Forest Licence Forest Licence, licence,  
Forest Service Forest Service, Ministry 
Global Marketplace global, globalization, globe 
Government Crown, government 
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Subtheme Subtheme Indicators 
Green Timber green timber, green wood 
Harvesting cut, cutting, log, logging, harvest, harvesting,  
Higher End Products plywood, peeler, glulam 
Ideology ideology, belief, philosophy, ideologically 
Independent Mills family owned mills, independent mills 
Investor investor, investment(s) 
Labour Force labour, work force, worker(s), employee(s), 
employer(s),skills, skilled, knowledge, logger(s), 
logging contractor(s) 
Land Use Planning LRMP, land use plan, land use planning 
Liability liability, liabilities 
Liberal Party Liberals,  
Log log 
Log Market log market 
Logistics logistics 
Lumber Manufacturing cut, mill, manufacture, milled, milling, volume, 
product(s), producer, miller, production, produce  
Major Licensees licensee(s), majors, company, companies 
Markets market(s), trade 
Mid-term Timber Supply mid-term timber supply, mid-term 
Mountain Pine Beetle mountain pine beetle, beetle, pine beetle 
NDP/Social Credit Parties NDP, Social Credit 
Operating Area operating area(s) 
Plans and Planning plan(s), strategy, strategic, 
Policy legislation, legislative, bill, regulation, regulatory, 
regulate, policy 
Public public, tax payer(s) 
Relationship relationship(s) 
Residual Products pellet, green energy, bioenergy, pulp, pulp mill(s),  
Salvage salvage  
Sawmill mill(s)/ sawmill(s) 
Shareholder shareholder, corporation, publically traded 
Silviculture silviculture, timber production, invest, investment(s), 
stewardship 
Social Engineering social engineer(ing)/licence/net/choice/contract 
Social Licence appurtenancy, social 
engineer/licence/net/choice/contract 
Specific Policy Forest Act, FRPA, Results-based, Code, Forest 
Practices Code 
Stakeholder stakeholder  
Stewardship stewardship, sustainable  
Tenure Reform tenure reform  
The Land Base Land base, landscape 
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Subtheme Subtheme Indicators 
State of the Current Industry adaptive, adapt, flexible, flexibility, strong, stronger, 
viable, viability, efficient, efficiency, effective 
Timber Allocation AAC, cut, quota, allocation 
Timber Profile timber profile 
Timber Rights rights, security, secure, certainty, uncertainty, tenure  
Timber Supply timber, supply, volume, fibre, wood 
Transportation transport, railway, rail, rail line, truck, trucking, 
shipping  
Tree Farm Licences TFL, Tree Farm Licence, area based 
United States Market American, States, United States, U.S., Softwood 
Lumber Agreement/Disagreement 
Value-added Sector value, value-added, niche market(s), custom, 
customer, product(s) 
Woodlot Licences Woodlot 
 
Subtheme Assigned Value Interview Question 
Allowable Annual Cut Specific Direct 
Area vs. Volume Tenure Specific Direct 
Asian Markets Specific Indirect 
BC Timber Sales Specific Indirect 
Benefits Specific Direct 
Bottom Line Specific Indirect 
Business Specific Direct 
Business Cycle Specific Indirect 
Business Decision Specific Direct 
Capital Investment Specific Direct 
Carbon Specific Indirect 
Centralization Specific Indirect 
Choice General Direct 
Community Specific Direct 
Community Forests Specific Direct 
Compensation Specific Indirect 




Control by Community Specific Indirect 
Control by Government Specific Indirect 
Control by Industry Specific Indirect 
Cooperation Specific Indirect 
Crown Revenue Specific Indirect 
Dimensional Lumber Specific Indirect 
Diversity Specific Indirect 
 165 
Subtheme Assigned Value Interview Question 
Economic Drivers General Indirect 
Economic Efficiency Specific Direct 
Economy Specific Indirect 
Employment Specific Direct 
First Nations Land Title Specific Direct 
First Nations Participation Specific Direct 
Forest Industry General Direct 
Forest Licence Specific Direct 
Forest Service General Indirect 
Global Marketplace Specific Direct 
Government General Direct 
Green Timber Specific Direct 
Harvesting General Indirect 
Higher End Products Specific Indirect 
Ideology Specific Indirect 
Independent Mills Specific Indirect 
Investor Specific Indirect 
Labour Force Specific Indirect 
Land Use Planning Specific Indirect 
Liability Specific Indirect 
Liberal Party Specific Direct 
Log Specific Indirect 
Log Market Specific Indirect 
Logistics Specific Indirect 
Lumber Manufacturing General Indirect 
Major Licensees General Direct 
Markets General Indirect 
Mid-term Timber Supply Specific Direct 
Mountain Pine Beetle Specific Direct 
NDP/Social Credit Parties Specific Indirect 
Operating Area Specific Indirect 
Plans and Planning General Indirect 
Policy General Direct 
Public General Indirect 
Relationship Specific Indirect 
Residual Products Specific Indirect 
Salvage Specific Direct 
Sawmill General Direct 
Shareholder Specific Indirect 
Silviculture Specific Direct 
Social Engineering Specific Indirect 
Social Licence Specific Direct 
Specific Policy General Direct 
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Subtheme Assigned Value Interview Question 
Stakeholder Specific Indirect 
Stewardship Specific Direct 
Tenure Reform Specific Indirect 
The Land Base General Indirect 
State of the Current Industry Specific Direct 
Timber Allocation Specific Indirect 
Timber Profile Specific Indirect 
Timber Rights Specific Indirect 
Timber Supply Specific Direct 
Transportation Specific Indirect 
Tree Farm Licences Specific Direct 
United States Market Specific Direct 
Value-added Sector Specific Indirect 
Woodlot Licences Specific Indirect 
 
Theme Absolute Number of 
Occurrences of Subtheme 
Indicators, All Groups 
Factors that Influence Business Decisions 202 
The Competitive Log Market 170 
The Disposition of Timber Rights 129 
The Lumber Manufacturing Business 117 
The British Columbia Economy 87 
Social Engineering 69 
The Social Contract 43 
Control 22 
 
Theme 12: The British Columbia Economy 






Business Cycle 30% 30% 40% 
Economy 32% 35% 32% 
 
Theme 13: Social Engineering 






NDP/Social Credit Parties 50% 17% 33% 
Social Engineering 28% 44% 28% 
Ideology 17% 50% 33% 
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Theme 14: The Social Contract 






Land Use Planning 4% 46% 50% 
Stakeholder 0% 13% 88% 
Woodlot Licences 22% 78% 0% 
 
Theme 15: Control 






Control by Community 20% 20% 60% 
Control by Government 86% 14% 0% 





No Emergent Theme 






Asian Markets 19% 57% 24% 
Cooperation 32% 47% 21% 
Diversity 37% 42% 21% 
Independent 32% 21% 47% 
Relationship 58% 25% 17% 
Investor 67% 22% 11% 
Liability 0% 75% 25% 
Carbon 50% 0% 50% 
